Результаты поиска
Поиск по этому сайту
Найдено 989 результатов с пустым поисковым запросом
- Stefan Berger. Thoughts on Serguey Ehrlich’s "Memory, Identity and Imagination"
06.04.2023 Anyone reading Ehrlich’s long essay on the relationship between memory, identity and imagination will be deeply impressed by the wide range of reading that went into it and the deep thinking that is emerging from it. He is attempting to relate memory to the guidance of behavior and argues that memory is tightly related to questions of identity and the role of imagination. All three together, memory, identity and imagination rely on a range of narrative templates (here he draws strongly on James Wertsch’s ‘schematic narrative templates’), of which Ehrlich picks out three in particular, the fairy tale narrative, which he sees most closely associated with family, kinship and clan identities, the heroic myth narrative, prominent in national identities, and the myth of self-sacrifice narrative that he associates with a vision of global humanity. He sees those narratives as primal phenomena which help to understand the history of human evolution. His is certainly an ambitious argument, and I am not really in a position to comment fully on all aspects of his intricate argument but draw from it a long list of interesting things that I will have read to engage more fully with what he presents here. The emphasis on storytelling and narrativity in the construction of memory and identity and the formation of imagination is one that is emphasized by Ehrlich, and here I concur entirely with his argument. [1] Yet, I would add that it is not enough to look at narrations but also to take into account practices. Practice theory has for some time now pointed to the weaknesses of just looking at discourses. [2] Hence I would urge everyone analyzing memory, identity and imagination not just to examine discourses but also the practices that are aligned to these discourses. Drawing on Reinhart Koselleck’s conceptual ideas around ‘the space of experience’ and ‘the horizon of expectation’, Ehrlich is, like Koselleck, connecting the former with memory (although Koselleck connected it to history, something also acknowledged by Ehrlich), but whereas Koselleck is linking the latter to hope, Ehrlich finds imagination better suited as a concept. Memory and imagination, he goes on to argue, are tightly interlinked in the way they both work together and impact on identities in any given present. Memory, identity and imagination are set up by Ehrlich as a triangle where each end of the triangle influences the other ends. I believe that at the bottom of his intriguing argument lies a normative desire that derives from strongly contemporary concerns. These include fear of the future in relation to either a nuclear or an environmental Armageddon, a deep skepticism about the values of industrial modernity, a dislike of nationalism and its terrible side effects, like wars, genocides and forms of ethnic cleansing, as well as a dislike of capitalism and its logic of utter greed. He follows Alvin Toffler in declaring that industrial modernity came to end with the late twentieth century and that instead we are now in an ‘information society’. What is largely ignored in this argument is, however, that we are still living in a capitalist society which connects industrial modernity and ‘information society’. The break therefore might not be as substantial as posited by Ehrlich. I believe that Ehrlich and I share a broadly left-wing normative political agenda. We are both looking for an ecologically and socially responsible world order, and he sees hope, in this respect, in what he describes as ‘narodniks of the global scale’ towards the end of his long essay. What he means is ‘the fast growing volunteer movement, which has crossed national borders’ and seeks to build a better world. I share his support and enthusiasm for these new ‘narodniks’ and I applaud them wholeheartedly. If Ehrlich and I share a common political vision, what about the epistemological basis of such a vision? Here I fear I am little more skeptical of the framework which Ehrlich constructs in his extremely learned and cogently argued essay. He wants to inspire the intellectuals of the twenty-first century to return to the age of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment and find there inspiration for a universal vision of humanity that will be able to overcome the nationalism that in Russia and Ukraine is currently fueling a cruel war that has pushed Ehrlich into exile. Whilst I have certainly been a strong critic of historiographical nationalism in my own work, [3] I am skeptical about universalism and humanism being able to serve as the guiding lights out of the darkness of both industrial modernity and nationalism. We should not forget the fundamental insight of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno about the ‘dialectic of the Enlightenment’ gave birth to its own monsters. [4] Not only do we know now that the historical humanists could also be nationalists, racists and religious zealots, the language of humanism has often been used in order to postulate a set of values and ideals that were very culturally specific and yet, by saying that they were universal and related to what it was to be a human, they in fact had a totalizing dimension that served various forms of liberal colonialism and imperialism. The ideology of humanism and universalism thus needs to be deconstructed just as much as the languages of nationalism, progress and modernity. Humanism and universalism served as vehicles for the construction of essentialized collective forms of identity as did the other grand narratives of which Ehrlich is so justly skeptical. As I have tried to argue in my recent book on History and Identity , the close link between historical writing and the construction of essentialized forms of identity, be it national, class, gender, ethnic or other forms of identity, has led to the construction of illiberal, totalizing and exclusionary forms of identity. [5] Instead, I follow Stuart Hall’s writings on identity in arguing that we should replace identity with identification, as such identification on the one hand recognizes the need for collective forms of identity whilst on the other hand avoids their essentialization and points to the changing and constructed nature of such identities. [6] They are constructed for a political purpose and become an argument in political contests, but they are invariably fluid and fuzzy. Such a reconceptualization of identity as identification allows forms of historical writing that are far more self-reflexive about the construction of collective identities and shun the essentialisms that previous generations of historians have employed - keen to write for the establishment of essentialist collective identities. Working with ‘identification’ rather than ‘identity’ draws us to a range of thinkers that have been problematizing essentialized collective identities from the 1960s onwards. These include Hayden White’s denial of the scientificity of historical writing, Michel de Certeau’s interest in the re-appropriation of cultural meanings, Michel de Foucault’s attention to power imbalances in knowledge formation, Jean-François Lyotard’s critique of ‘grand narratives’, Peter L. Berger’s and Thomas Luckmann’s theory of social constructivism, Pierre Bourdieus thinking around ‘cultural reproduction’ and ‘social habitus’, Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony, Jacques Lacan’s skepticism of ‘fixed identities’, Jacques Derrida’s reading of texts as sites of contestation, Edward Said’s hostility towards binary oppositions when it comes to the construction of collective identities, Homi Bhaba’s notions of ‘hybridity’, and Frederick Coopers’ and Rogers Brubaker’s critique of reified collective identities. Whilst this is by no means an exhaustive list, I mention these examples, as they have all had major impact on the way historians today write history in relation to forms of identification – which I try to show in relation to different sub-fields of historical writing in History and Identity . [7] Ehrlich also refers to my own work next to that of Wulf Kansteiner and others to point out that many historians have now argued that the border between history and memory is a porous one. But what he concludes from that is, if I understand him correctly, that we need to create a firm line of division between those scholars adhering to what he calls ‘group memory narratives’ and those adhering to the ‘universal narratives of science’. For me this sounds like resurrecting ‘scientificity’ [8] through the back door and losing the insights about the relativity and normativity of all historical knowledge. The point about all historical narratives is that they can pretend to be as ‘scientific’ as they want, they will invariably carry messages that are inflected by normative values and identifications. Adhering to universally valid scientific methods is no protection against the link between narratives of the past and identifications. Hence, in my view, Ehrlich’s attempt to recreate a firmer border between history and memory is bound to fail, but what might indeed be useful is a sustained reflection on what we are actually comparing. As Wulf Kansteiner has recently pointed out there is, on the one hand, the past and the memory of the past, and then there is, on the other, memory studies that studies how the past was remembered through different media (one of which has been historical writing), and historical studies which studies the past in itself. I would argue with Kansteiner that memory studies has the far easier task, namely to make statements about how (mostly differently) a past was remembered by different memory actors. Historians have a far more difficult task, because how the past actually was is impossible to infer from what is left to us from the past and because each and every author approaches these remnants with a set of normative ideas and choices that invariably colour their readings of those remnants. [9] Unbiased history is therefore as impossible as objective scientific history. There is then, in my opinion, no ‘universal and objective perspective of the historical discipline’ that can be juxtaposed neatly to biased historical writing. The emotiveness with which Ehrlich seeks to resurrect objectivity and scientificity in historical writing carries much of the apocalyptic and eschatological power that also informed other doctrines of salvation in the past, from Christianity to Communism. Their close links to oppression should be a warning sign not to search for new truthful utopias. If Ehrlich writes: ‘By searching for truth, he/she [the historian] fearlessly destroys the nation-state memory, identity, and imagination and creates instead the global ones. Therefore, he/she brings the triumph of the global information civilization closer.’, it is indeed reminiscent of earlier constructions of historians as prophets – prophets of nationalism, of liberalism, of progress, of the classless society. The fact that they are now supposed to be prophets of a universal humanity does not bode well for the future of those prophecies, I fear. The proximity of Ehrlich’s argument to another form of scientificity is underlined by his use of metaphors from physics, the key precise natural science. Thus he calls memory, identity and imagination ‘atoms’ of a larger ‘molecule’ and describes these ‘atoms’ in terms of having a ‘triple-layered narrative “nucleus”’. ‘The core of “nucleus”’, according to him ‘consists of three base mythic narratives’ which themselves contain ‘”quarks” or “fundamental particles”, which he identifies as ‘self-sacrifice, others-sacrifice, and booty’. Yet memory studies and the historical discipline are not ‘sciences’, and, of course, the exactness of objectivity of the natural sciences has also long been in doubt, thanks to Albert Einstein and Werner Heisenberg and their successors. There is then, I would argue, no way of going back to the scientificity of the past. We are firmly in the realm of anthropological knowledge production, when Ehrlich argues that these ‘”fundamental particles” represent condensed experience of millions of years of humankind evolution’ – a long line of continuity which I eye with huge skepticism. I find it even more dubious to claim that ‘they still powerfully govern our behavior even in situations when we are not able to realize that’. He draws on Sigmund Freud for this argument, but if this is the case, who then can realize that they govern our behavior, i.e. who stands outside the process of non-recognition and why? If I have to admit skepticism towards his scientifistic metaphors, I am also wary of his use of organic metaphors when it comes to describing his ‘structure of behaviour’ as ‘a process of temporal changes’. Self-sacrifice, others-sacrifice and booty are to Ehrlich the ‘seeds’ from which ‘societal plants’ grow. Here he draws on Oswald Spengler. There is of course, in the history of nationalism, a massive tradition of using organicist metaphors to describe the growth, flowering and death of nations. Critics of this organicist understanding of nation have pointed out that it is naturalizing processes that are socially constructed. The combination of scientificity and organicity in Ehrlich’s argument multiplies this tendency to naturalize things that are always situational, contingent and changeable and usually the result of power contests of different social groups in society. There is no unavoidable primalism in history, only change, contestation and diverse constructions of space, time and identity. By calling something primal we are again naturalizing it and making it an anthropological universal and constant, which, in my estimation, do not exist outside the construction of an increasingly smaller group of anthropologists today. By referring to ‘booty’ as ‘primal trauma’, Ehrlich is making a historically dubious (because hard to evidence) link between ‘the consequences of a trauma of early humankind’ and ‘the omnipresent atrocities of Modernity’. According to him ‘the cannibalistic complex of our Paleolithic ancestors is the primal trauma of humankind, which is still not realized and hence is not worked through.’ I find it hard to believe that we have to go back all of the way to the Paleolithic to understand historically specific atrocities in the modern world. Close attention to the specificities of historical situations, actors, events and to interests, power constellations and contingencies are in my view better able to explain those atrocities than any vague reference to ‘primal trauma’ and ‘cannibalism’ in the Paleolithic. Overall then, I find in Ehrlich’s argument too much universalizing psychology and anthropology and too little specific history and sociology. I doubt whether we as academics have to work ‘through the “metaphysical guilt” (Karl Jaspers) of the Stone Age’ in order to understand modern-day atrocities. It would lead us into a cul-de-sac and might well draw attention away from those often very specific individuals who have been guilty of committing atrocities. To Ehrlich, ‘others-sacrifice’ is a ‘primal religion’ – once again he refers to Freud’s speculations about religion and mixes those ideas with insights from anthropology on cannibalism and sacrificing rituals. Like with the ‘primal trauma’ of ‘booty, ‘others sacrifice’ thus becomes something that is naturalized in human evolution and allegedly has universal qualities rooted in a kind of deep history. Ehrlich draws again on Spengler to describe ‘self sacrifice as “the prime phenomenon of all past and future world-history”’. It is another totalizing statement that, when applied, eradicates diversity, plurality and contestation which stand at the heart of historical debates on identity, and inform both memory and imagination. He constructs ‘self-sacrifice’ as binary other to ‘others-sacrifice’. Self-sacrifice, he contends, is present in the ‘construction of every human community’, and ‘the starting point of all three basic myth narratives: the fairy tale, the heroic myth, and the myths of self-sacrifice’. I am not an expert in comparative religious history, but I find his claim hard to believe that Christianity is the only religion exhibiting forms of self-sacrifice. But it is this claim which allows Ehrlich to argue that Christian values were at the heart of the rise of Western civilization to the dominant position in the world. Without referencing Max Weber’s protestant ethic, [10] there is, like in Weber, an attempt to ascribe some kind of superiority to (in Weber’s case Protestant) Christianity over other religions, and, by implications, superiority of Western civilizations over other. Hence it is no surprise that he argues that the current decline of the west and western values is due to the ‘process of “dewesternization” of the West itself’, which includes the abandonment of the former willingness to live according to the ‘spirit of self-sacrifice’. Whilst this seems to be directed at well-established, and in my view, well-argued postcolonial attacks on the west, [11] there is nowhere in his piece an in-depth engagement with postcolonialism which might indeed be necessary if Ehrlich intends to defend the west against its many critics. Ehrlich’s seems to be a very linear understanding of history, where we move from a ‘limited identity-solidarity’of kin, clan and tribe from pre-history to the medieval world, based on the ‘myth of booty’ to nationalism, based on ‘others-sacrifice’ to the future of universalism, based on ‘self-sacrifice’ that has the quality of saving mankind from nationalism, wars, environmental disasters, capitalism and whatever else threatens humanity in the present. Whilst this is undoubtedly an attempt to create a positive utopia, it might very well be wishful thinking and, at worst, a dangerous way of constituting new essentialisms and totalizing thoughts. Ehrlich is looking for a pathway from ‘savagery’ to ‘civilization’, but I am not sure whether he has found it, or indeed, whether it is at all findable, or whether we can only try, in every historical situation, to stand on the side of those stemming themselves against ‘savagery’ without ever being entirely sure whether we are standing on the right side of history. This doubt also acts as an important reminder that we need to accept other positions than our own in a democratic forum where those positions can be exchanged, as long as our adversaries also accept the democratic forum itself. The self-sacrifice that Ehrlich sees as the foundation for a future better society, is not a collective one, but an individual one. He sees the ‘global world of information civilization’ as a ‘concert of billions of sovereign individuals’, ‘unique persons’ who create universality through the rejection of universal collective identities. Whilst acceptance of unique personalities and sovereign individuals is no doubt a good thing, we may, of course, ask, how unique personalities actually are in the highly commodified and commercialized worlds of late capitalism, and we also may ask how sovereign the individual actually is in a world in which forms of identification seem to be of high continued importance to many of these individuals. Furthermore, is not the vision of sovereign individuals quite close to the neoliberal utopia so famously formulated by Margaret Thatcher in the words: ‘There is no such thing as society.’ [12] Is the solution to all of the problems of our contemporary world really individualism? Or is it rather a more playful form of identification with particular collectives leading to political engagement on behalf of those collectives in a liberal-democratic forum of decision making that reflects on the power inequalities within such fora and seeks to implement mechanisms countering such power inequalities? Ehrlich’s individualistic universalism is critical of Chantal Mouffe’s notion of the need of collective identities that will always work on an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mechanism. Instead he posits that the individualized universal identities of the future would not have an ‘outside’ as they no longer have an ‘inside’. I have to admit that I find that perspective rather frightening, as it resembles to me a new totalizing framework where there are no legitimate conflicts of interest anymore. Such a global identity to me is a dangerous fiction which may well hide very specific interests, as does the liberal-democratic universalist and cosmopolitan ethos that we find in many cosmopolitan thinkers. [13] They have a very clear ‘other’, of course – something they call totalitarianism. Anyone not subscribing to the cosmopolitan ideology of human rights and victimhood-centred memory will quickly find themselves as ‘other’ with whom no communication is possible any more. The consensus-oriented nature of a cosmopolitan deliberative democracy is as willing to exclude as antagonistic Schmidtian or Lucacsian notions of the political, even if they are arguably far less deadly. Ehrlich’s ‘dream for an optimistic future’ might work in the same direction as Francisco Goya’s idea that ‘the sleep of reason produces monsters’, but don’t we know that reason itself is very capable of producing monsters of its own? In line with his own universalist ambitions, Ehrlich is very much in favour of the transnational and transcultural turn in memory studies and with their championing of diverse forms of cosmopolitanism, which is, of course, also rooted in universalist aspirations. He thus hails the transnational turn in memory studies as being ‘grounded in the recognition that the phenomenon of national memory … less and less corresponds to the “globalizing’ reality. Present-day memory does not fit into the container of the nation state.’ I wonder whether the rise of deadly nationalisms around the world over the last two decades has not shown this to be an illusion. Of course, there is a globalizing reality, but there is also a nationalizing one. There is not just one reality, but several temporal and spatial frames working alongside each other. Hence there are different forms of memory, national and transnational among them, which relate to different forms of constructed ‘reality’. We need to take all of them seriously, analytically and normatively. This is also where Aleida Assmann’s recent critique of the transnational turn in nationalism studies is important, for it takes seriously the national memory and its huge implications in the present. [14] Where I would contradict her is that the left has to present a national countermemory to the right. In other words, analytically it remains important to understand national memory, but normatively we should continue to deconstruct it and instead construct a plurality of possible national memories and transnational memories that have the power to counter the nationalist memoryscapes of the right an empower visions on the left for greater social justice and a more equal distribution of wealth in the world. Ehrlich’s plea to create ‘an effective pantheon of global culture’s creators’ (using Shakespeare as an example) is highly reminiscent of Friedrich Meinecke’s call at the end of the Second World war to found Goethe societies in Germany. [15] The universalist genius of literary greats was to guide his compatriots after the ‘German catastrophe’ of National Socialism. We may indeed ask if this is not a rather helpless form of humanism seeing in high culture a panacea for the ills of the world. Without wanting to denigrate cultural interventions in the world past and present, it is not enough to appeal to idealistic values and beliefs in order to find the pathway to a better world. We need to contest political power in an attempt to frame a politics in line with our beliefs in a better future and we have to face resistance of those who envision the future world differently from us. This is the basis of an agonistic politics, championed by Mouffe, and it is also the basis of agonistic memory work, championed by Cento Bull and Hansen and those who have adopted and adapted their initial theoretical frame. [16] I find very interesting in this respect Ehrlich’s engagement with Mouffe’s agonism and his use of the example of Winston Churchill and how he is a hero to his ‘own’ British people (or at least most of them, for in the South Wales valleys, they might also think differently about him), and a villain to many in Greece, Kenia and India. A very interesting project would be one that looks in detail at the aggressor in history and memory. Such a project would invariably find that many aggressors are at the same time heroes, depending on which (national) perspective one takes on the person in question. The aggressor is a typically transnational figure in history and memory, yet he is also a strongly national memory resource for those promoting nationalist forms of history and memory. The image of the aggressor can thus not be fixed to that of perpetrator or hero. He is in fact always both, in different memory contexts, spatially and temporally. [17] However, agonistic perspectives would show the political contest in the uses of heroes/ villains and the political interests behind the diverse constructions of heroes/ villains in historical aggressors. It does not aim, as Ehrlich seems to believe, at a ‘conflictual consensus’ for it is skeptical of any consensus that would bring political contestation to an end. Of course, Ehrlich is quite right in pointing out with reference to contemporary Russia that from the political perspective of the left, political contests may indeed be lost to the political right. That is the nature of political contests and has to be accepted in liberal democratic fora for political debate. However, Russia does not present such a forum, for it is a strongly authoritarian state. For agonism to work, the liberal democratic state frame is an absolute precondition. And within that frame everyone has to accept the other as adversary, worthy of debating with, and not as political enemy to be destroyed. This is the only form of binary or ‘us’ versus ‘them’ construction that also agonism needs to uphold. Overall, anyone reading Ehrlich’s long essay will come away from it deeply inspired to engage with a range of theoretical and philosophical issues that are extremely relevant to our present condition. I am in deep sympathy with many of the ideas and thoughts put forward by him, I still have to engage more fully with several of the arguments he makes on the basis of reading what he has already read, but I have also indicated above, where I beg to differ from his arguments and line of reasoning. I hope that this might be the beginning of a fruitful dialogue on issues that should concern every practicing historian and memory studies scholar today. [1] On the importance of narrative theory for diverse forms of historiography compare Stefan Berger, Nicola Brauch and Chris Lorenz (eds), Analyzing Historical Narratives. On Academic, Popular and Educational Framings of the Past, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2021. [2] Gerd Spaargaren, Don Weenink, and Machiel Lamers (eds), Practice Theory and Research. Exploring the Dynamics of Social Life, London: Routledge, 2016. [3] Stefan Berger (with Christoph Conrad), The Past as History. National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Modern Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. [4] Max Horheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of the Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002. The work was first published in German in Amsterdam in 1947. [5] Stefan Berger, History and Identity. How Historical Theory has Shaped Historical Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. [6] Stuart Hall, ‚Introduction: Who Needs Identity?’, in: Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (eds), Questions of Cultural Identity, London: Sage, 1996, pp. 1 – 17; also: Stuart Hall, ‘The Question of Cultural Identity’, in: Stuart Hall, David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds), Modernity and its Futures, Cambridge: Polity, 1992, pp. 274 – 316. [7] See footnote 5 above; I treat all of these thinkers at greater depth in chapter one of my book. [8] Heiko Feldner, ‚The New Scientificity in Historical Writing around 1800’, in: Stefan Berger, Heiko Feldner and Kevin Passmore (eds), Writing History: Theory and Practice, 3rd edn, London; Bloomsbury, 2020, pp. 7 – 24. [9] Wulf Kansteiner has been developing these ideas in the context of the Oxford Handbook of Memory Studies that he is currently preparing for publication together with Tina Morina. I am grateful that he allowed me to draw on those ideas in Stefan Berger, ‘History Making and Ethics – an Integral Relationship?’, in: History and Theory 62:1 (2023), pp. ?? - ??. [add when it has been published]. [10] Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London: Routledge, 2012. Weber published this much-quoted work first in German in two subsequent journal articles in 1904 and 1905, from which they were later put together as a book. [11] In my view still unsurpassed is Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Since then, of course, a whole library of books has appeared that has followed Chakarabarty’s call in decentering the west. [12] Thatcher’s words are often quoted, but in the same text she goes on to refer to family, and neighbours as concrete examples of how people care for other people. So even an alleged dyed-in-the-wool neoliberal like Thatchter was not denying the need of individuals to form relationships with others. [13] Whilst I find Chantal Mouffe‘s critique of Habermas and other thinkers of a deliberative democracy and their universalism quite inspiring, I recognize that there are also intriguing ideas about the development of cosmopolitanism that includes notions of open-ended debate and radical plurality. For Chantal Mouffe, see idem, Agonistics. Thinking the World Politically, Cambridge: Polity, 2013. Very inspiring on a different kind of cosmopolitanism is Paul Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.i [14] Aleida Assmann, Die Wiedererfindung der Nation: warum wir sie fürchten und warum wir sie brauchen, Munich: C.H. Beck, 2020. [15] Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections, New York: Beacon Press, 1963. The text was first published in German shortly after the end of the Second World War in 1946. [16] Anna Cento Bull and Hans Lauge Hansen, ‘On Agonistic Memory’, in: Memory Studies 9:4 (2016), pp. 390 – 404. [17] I am drawing here on an exchange of ideas about historical aggressors with Thomas Maissen, Ilaria Porciani, Balazs Trencsenyi, Diana Mishkova and Macjej Gorny, with whom I am applying for a project on historical aggressors to the Mercedes Benz Foundation.
- Tyler Wertsch. Remembering the Future: Imagination, Memory, and the Possibilities of Games as Memory
Abstract : The author responds to Serguey Ehrlich’s essay, “Memory, Identity, and Imagination: The Structure of Behaviour from the Perspective of Memory Studies,” and explores how imagination is an integral but often overlooked facet of memory studies. The author is particularly interested in how imagination is invoked to restructure collective memory of the past into predictions for the future that are rooted in remembering, and how this process is carried out in popular video games. The author closes with some reflections on Ehrlich’s assertions on the challenge nation-states pose to self-sacrifice and collective action int eh face of unprecedented global concerns such as climate change. Keywords : Memory Collective Memory, Imagination, Future Thinking, Video Games, Nationalism, Synthetic Memory, American Memory, Cold War, War on Terror, Call of Duty Author Biography: Tyler Wertsch is a PhD candidate in the American Culture Studies program at Bowling Green State University in Ohio, USA. After living and working in Japan, Korea, Mongolia, and Azerbaijan, he pursued his MA and PhD in order to explore the complex relationships between nationalism, identity, memory, and media. Serguey Ehrlich’s “Memory, Identity, and Imagination: The Structure of Behaviour from the Perspective of Memory Studies” is a creative, expansive application of memory theory that grapples with the challenge of national memory as a primary lens of remembering and explores why we must break free from this pattern. Drawing upon structuralist and Russian formalist patterns of analysis in the vein of Claude Levi-Strauss and Vladimir Propp, Ehrlich identifies patterns of narrativization (“self-sacrifice,” “other-sacrifice,” and “booty”). His meditations on the limits of nation-based remembering are timely and important, as humanity faces a number of unprecedented existential threats that are somewhat novel, climate change being chief among them. The capacity for us to remember as a species rather than as tribes or nations is a skill we must develop quickly, and while Ehrlich’s vision is utopian on this point, he no less correct for stating it. The true power of memory is, paradoxically, located in the present and future rather than the past. The nature of human existence is, by definition, perpetually located in the liminal space between the past and the future, and it is by reshaping our pasts with advanced technologies of memory (narratives in general fulfill this function, but more specifically the “schematic narrative templates” Ehrlich mentions) that we may craft useable, workable present and future realities. Yet, how does on “remember” the future? Ehrlich cites several scholars like Reinhart Koselleck, Emily Keightly, and Michael Pickering who engage with this very question in theoretical mnemonic spaces, though other disciplines may provide excellent insight as well. Media and communication scholars like Richard Grusin and Jay Bolter have explored how these concepts function in consumable narrative formats, while memory scholars like Astrid Erll have deftly adapted literary theory from giants such as Paul Ricoeur to better work within discussions of memory and narrative, citing how “prefigure,” “configure,” and “refigure” narratives in the context of cultural memory (Erll, 2011). These thinkers explore the more literal application of the imaginary when it comes to using memory to craft identity. Ehrlich’s argument that mythic narratives are at work in these processes is extremely well crafted, as patterns of remembering are often as powerful or more powerful than narratives involving specific characters or actors. I would add that the social theory often cited in cultural studies can add to this approach, particularly the arguments of Gramsci regarding hegemony and the Frankfurt School’s Horkheimer and Adorno’s concept of the culture industry. Ehrlich’s vision of futures enabled by narratives of self-sacrifice that extend beyond the tyrannical limits of the nation-state is beautiful and desperately needed, though the current technologies of memory seem to be stuck in more regressive patterns of memory. One of the most popular (but under-studied) formats of this memory is blockbuster video games. The Call of Duty series, for example, is deeply rooted in nationalist and right-wing patterns of remembering. Call of Duty games alone have accounted for $21 billion in sales over the last 20 years, roughly equal to all the Marvel films combined, and more than twice the box office of all Star Wars films combined (Radic, 2020). It stands to reason that these games can have no less impact than the aforementioned film franchises, and if anything the games more directly access and redirect memory to stay firmly within the limits of nation-state identities. Furthermore, the Call of Duty games are sites of what I call “synthetic memory,” or rhetorically weaving together memories of entirely separate events in a fictional space in order to generate high affect in the target consumer base. Synthetic memory is especially active in invoking WWII, the Cold War, and 9/11 with more recent memory in texts designed to be consumed by American and western audiences. Earlier titles in the Call of Duty franchise set in defined past conflicts, mostly WWII, are examples of a process Grusin and Bolter call remediation [1] , or attempts to access, explore, recast, and reconcile the past through reinscribing it in new and adapted media texts. This process is somewhat similar to Erll’s concept of inter-mediality, or the process of adapting cultural memories of the past into new textual forms that are created in dialogue with previous iterations of the memory in question. Remediation is an important process that analyzes the ways in which artists and mnemonic communities actively shape usable pasts, though how might one redirect this process to “remember” a usable future? Grusin addresses this phenomenon with the concept of premediation, or channeling and reapplying the past to predict futures. The concept of premediation is a useful theoretical tool when considering the games of the Modern Warfare series, which takes Call of Duty ’s action from the second world war to theaters and times more closely reflective of modern American existential and sociopolitical concerns. Grusin’s work focuses on 9/11, the attendant anxieties of which also somewhat define military shooters in near future scenarios, though his theory of premediation extends to the cultural conditions that both cause and are caused by this process. He goes on to explain the utility of premediation as an extension of media markets and collective anxiety, stating it “is not about getting the future right, but about proliferating multiple remediations of the future both to maintain a low level of fear in the present and to prevent a recurrence of the kind of tremendous media shock that the United States and much of the networked world experienced on 9/11” (Grusin, 2004, p.1). It is crucial to note that the quality and type of remediation being performed here is both powerful and political. Military shooters only allow a narrow range of actions to the player, mostly limited to movement, gunplay, and the use of various tools (these are typically in the form of grenades, mines, flares, or other items used in combat). While these types of games often have an all-purpose” interact” command used to perform tasks like opening doors or entering vehicles, there are typically no options given to the player to ask for and accept the surrender of opponents, direct tactical decisions to encourage enemy forces to retreat, or have access to any policy decisions that could result in diplomacy and detente. In other words, military shooters are laden with gamic designs and decisions that only allow interaction and progression through violence, a phenomenon that Ian Bogost calls “procedural rhetoric” in his book Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames . By crafting strict procedural boundaries for gamic interaction that center on violence and pairing these designs with narratives that remediate American anxieties in a premediated setting, these texts become potent sites of signification and memory while still allowing the player to feel some agency over the situation through simulated use of force and participation in an ideologically directed war machine. Functionally, these games work as a way to access anxieties and collective traumas in ways that often do not directly replicate the event in question, thus eliding the task of reproducing authenticity and detail. Rather, these games create fictional spaces of synthetic memory in which multiple traumas can be accessed, thus allowing for the affective power of memory without the burden of historicity. The affective dimensions of these games are well documented, as seen in Matthew Thomas Payne’s book Playing War: Military Video Games after 9/11 . Payne argues that games that premediate future conflicts in the context of America’s so-called “War on Terror” do so in a specific cultural and rhetorical contexts, stating “Military shooters reinscribe 9/11’s cultural memory into their ludic wars not for the sake of predictive accuracy, but to give players hope that these reimagined 9/11s can have different outcomes than their horrific ur-text. This explains why so many shooters possess fearful narratives that take place immediately before or directly after attacks on the United States,” (Payne, 2016, loc. 640). As Payne goes on to explain, these texts are designed to give some small measure of agency to the player and enable a revenge of sorts. Importantly, however, these games do not go so far as to create worlds in which a 9/11-like tragedy is wholly prevented and lives are saved. After all, a situation in which situations are averted or erased neither serves hegemonic military-industrial-entertainment interests of perpetual remediation and consumption nor does it align with living memory. Instead, the game worlds are steeped in the violence and death of a deeply disturbing event that allows and demands synthetic memory and gives players the ability to interact with this world in a very narrow band of highly mediated action. This is especially clear in the Call of Duty franchise’s Modern Warfare games, which take place in a near-future setting in which US and UK military forces battle against Russian Federation and/or Arab enemies that are mounting anti-democracy coups or engaging in a military invasion of the United States or western Europe. In the terms of Erll’s treatment of Ricoeur, the Modern Warfare games are prefigured by past, albeit powerful, anxieties that still bear tremendous cultural meaning. As the games are configured, these past anxieties are strategically accessed and incorporated in matrices narrative that compress time and construct connections and causality, resulting in texts that tap into the maximum amount of mnemonic salience while producing the maximum amount of mnemonic capital. In the quest to make these games the most consumable version of shared usable pasts, the narratives are configured in ways that make use of narrative filters as explored in work by Holger Pötzsch as well as the political and historical conventions identified by game scholars Kevin Schut and Peter Mantello. Even as these narratives are configured with practiced cultural and storytelling tools common to games, the signs that construct them function within the semiosphere, carrying second order signification and topoi laden with attached meanings across temporal spaces and into new contexts, accessing both mnemonic anxiety and becoming sites of synthetic memory. Figure SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 1 Frost looks at Manhattan from a helicopter after capturing a Russian submarine and using it to attack other Russian forces. Taken from iampanax YouTube channel, screenshot by author.The dominant narrative thread of the Modern Warfare trilogy is centered on British and American interventions, covert violence, and invasions in foreign territories in an attempt to defend against Russian incursions. These sites of premediated violence cover a number of physical locations and simulate a truly global World War conflict, though some of the most powerful moments of the game narratives center on warfare as a spectacle in high recognizable and mnemonically powerful places, including Russian invasions of Washington D.C. and New York. While there is no historical precedent for Russia or the Soviet Union invading the United States, the premediation seen in Modern Warfare 2 and 3 does build on American Cold War-era fears of Soviet aggression and remediate collective memory of real trauma. Of particular note is the “Black Tuesday” and “Hunter Killer” levels towards the beginning Modern Warfare 3 in which the player, acting as the American soldier Frost, works as part of a Delta Force team to drive Russians out of Manhattan in tense, street to street combat taking the player from the floor of the stock exchange to a Russian nuclear submarine in the bay. Manhattan is particularly powerful site of memory, both in its assigned role as a center of cultural production in the United States and for being the site of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. By positioning the player in a situation where Figure 1. Frost looks at Manhattan from a helicopter after capturing a Russian submarine and using it to attack other Russian forces. Taken from iampanax YouTube channel, screenshot by author. they witness a foreign enemy wreak destruction on New York civilians and buildings, the game manages to perform three important functions of remembering. First, this gameplay indirectly accesses the collective trauma of 9/11, and allows the memory (and all its attendant complexity) to lend itself to the mediated text. Second, Modern Warfare 3 presents the situation as a site of synthetic memory by combining the memory of 9/11 with the historically and socially distinct generative memories and anxieties of Cold War. The game thus creates a scenario in which Russians commit an attack uncannily similar to 9/11 while also acting within the context of Russophobic patterns of memory. Third, the narrative of the game, and the cultivated positionality of the player, allow for retributive violence against the Russian aggressors, meeting both the needs of a defensive narrative structure as well as symbolically avenging both 9/11 and the generative threat of Russian rapaciousness in the Cold War. Interestingly, the Modern Warfare trilogy presents still other synthetic memory sites premediated in 9/11, albeit with additional layers of highly salient remembering. In the Modern Warfare 3 level “Iron Lady,” WWIII is fully engaged, and Russian forces expand their invasion through western Europe to Paris. NATO forces fight the Russian advance back, eventually reclaiming Paris for the allied nations, though in the process the Eiffel Tower is struck by various artillery and aircraft rounds, resulting in its dramatic collapse at the end of the level. In the American semiosphere, this moment functionally accesses multiple, layered signifiers. The sight of a tall, collapsing monument, though distinctly European, is still evocative of 9/11 and the disintegrating of the World trade Center towers. This moment is certainly primed for the player since it occurs only about an hour or so of gameplay after the “Black Tuesday” and “Hunter Killer” discussed above. There is another, deeper layer of synthetic memory present in this scene, however. The sight of Paris being overrun by an enemy force is also highly evocative of the Nazi occupation of the city in WWII. In fact, the Liberation of Paris is a playable historical moment in two earlier Call of Duty games: 2006’s Call of Duty 3 and 2017’s Call of Duty: WWII . The Call of Duty series has featured a long history of American (and later, NATO-allied) forces driving invaders out of France, thus meta-textually prefiguring players of Modern Warfare 3 to draw connections between the premediated WWIII seen in the Modern Warfare trilogy and remediations of America’s military engagements in Europe. These narratives mutually reinforce one another and foreground a common theme of just intervention, thus allowing the Modern Warfare trilogy to access the mnemonic capital of “Greatest Generation” narratives. Figure 2. Frost observes the Eiffel Tower collapse after NATO forces drive out Russian troops from a position on a bridge. Taken from iampanax YouTube channel, screenshot by author Throughout these episodes in the Modern Warfare trilogy, powerful signs are recast within the semiosphere, effectively accessing mnemonic anxiety by dredging up traumas beyond the generational horizon for most players. These generative memories are given new meaning in a new cultural context of premediation, thus allowing use to engage with a configured worldspace that is evocative of both past and present trauma and the attendant collective memory. In resurrecting mnemonic anxiety and presenting events with potential, if very unlikely, applicability to modern geopolitics and histories, the games effectively induce anxiety in the player. However, as the game narratives and design allow the players, as per Payne’s observations, to cathartically solve the problem through violence, a feedback loop is formed. The games become both the source of and answer to mnemonic anxiety. By strategically framing near-future conflict in settings that evoke modern concerns of terrorism, Cold War fears of invasion (particularly with calculated application of topoi), and even WWII memory, a master narrative emerges that reifies Orientalist and nationalist ideologies. This central narrative pattern occurs in spite of the mildly complicating characters and choices that are coded to show war as a complex event that should be thought of in shades of gray. The end result is a narrative that, despite its moderate complexity, still adheres to conservative American cultural values of militarism and triumphalism. Certainly these games revel in the “other-sacrifice” narratives Ehrlich outlines in his paper, and we see national memory on full, guileless display in conflicts clearly designed to access and mimic latent American anxieties dating back to the Cold War. As Viet Thanh Nguyen argues in Nothing Ever Dies, Vietnam and the Memory of War , “Memories are not only collected or collective, they are also corporate and capitalist. Memories are signs and products of power, and in turn, they service power” (loc. 240). In order to outsmart a military-industrial-entertainment complex that has quite literally made an art form of commodifying memory, we must interrogate the use (and abuse) of narrative and imagination in the powerful processes of cultural memory. For all the possible dangers to memory and identity present in these games, they are simply too popular—and too fun [2] —to dismiss. It would be easy to discount these gamic texts as puerile and unimportant, but they are fully engaging, exciting, and technically masterful experiences with complex rhetorical strategies that help to make them very fun. There are few films or novels that can match the level of stimulation found in Modern Warfare games. However, it is here that we may also find hope. If we can redirect memory to lean past national memory and into species-wide memory, we may have a technology of memory that can counter the factional, tribal impulses to which we are currently beholden. Unfortunately I do not have a plan to take us from the feedback loop of games that elicit memory-based anxieties only to assuage them with aesthetically nationalist violence, but the strategic, intentional use of memory Ehrlich explores in his essay is a future we should (and can) active work to realize. Citations : Bogost, I. (2010). Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames . MIT Press. Erll, A. (2011). Memory in Culture . (S. B. Young, Trans.). Palgrave Macmillan. Grusin, R. (2004). Premediation. Criticism , 46 (1). https://doi.org/www.jstor.org/stable/23127337 Accessed 23 Jan. 2021 Grusin, R., & Bolter, J. (1999). Remediation: Understanding New Media . MIT Press. Mantello, P. (2012). Playing Discreet War in the US: Negotiating Subjecthood and Sovereignty through Special Forces Video Games. Media, War & Conflict , 5 (3), 269–283. Payne, M. T. (2016). Playing War: Military Video Games after 9/11 . New york University press. Pötzsch, H. (2017). Selective Realism: Filtering Experiences of War and Violence in First- and Third-Person Shooters. Games and Culture , 12 (2), 156–178. https://doi.org/10.1177/1555412015587802 Radic, V. (2020, December 4). The Highest-Selling Call Of Duty Games, Ranked (& How Much They Sold) . Game rant. Retrieved September 10, 2022, from gamerant.com/highest-selling-call-of-duty-games-ranked-by-amount-sold-world-at-war-modern-warfare-black-ops/ Schut, K. (2007). Strategic Simulations and Our Past: The Bias of Computer Games in the Presentation of History. Games and Culture , 2 (3), 213–235. YouTube. (2015). Call of Duty Modern Warfare 3 Game Movie . Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-i8bRS17F7Y&pbjreload=101&ab_channel=iampanax [1] Bolter and Grusin’s original use of this term is in the context of media studies and exploring the presence of the medium itself int eh content provided. The use of the term in this project is closer to the memory studies usage, as seen in Astrid Erll’s work. The primary difference is that in memory studies, the focus in on how mnemonic content appears across multiple sites, tracking the changes in the content over time, whereas in media and communications, remediation is a means by which to explore how mediums are both designed to simultaneously feel invisible as well as extremely present—what Bolter and Grusin call the “double logic” of “immediacy” and “hypermediacy.” [2] It is important to note that I, as a cultural studies scholar highly critical of nationalism in all its forms, deeply enjoy these games. They hit on so many critical markers of engagement and identity for me (and many others) that we can and should acknowledge the visceral pleasure of simulated, sanitized violence, even in a highly ethnonationalistic narrative setting.
- Marie-Laure Ryan. Comments to “Memory, Identity, Imagination” by Serguey Ehrlich
06.04.2023 Visionary as well as based on solid scholarship, “Memory, Identity, Imagination” is far more than a contribution to memory studies and to the relation between the three concepts of its title—it is above all a diagnosis of what plagues the world: conceptions of identity, whether individual or collective (the nation-state) based on an opposition “us vs. them,” which leads to wars, inequality, and the destruction of the environment. But whereas one may be tempted ascribe the sorry state of the world to an unchanging “human nature” that is bound to repeat the same patterns of behavior over and over again, Ehrlich provides a ground for optimism by stressing the creative nature of the imagination. Dare to imagine, he tells us, a world where citizenship in a nation-state is replaced with citizenship in a global community, where self-sacrifice to a common good replaces the other-sacrifice of war, where the “other” necessary to the definition of identity is no longer located in space but in time—in the memory of the Holocaust as the epitome of that which should never happen again. One important thing I learned reading the article is how outdated political discourse in the U.S. and elsewhere is with respect to the digital revolution. Politicians keep talking about jobs being lost by being shipped away to some foreign countries where labor is cheaper. This presupposes the zero-sum, “us vs. them” mentality that Ehrlich so eloquently denounces. The main reason for job losses is automation, and we are moving toward a situation where most workers will be replaced by machines. The most urgent problem is not how to keep manufacturing jobs at all cost in a given part of the world, but how to deal with a society where jobs and working hours are severely reduced, either by creating new kinds of jobs, by sharing the jobs that remain, or by removing the stigma (and economic hardship) of living without a job. It will take imagination to deal with this new situation. Ehrlich’s article is an eloquent plea to begin to grasp the consequences of the digital revolution. As a narratologist I am particularly interested in the distinction between three types of mythic narratives, corresponding to three stages in the development of humanity. It reminds me of previous efforts by literary theorists such as Georg Lukács and Northrop Frye to identify basic archetypal kinds of narrative and—in the case of Lukács-- to connect them to different types of society. For Lukács, the epic was the manifestation of a harmonious relation between the individual and the group he belongs to, while the novel was the manifestation of a struggle between the aspirations of the individual and those of society. Ehrlich’s narrative typology offers an intriguing alternative to Lukács. He presents the fairy tale as a fundamentally individualistic quest by which the hero strives to acquire that which he is lacking—the princess of Proppian fairy tales or the magic object given by the donor standing in this case for the goods that enable the individual to survive. It could be objected that humanity never existed without the support of a group, and that the individualistic nature of the fairy tale hero’s quest does not correspond to a stage in the development of humanity that precedes the emergence of the nation-state. Before there were large groups, there were small groups, but there was always some kind of group. Moreover there is no evidence that the fairy tale preceded historically the epic tales that represent what Ehrlich calls “the heroic myth.” In fact, Ehrlich’s interpretation of the fairy tale makes it a fitting representation of capitalism. I prefer to regard the three basic types of narrative—fairy tale, heroic myth, myth of self-sacrifice—as forms that coexist within a given culture rather than as forms corresponding to various historical states of civilization. Ehrlich envisions a stage of humanity when the individual will identify with a global community that overcomes the “us vs. them” and zero-sum-game mentality of the nation-state system, and he describes the narrative of self-sacrifice as representative of this stage, but what this narrative will be like is open to question. Can there still be narratives without antagonism and competition, that is, without conflict? If we look at the total literary production of contemporary society, we find a lot of individualistic narratives where the characters act on behalf of their own private interests; we also find lots of ambiguous narratives where “the good” and “the bad” are ill-defined. The heroic myth survives mainly in popular entertainment, especially in fantastic stories like Star Wars , whose world differs significantly from the real world, but heroic tales seem to have died out in realistic narratives. Does this mean that, even though we still live in a world dominated by the “us vs. them” ideology, we no longer believe in the heroic myth, and we can only accept it in supernatural worlds? As for self-sacrifice, it will be an essential gesture in real life if we are ever going to do something about climate change, for we cannot continue with our present materialistic pursuits and conspicuous consumerism without destroying our natural environment, but self-sacrifice cannot be more than a theme among many others in the literature of a culture. Rather than thinking of the three “basic mythic narratives” as the dominant narrative genres of three stages in the development of humanity, we should regard them as abstract patterns that capture the spirit of the three cultural forms defined by Ehrlich. They are not so much real stories as “Grand Narratives” (Grands Récits) in the sense of Jean-François Lyotard: a global explanatory scheme that legitimates institutions or forms of political organization, but does not correspond to any existing concrete text.
- Ann Rigney. Memory as Resource in the Making of a Sustainable Future
Response to Serguey Ehrlich’s Memory, Identity, and Imagination: The Structure of Behavior from the Perspective of Memory Studies. 11.08.2023 Serguey Ehrlich’s ambitious account of the entanglement of memory, identity, and imagination offers lots of food for thought. It brings together a dazzling array of thinkers from different disciplinary traditions, including Freud, Marx, and Halbwachs, in order to formulate an alternative and more forward-looking model of identity-formation. It is focused on the present but draws on anthropological theories about the long-term development of human societies, positing that today’s concerns have deep historical roots. Driving Ehrlich’s account is an outspoken desire to find an alternative both to nationalism as a framework for identity and to global capitalism as a social-economic structure. At a time when the imminent exhaustion of the planet is amplifying global inequality and forced migrations, this is a welcome and necessary move. As Ehrlich puts it: “We need a dream for an optimistic future” (p.55). Indeed, we do. The dream that Ehrlich offers is of a form of global citizenship in which people would be less concerned about defending their own group’s interest and more ready to recognize the interdependence of all peoples, and of humans and the environment. He considers this to be a necessary condition for peace, justice, and ultimately, the future of the planet itself. The key question of course is how these vital aims are to be achieved. More than just an idea, he posits that a new form of global citizenship is already emerging, facilitated by electronic communication systems, and based on the “concert of billions of sovereign individuals” (p.49) who are willing to engage in “different volunteer activities for the benefit of global humanity (p.64) and hence give up their sovereignty. He supports this argument by deploying a complex matrix, inspired by long-standing traditions in narratology and anthropology, in order to map different social structures onto different deep-seated narrative templates. This leads him to conclude that we are entering a new phase in human history in which individuals commit themselves to humankind rather than to their own national tribe. In doing so, they make sense of their world using the ‘myth of self-sacrifice’. The term ‘self-sacrifice’, which Ehrlich uses throughout his essay in opposition to value accorded to the sacrifice of others in imperialistic nationalism, has heavy overtones of self-destruction as Marianne Hirsch has already pointed out. But luckily there are other terms available. Altruism, solidarity, sharing, caring, connectivity, and relationality help articulate more positive and constructive ways of engaging with the world that are still compatible with Ehrlich’s overall vision. The crux in responding to Ehrlich’s thesis, then, is to know the basis of his optimism at this moment of danger. Does ‘global citizenship’ or altruism already exist at scale, or is it rather an ideal which we should try to realize? And if the latter, how do we get from ‘here’ to ‘there’? What role could memory and memory studies play in this transition? This is not the place to engage with the specifics of Ehrlich’s complex evolutionary model, which like all such universalizing models, are very difficult either to prove or disprove. Instead, I would like to build further on the valuable point that Ehrlich makes about giving narrative a more central place in memory studies (p.16). In line with the work of James Wertsch (2021), [1] and more generally of structuralist narratology, Ehrlich distinguishes between specific narratives, schematic narrative templates, and base mythic narrative, moving in the process from unique stories, which figure recognizable characters in particular places at particular times, to more abstract configurations that occur in more instances. The capacity to distinguish between specific stories and underlying templates makes it possible to compare, contrast, and aggregate unique narratives at differing degrees of abstraction. Accordingly, thinking in terms of templates is very useful in explaining how unique stories resonate with each other, thereby creating narrative schemata in the long term that come to be used as hermeneutic tools in shaping the understanding of new events. More than communication technologies as such, this capacity to compare and contrast, to move between the singular and the communal, is arguably the core of interpersonal and transcultural communication. It is also the source of its power to build connections and create affective relations between individuals which is the precondition for making collective identities, memories, and shared visions of the future. Narrative schemata have long been recognized in memory studies as one of the structuring principles in the transmission of experience, although as Ehrlich posits, the role of narrative is often more assumed than explored. Narrative schemata are the foundation of our understanding of culture as memory (Erll 2011) in that they provide a repository for understanding or premediating new events. [2] However, schemata too are always work in progress. So, in applying the concept or any narrative model we need also to keep asking how schemata become transformed. After all, the very idea of cultural evolution supposes they do. Frederick Bartlett, the inspiration behind the concept of schemata already noted this: "An organism has somehow to acquire the capacity to turn around its own 'schemata' and to construct them afresh.” [3] So how are ‘schemata’ turned around? Structuralist narratology came aground on this issue. Its highly abstract models helped to explain how certain ways of world-making replicate themselves across time. But it took post-structuralism to explain how ‘difference’ is produced as the inevitable by-product of repetition, showing that the application of a model produces deviations in the long-term. What Bartlett called ‘the capacity to turn around its own schemata’. Thanks to these insights, we no longer think of cultural history in terms of the total replacement of one system by another (or one dominant narrative by another). Instead, storytelling is a site of continuous repetition but also of minor adjustments which, as they aggregate, can help to reframe, or ‘reinvent’ the world. As the tenacity of toxic nationalism in a patently interdependent world shows, the transformation of schemata meets the resistance of habit and of deeply rooted affects. So is change effected? It is worth considering here the key role played by the creative arts and aesthetics. Following the influential theories of the Russian Formalists, the role of art is to undermine habit through ‘defamiliarization’, that is, by presenting new perspectives on the world or by presenting familiar things in a surprising form. [4] As Ehrlich rightly emphasizes this is where imagination and creativity can help counter habit. In light of this, it would be good to build into his model an understanding of how ‘singular’ narratives told creatively by imaginative persons can help to shift in however minor a way, the ‘same old story.’ The operative word here is ‘minor’, since as Marianne Hirsch and others have shown, the arts operate in the micropolitics of viewing and reading, and thus bring about ‘small acts of resistance’ in the hearts and minds of individuals. [5] Being small does not make them insignificant, however. On the contrary: the power of singular stories to move individuals by deviating from familiar schemata is the core of cultural change, which is always going to be slow. This power also helps explain how memory can move across local, regional, and national borders. Ehrlich expresses a confidence in the power of electronic media to create global citizenship, which by now seems overly optimistic in view of the ongoing fragmentation of the public sphere thanks to social media. But he is right in claiming that communication and storytelling will be key to the creation of new identities since it is through the sharing of experience that connections are forged between people who do not live in the same circumstances. However, as cultural memory studies has shown, communication is not just about the spread of common views among likeminded people. Instead, it is about articulating and recognising differences in a world that is diverse while entangled. Memory studies has provided insight into the production of stories articulating past, present, and future and, increasingly, into the circulation, reception, and uptake of those stories. Crucially, it does not presuppose that the world is a level playing field, or that it can ever become one, but examines the ways in which specific memory narratives – relating to individuals, groups, cities, countries, regions – are shaped and made legible both to members of a group and to outsiders. This will always be work in progress and, ideally, this work should not be a matter of merely replicating Western hegemony. If memory is to continue to offer a resource for making sense of the present and future it will not be because consensus has been reached on some common story that defines ‘mankind’ once and for all. Memory stays meaningful (and hence will continue to be disputed) as long as cultural acts of remembrance open up new perspectives on the history of the planet through specific narratives. In the process, it can create new conditions for building affective and cognitive relations across borders which recognise both differences and common concerns. Ehrlich’s comments on the different views of Churchill (p.61) offer a case in point: a hero in one context, he is a perpetrator in another. The example serves as a reminder that collective remembering is never a matter of transmitting a single body of knowledge; instead, it offers a site for recognizing and negotiating differences between perspectives and relations to power. Crucially, these negotiations take place at different scales, meaning that changes occur at different sites and only in a slow manner. [6] Thinking in terms of slow ‘mnemonic transitions’ [7] , rather than positing a one-off systemic shift into a new world, could be a fruitful way of combining a focus on narrative with a more fit-for-purpose understanding of change. [1] James V. Wertsch, How Nations Remember: A Narrative Approach . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. [2] For a summary, see Astrid Erll, Memory in Culture . London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. [3] Frederic C. Bartlett, Remembering: An Experimental and Social Study . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932, p.206. [4] Viktor Shklovsky, "Art as Technique” [1917]. In Russian Formalist Critics: Four Essays , edited by L.T. Lemon and M.J. Reis. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965: 3-24. [5] Marianne Hirsch in Altınay, Ayşe Gül, et al, eds. Women Mobilizing Memory . New York: Columbia University Press, 2019, p.3; for a more detailed version of this argument, see A. Rigney, "Remaking Memory and the Agency of the Aesthetic." Memory Studies 14.1 (2021):10-23. [6] On the importance of multiscalarity in post-national approaches to memory, see Chiara De Cesari and Ann Rigney, eds., Transnational Memory: Circulation, Articulation, Scales (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014). [7] Miguel Cardina and Inês Nascimento Rodrigues. "The Mnemonic Transition: The Rise of an Anti-Colonial Memoryscape in Cape Verde." Memory Studies 14,2 (2020):380-394.
- Dr. Milica Popović. Beyond Western Modernity. In response to Serguey Ehrlich’s “Memory, Identity and Imagination. The Structure of Behaviour from the Perspective of Memory Studies”.
Serguey Ehrlich’s essay raises important questions on the role of memory studies in the contemporary world, and the accountability and responsibility of scholars, and presents another ambitious and important contribution to theorization of memory studies. Ehrlich’s text on its own, with the multitude of responses obtained by renowned memory scholars across the world, is countering its claim of “atheoretical trend” in Memory Studies. Providing us with a rich outlook on the structures of human behavior and the role of memory in both individual behavior and societal structures, Ehrlich indeed opens new avenues for reflection. As previous colleagues noted, it makes it impossible to give a thorough response to all the observations, theoretical proposals, and programmatic invites Ehrlich’s text puts in front of us. Also, previous reflections have successfully underlined and elaborated many of the original observations of Ehrlich’s essay and the importance of the dialogue Ehrlich has opened. Ehrlich presents the “holy triad” of memory, identity, and imagination as the core structures of narratives as “programs of behavior”; and presents three base mythic narratives: fairy tale, heroic and self-sacrifice. In the author’s view self-sacrifice is the only one adequate for global humanity - the contemporary society which we live in. Calling for the accountability of researchers to involve with changing the world, rather than simply observing it, and most importantly, to leave behind the modernistic lenses of understanding the new Global Age, as he names it, Ehrlich finds himself in a couple of paradoxes that I wish to underline. While asking to leave Modernity behind, Modernity itself and the classical authors are at the core of Ehrlich’s attempt at a theorization of memory studies, just as Marianne Hirsch (2023) has rightly noted. Standing on the shoulders of the giants – the Rennaissance and the Enlightenment, Ehrlich’s essay misses the opportunity to present a truly global essay founded in the diversity of global knowledge. Starting early with a position that: “it is not surprising that Western civilization based on Christian values achieved the leading position in the world” (p. 31) and criticizing harshly what he calls “the ideology of decolonization” (p. 27), the essay openly proclaims Christianity as the only religion “which exhibits self-sacrifice" (p. 31). Thus, while criticizing nationalism and even displaying the multiplicity of memory cultures and “spaces of experience” on the case of Winston Churchill later in the essay (p.56), Ehrlich, however, himself remains enclosed in his Western-centric gaze. This is further confirmed by the choice of the religious language of “self-sacrifice” instead of progressive theorizations of solidarity and hope, as has been previously raised in both Marianne Hirsch’s and Ann Rigney’s responses. The latest call for papers of the journal Memory Studies for a special issue on “Decolonizing the Study of Memory” will certainly bear fruit to further enrich the literature which has already been vastly produced and which would be of crucial importance to Ehrlich’s work. Engaging further with brilliant work of Ruramisai Charumbira, for example, and her article on “The Historian as Memory Practitioner” (2022) where Charumbira reminds us that “The historian who practices a history focused on the conqueror, even when telling stories of the vanquished, unwittingly practices the memory for the powerful” - all would help Ehrlich embrace the importance of positionalities in his quest for global identity. For a world to be global, one must leave the Whiteness and Westerness of Christianity and open the thought to the indigenous ways of knowing as well as practices of epistemic disobedience (Mignolo 2011). And the decolonizing agenda encompasses the peripheral positionality of Eastern Europe (Wawrzyniak and Pakier 2013), the positionality of author himself. Understanding Michael Rothberg’s concept of multidirectional memory (2009) we can see the global citizen, that Ehrlich is so passionately looking for, emanated in the examples Rothberg offers - like W.E.B. Du Bois discourse on Warsaw Ghetto. A decolonizing approach is the only one which can even pretend to offer a truly humanistic and universal approach to memory cultures, while producing an outlook into the future. Rejecting to acknowledge the privileges of the authors invoked in his essay, Ehrlich finally surrenders, as an implicated subject (Rothberg 2019), to the reproduction of totalizing and colonizing identities. Another, and complementary, paradox the essay opens is found in its understanding of a certain singularity of identity, focusing on national identity. A global citizen exists only within the nuances and multiplicity of (post/modern global) identities (see further the works of Stuart Hall, for example). Without taking into account the development of identity politics, which in the contemporary world goes well past ethno-national identities, it is difficult to imagine a finer understanding of the interconnectedness of identity and memory, tensions which also Barbara A. Misztal has elaborated on discussing “sacralization of memory” (2004). The delicate interwovenness of contemporary identities could further help illuminate author’s search for a (primal) trauma besides “murderous cannibalism”. Opening the wealth of knowledge outside of the “usual suspects” would enhance the analytical capacities of the essay, for example when discussing “witch hunts” explained as “confusion over challenges posed by the transition to Modernity” (p. 54), and seemingly without taking into account the crucial gender perspective and thoughtful reflections elaborated by many, including Silvia Federici (2021) on the intricate relationship between patriarchy and the development of capitalism. If we wish to follow the invitation Ehrlich sends us to work through our primal traumas in the attempts of creation of new mythologizations adequate for the Global Age, it is impossible to continue through the same monopolizing lenses of the theories of the 20th century. It is impossible to continue without opening the space for vast diverse knowledge created beyond the realms of Western theory. The mere substitution of the idea of hope with the term of imagination, in this context, does not seem so innocent anymore – if theory ever is. Imagination can continue to reproduce the traumas of the past centuries, demanding the structural inequalities to remain in a status quo. The promise of self-sacrifice does not bring hope nor does it sounds as a promise of life in its full multitude of identities. And thus, as the biggest paradox indeed, it can even prevent solidarity on a global level - contrary to Ehrlich’s gracious plea. References Charumbira, Ruramisai. 2022. “The Historian as Memory Practitioner.” In The Politics of Historical Memory and Commemoration in Africa. Mark-Thiesen, Cassandra, Moritz Mihatsch, and Michelle Sikes (Eds.) Pp. 195–216. Oldenbourg: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110655315-009 . Federici, Silvia. 2021. Caliban and the Witch . London: Penguin Classics. Hall, Stuart. 2017. The Fateful Triangle. Race, Ethnicity, Nation . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hall, Stuart, and Paul du Gay, eds. 1995. Questions of Cultural Identity . London: Sage. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446221907 . Hirsch, Marianne. 2023. Memory for the Future: Response to Serguey Ehrlich, “Memory, Identity, Imagination: The Structure of Behaviour from the Perspective of Memory Studies” . Available at: https://www.istorex.org/en/post/26-07-2023-marianne-hirsch Mignolo, Walter. 2011. “Epistemic Disobedience and the Decolonial Option: A Manifesto.” In T RANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 1 . No. 2. https://doi.org/10.5070/T412011807 . Misztal, Barbara A. 2004. “The Sacralization of Memory” in European Journal of Social Theory . Vol. 7 (1). Pp. 67-84. Rigney, Ann. 2023. Memory as Resource in the Making of a Sustainable Future. Response to Serguey Ehrlich’s Memory, Identity, and Imagination: The Structure of Behavior from the Perspective of Memory Studies . Available at: https://www.istorex.org/en/post/11-08-2023-ann-rigney Rothberg, Michael. 2009. Multidirectional Memory. Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization. Redwood City: Stanford University Press. Wawrzyniak, Joanna, and Małgorzata Pakier. 2013. “Memory Studies in Eastern Europe: Key Issues and Future Perspectives.” in Polish Sociological Review. N o. 183. Pp. 257–79. Dr. Milica Popović (Sciences Po CERI) is a political scientist, specializing in Memory Studies, Political Sociology and Higher Education Studies. She obtained a PhD in Comparative Political Sociology at Sciences Po Paris and in Balkan studies at the University of Ljubljana. Currently, she is working as an independent researcher and consultant. Popović is also an affiliated researcher at the Institut Jacques Delors in Paris, on issues regarding the Western Balkans and the European Union enlargement. She has been Postdoctoral Fellow and Project Lead at the Global Observatory on Academic Freedom at Central European University in Vienna from 2021 to 2023, and for her work at CEU she is a recipient of DAAD Fundamental Academic Values Award for Early Career Scientists. Popović also worked as a lecturer at Sciences Po Paris. She has been a visiting fellow at the University of Warwick and the Institute for Contemporary History in Ljubljana. While finalizing her monograph on Yugonostalgia and the memory narratives of the generation of the last pioneers in the (post)Yugoslav space, she is currently developing a new research project on the memory narratives of deserters in Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.
- Natalija Majsova. Serguey Ehrlich, “Memory, Identity, and Imagination: The Structure of Behaviour”
6.04.2023 Natalija Majsova is an associate professor of cultural studies at the University of Ljubljana. Her research cuts across memory studies, film and media studies, heritage interpretation, and (post-)socialist popular cultures. Her current research projects focus on the transmediality of memory work in popular culture. Her publications include Memorable futures: Soviet science fiction cinema and the space age (Lexington books, 2021) and Faith in a Beam of Light: Magic Lantern and Belief in Western Europe, 1830-1940 (co-edited with S. Lenk, Brepols, 2022). She is the co-editor-in-chief of the journal Social Science Forum (with T. O. Črnič) and an occasional film critic. Serguey Ehrlich’s essay “Memory, Identity, and Imagination: The Structure of Behaviour from the Perspective of Memory Studies” is a passionately articulated blueprint for a future-oriented memory, and for a sustainable academic agenda in the interdisciplinary domain of memory studies. Ehrlich unpacks the triad of memory, identity, and imagination as “guidance and control subsystems of behaviour”, relying on the premise that all these three agenda-setting time-spaces are underpinned by narratives. According to the author, and echoing scholars like Astrid Erll, these narratives are neither random nor countless, but consist in individual and collective reinterpretations of “cultural schemata” (Erll, 2011a: 108). Following foundational narratological insights ranging from Vladimir Propp to Joseph Campbell’s analysis of the hero and their quest, Ehrlich posits that, from the perspective of ethics, these narratives can be distinguished according to three distinct orientations: the primal and, to my mind somewhat petty, obstacle-ridden quest for material reward; the dreadfully uncomfortable quest for collective unity based on sacrifice of someone, who is not us; and the noble route of self-sacrifice for the better of the planet (and humanity, by consequence). Ehrlich explores the significance of these three mythical quests (in other words, the fairy tale; the heroic myth; the myth of self-sacrifice) in a variety of historical, economic, cultural, and technological contexts. This results in a rich, intriguing, and dense reading, as the author conscientiously repackages and elaborates his ideas to address inquisitive readers from various fields, from memory studies and narratology to history, critical theory, and history of anthropology, seemingly effortlessly polemicizing with founding figures in the fields in the process. “Memory, Identity, and Imagination” is an inspirational text, a manifesto, in the most laudable sense of the term, and clearly the product of a great passion for intellectual thought. In the context of increasing specialization and compartmentalization in academia, Ehrlich audaciously returns to the tradition of socially engaged, stylistically emancipated, and somewhat utopian reasoning, especially characteristic of the social sciences and humanities in the context of Slavic cultures. The result is a dynamic and fascinating text that echoes the author’s intention both in content and in form. In a somewhat disruptive gesture, Ehrlich expands the current preoccupation of the social sciences and humanities with inter- and transdisciplinarity, demonstrating that these agendas may not and should not be a dry substitute for systematic and relentless engagement with sociocultural and political reality; and that academic discourse can never be clearly separated from narratives that encourage and discourage individual and collective conduct. Thus, Ehrlich’s blueprint for an ethical stance reflecting the challenges and possibilities of the information age (as a social formation structurally distinct from the earlier modern and pre-modern ages) draws on sweeping, yet illuminating and analytical overviews of changes in the human condition, initiated by transformation in the spheres of economics, industry, and communication technologies. As if recalling Karl Marx’s 1859 observation that humanity “always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation”, Ehrlich stresses that today’s conditions of existence (and therefore of possibility) differ remarkably from those of the modern age. Namely, the modern age did not offer technologies for the seamless kind of global connectivity that characterizes contemporary experience; nor did it provide nearly as many means of self- actualization, self-reflection or aesthetic, political, and social individualization. Has the time come for new formative narratives to take the lead in scholarship, activism, and everyday life? Ehrlich’s response is emphatically positive. Activating the impactful premise that memory of the past, identification grounded in the present, and future-oriented imagination work with the same materials, Ehrlich’s essay calls for a programmatic link between future scenarios and memory studies, harnessing an important insight from utopia and science-fiction scholarship. The author acknowledges his utopianist inclination, but does so in a modest way, almost under-emphasizing the idea that futurological utopias are known to go hand in hand with nostalgias for an idealized past, conjoining technological advances with traditional social organization. Additionally, in the 21st century, new utopias are often marked by nostalgias for that past’s mediatized (for example, popular-cultural) versions of the future. In other words: there is little spontaneity to how we think about the future; just like other speculations, these, too, draw on mnemonic imaginaries. The question is, then, what our mnemonic imaginaries have in store; what kind of styles, forms, and arguments are at our disposal, and which narratives are the ones we tend to rely on. Ehrlich stipulates that there is of course no one single narrative available to a society in a certain historical moment. Writing about regimes of art, Jacques Rancière (2009) has convincingly demonstrated that art may be talked, understood, and handled by different social formations to various effects (e.g., as ethical guidance, craftsmanship-based pleasure, or an invitation to perceive the world from an unprecedented perspective). All three options (and for Rancière, this is a non-exhaustive list) coexist; however, they do not co-exist with equal visibility, as societal consensus tends to privilege one distinct regime for a distinct period. Similarly, Ehrlich argues that, throughout history, all societies have the capacity to produce and work with the three basic narratives of material reward, exclusionary collectivity, and self-sacrifice; at the same time, one of these narratives appears to become privileged under certain circumstances, marking the prevalent ethical inclinations of an era. In other words, while institutions such as monarchies, nation-states, heritage identification, preservation, and interpretation mechanisms, funding bodies, and the culture and creative industries work with some mnemonic narratives but not others, a distortion necessarily occurs, as the modes of conduct that are promoted and celebrated in the media, textbooks, and museums no longer necessarily correspond to contemporary challenges. Indeed, Ehrlich identifies many instances of such distortion, pointing to specific steps that policymakers in countries from Russia to the UK and India can and perhaps should implement to reorganize national memory cultures to better respond to the demands of the globally connected and interactive world. Even more compellingly, Ehrlich identifies contemporary volunteer movements as the flagships of a new ethics, concerned with the future of humanity (and the planet, it seems fitting to additionally emphasize). Ehrlich’s contemplation on the invaluable contribution of volunteer activist movements to the proliferation of an ethics concerned with the well-being of globally connected individuals, all inhabitants of planet Earth, may easily be extrapolated to other activist groups concerned with issues that cut across the exclusionary nation- or ethnicity-based frameworks. In fact, it seems that this expansion be the logical outcome of Ehrlich’s utopian (and therefore especially enlightening) manifesto. Contemporary movements that envision change on the scales of humanity, nature, and the planet require rich mnemonic resources. Therefore, the task of memory-studies scholarship is, to paraphrase Ehrlich, certainly to “work through the primal trauma of cannibalism”. One of the ways of doing this is to work on systematically uncovering the constant ethical diversity of memory narratives, in the nascent tradition of recent scholarship, focusing on memories of hope, joy, and activism, as they are pre- and remediated, archived, and preserved in different technocultural contexts. Another promising line of research is the reinterpretation of well-known future-oriented texts, with the aim of offering new perspectives on their ethics and on their mnemonic impact. Ehrlich’s potent observation on the ethical dimension of these narratives as the tenants of memory, identity, and future-oriented imagination is a welcome addition to such research, due to its capacity to open up new questions for narratologists, memory scholars, and media scholars, to name several disciplines that I am personally most at home in. In equal measure, and partly due to its intriguing plot, “Memory, Identity, and Imagination” also has promising applicative potential in spheres such as policymaking, education, heritage interpretation, and cultural and creative industries. References Erll, Astrid. (2011) Travelling Memory. Parallax 17, no. 4: 4–18. Marx, Karl. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977. Preface. Rancière, Jacques. The aesthetic unconscious . Polity, 2009.
- Evgeny Blinov. Were we born to embody our forefathers’ wounds?
Evgeny Blinov (b. 1979). Graduated from Philosophical faculty of Russian State University of Humanities (Moscow), MA (Erasmus Mundus Europhilosophie), Candidate of Philosophical Sciences (Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences), PhD University of Toulouse 2 (France). Professor of the Department of History and World Politics, Tyumen State University. His interests include Western philosophy XVIII century, history of political thought, language policy, social anthropology and contemporary French Philosophy. He is the author of the book “By Pen and Bayonet: Introduction into Revolutionary Policy of Language” (Moscow: HSE, 2022). Email: e.n.blinov@utmn.ru Sergei Ehrlich’s bold and thought-provoking essay aims to provide nothing less than a new discourse on the methods used in memory studies. This field of research is multidisciplinary by definition, and the author doesn’t hesitate to cross the borders of various disciplines, far from limiting himself by historical, sociological, or psychological narratives. The latter term is one of his favorite methodological tools for his critical tasks and a positive program that is supposed to be the prolegomena to the “the New Golden Age” of humanity. If I understand his intentions correctly, he intends to create a new global community liberated from the bonds of national narratives and heroic myths of the bloody past. The main objects of his criticism are two fundamental approaches used by both professional historians and representatives of any given memory community. In the narrow professional sense, he is defying the spatial turn in the memory studies proclaimed in 1980’s by renowned French historian Pierre Nora (Nora 1989). In the broader sense, Ehrlich aims to deconstruct the “heroic myths” of the long memory of a nation. To those two fundamental tasks, we can add his admonishment of abusing the postmodernist focus on the traumatic events often seen as a universal remedy for conflicting and strictly national heroic mythology. Ehrlich champions time over space and globality over locality. These methodological choices are happily married to his political project, which he proudly designates as “utopian” (Ehrlich 2023, 57 ). Far from being a specialist in memory studies, the author of these lines is not in the position to evaluate or criticize Ehrlich’s historiographical generalizations or his analysis of current or forthcoming trends in this domain. Although the interdisciplinary and, more broadly, ideological appeal of his work inspired me to make some critical comments on this impressive piece of research. Considering myself a historian of thought or, in more foucauldian terms, specialist in the history of “systems of thought” [1] , I agree with Ehrlich’s idea that memory studies are interconnected in a myriad of ways with group identities and all the possible “behavior patterns” associated with them. Variously shaped and selected collective memories are always used as a reason for what we say, feel, or do as members of a social or political community. Furthermore, the author’s theory seems to be quite consistent as a system of explanation, although I am not totally convinced by some of its core arguments. First, I’d question his rather metaphysical argument that “There is no lieu de mémoire without its own narrative unfolded in time. Time is primary in relation to space” (Ehrlich 2023, 16 ). Even without diving deep into philosophical discussion about the primacy of time over space, one could ask how something like “primal time” (if we do not consider it in religious terms) could exits for an “honest historian”. Historians deal with the history of a particular region, institution, domain, or concept that cannot be excluded from its locality. What is supposed to be a “historical fact” cannot be identified as such without its material dimension. In this case, I will refer to Bruno Latour’s conception; the “production of facts” that is, to me, as valid in historical science as it is in physics or chemistry (Latour 2004, 117). A historical text can be referred to as a trustful source only if it is associated with a material medium such as the oldest possible manuscript and later compared to the various archeological data that could require all sorts of material analysis (from the visual comparison to the radionuclide or genetic tests). So, we can produce something called “historical facts” or, at least, a plausible hypothesis about them, only after putting them to the test in our laboratory. While in the case of the “raw materials” that could later become “historical facts,” they are first and foremost spatial and material phenomena, and only after professional processing become “temporal” in the strict sense. An artefact like an ancient helmet found during an excavation can be classified only according to provenance at first. I.e., it is primarily a spatial object, and the task of a historian is to put it on a chronological line after the long and detailed process of attribution. Even if we can use some narrative sources to localize a historical place, like Schliemann used Iliad to find Troya, we can do so only if we consider this source as an authentic Greek literary text and not an invention of a Greek nationalist living in the XIX-th century. In its turn, the authenticity of the text could only be attested to through the material analysis and so forth. Space first, time second. Otherwise, we will be doomed to tailor our task to the ready answer. Manipulation like this is very typical in many national narratives. Another Ehrlich maxim states that “the Earth of lieux de mémoire circulates around the sun of narration, but not vice versa. Therefore, the narrative approach should play the leading role in memory studies” (Ehrlich 2023, 16). This argument seems to contain a reference to the idea of a certain “helix of history”, which, I hope, didn’t refer to the One-and-Only-Objective-Universal-Narrative but something like a continuum of various narratives. Although even those narratives could only be distinguished if localized, not to mention that the very idea of big narrative is a product of Western European and more particular XX-th century French thought (Lyotard 1984) as the idea of “objective history” was largely a product of XIX-th century German thought. In this sense, I found the author’s appeal to “look at the world from the entire humankind perspective” rather confusing and contradictory (Ehrlich 2023, 13). As Marx and Engels put it in their early chef d’oeuvre, German Ideology criticizing Feurebach idealistic “man” instead of “real historical man.” “`Man` is really `the German` (Marx, Engels 1976, 39 ). The “entire humankind‘s” point of view is not a “point of view from nowhere,” its’s the point of view of Western Europe. According to Ehrlich, the “anti-spatial turn” in memory studies will allow him not only to get rid of the tenets of narrow nationalistic narratives and adopt “humankind’s perspective,” but also to dive deep into the depts of the human soul. It’s no wonder that he salutes the psychological aspect of the narrative turn associated with the works of James Wertsch, psychologist by his primary background. Ehrlich believes that the psychologism of the narrative turn in memory studies could provide us with new tools for the “molecular” analysis of the human behavior. Here, he intrudes into a completely new domain, proposing his own anthropological perspective on the general evolution of human society. Ehrlich’s humans are gregarious and political animals with historically determined patterns of behavior that could become an object of scientific analysis. These patterns are organized around temporal structures called “subsystems,” where memory belongs to the past, “identity” to the present, and imagination to the future. Memory is not simply “remembered”, but lived through, it’s very essence is performative, and the process of the collective mnemonic experience could be studied through the different “narratives”. The narratives for Ehrlich and for Wertsch are collective phenomena, or more precisely, in a narrative one could find “essential temporal interplay of its collective and individual forms” (Ehrlich 2023, 14). It’s important to note that Ehrlich goes beyond flat “psychological” conceptions that oppose individual and collective memories, although he clearly formulates his distaste for the “identities” produced by national states. For him, there are no “wrong” collective memories imposed to the individuals, although narratives themselves could be wrong or right from the point of view of a professional historian. He mentions Orlando Figes’ research on the case of memory aberration, when many Gulag prisoners discovered that, after reading Solzhenitsyn’ s magnum opus, their own “confused and non-organized” memories were somehow “erased” by the writer’s coherent and organized narratives and became more vivid than their actual memories (Figes 2007, 636). I suggest that this curious phenomenon deserved much better attention but, unfortunately, it’s only briefly mentioned in a footnote. Otherwise, it would be interesting to observe the implementation of this theory to something like “false memories” in the vein of the classical Marxist notion of false consciousness (that should be based on the “false” or rather “confused” memories turned into the behavioral patterns by the means of ideology). The pivotal role of narratives turns them into the bricks on which our social world is composed as they permanently shape group identities. The collective is constantly changing itself (i.e. its views on the past, present and plans for the future) through the various narratives. In this sense, the author’s ambitions are well beyond the reflection on the collective memory and its complex relationship with what he calls “professional history”. From this perspective, narratives are not only histories of the plural voices that could merge into a common “mnemonic community,” but a part of the fundamental structure that Foucault called the “historical ontology of ourselves” (Foucault 1984). The very tissue of this ontology is woven from the narratives presented through something like an autonomous and self-moving spindle. Narrative naturans, narrative naturata. This sort of “hyper-narrativism” leads the author to the criticism of the heroical myth and the ideology of self-sacrifice, tied with the ideology of the national state and apparently considered as the main reason for the wars that struck Europe in the XX-th century. Ehrlich was referring to the famous pamphlet of the interwar period: Julien Bendas’ Betrayal Of The Clerks (Benda 2011), in which he blamed the European intellectuals on both sides of the front line for betraying the universalists’ ideals of Enlightenment and falling into nationalist rage during World War 1. The very fact that many of those societies were already democratic at the time encouraged the warmongers who instrumentalized or created the narratives of a unified nation. Here, Ehrlich seems to accept Michael Mann’s arguments from the Dark Side of Democracy (Mann, 2005), about the belliсouse nature of democratic societies and severely criticizes the renaissance of the archaic “same blood” ideology. That becomes far more powerful as it is provided with the modern instruments of mobilization and mind control, which while belonging to the same “memory community” appears to be one of the most efficient. I have to admit that I do not agree with Ehrlich’s central opposition on the ideas of “national” memory and universal values. This opposition was believed to be crucial in the particular periods of European history. It had its moment of glory in the early interwar period, as attested to by the popularity of Bendas’ book, and was reestablished in the early nineties as part of the globalist ideology of the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992), and similar theories. Although, from a larger historical perspective, universalism was the essential part of nationalist big narratives. In his scrupulous study of the genesis of French nationalism in the XVIII-th century, David Avram Bell analyzed numerous intersections between nationalist and universalist narratives (Bell 2001). Even in the age of Pax America, French intellectuals were constantly referring to the idea of France as a “Universal Nation” (Latour 2004). The nationalist narratives contemporary to the French revolutionary project pretended to be universalist in one way or another as is attested to by the original project, American Empire, as “City upon the Hill” (Anderson 2006) or German nationalism that was opposed to its French adversary. Even secondary nationalism, fashioned upon French, German, or American models constantly justify themselves with various references to the universalist arguments. These newer nationalistic perspectives are often confused with their old-fashioned nationalist narratives that treacherously resemble that of WWII, a period which they tend to present as a part of European civilization as opposed to the various incidences of “barbarism” and “totalitarianism.” There is no need to argue that the clash between two “universalists” perspectives as in the Cold War era could be much more dangerous than a war between some nation states for a disputed territory. Not to mention the fact that universalist perspective doesn’t exclude the support of the local nationalism for a “higher” purpose: Soviet project was branded by Stalin as “national in form, proletarian in content” and was seen externally as a true “Empire of Nations”, to put it in Francine Hirsch’s terms (Hirsch 2004). The ongoing European project was equally built upon the explicit or implicit support of the Eastern European nationalism, even if it was perceived by some as a temporary instrument necessary for their later reintegration into the “European family”. In one way or another, modern nationalism referred to the universalists arguments and reshaped the collective memory by the standards of what they believed to be “objective history”. It is so much easier to be a nationalist proud of your history when your own nation is supposed to be on “the right side” of its general course and progress. Or, at least, of what one believes to be progressive and right. French and Germans (at least their elites), were no less convinced that they represent an authentic comprehension of universal values than Catholics and Protestants centuries ago and did their best to persuade their fellow-citizens that they were fighting on the right side of history by joining the “union sacrée” or defending Kultur (Hanna 1996, 129). I was even less convinced by the author’s surprisingly optimistic final part that dissents with the generally pessimistic description of the dominance of national narratives throughout his essay. His proposal to elaborate some sort of “global memory” was supposed to replace various national memory narratives with their heroic mythology does not represent something new from the point of narrative construction. He states that “The first step to solve the problems that the nation-state and capitalism are incapable of solving is to imagine post-state and post-capitalist forms of memory and identity, which would correspond to our global epoch of information civilization” (Ehrlich 2023, 41). But is there something new about the idea of global memory? If we take the classical account of the mnemonic aspect of national genealogies suggested by Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities, it does not seem to be very different from the old good “scientific nationalism” that was trying to expulse the ghosts of the ancient hostilities by introducing what he called “Reassuring Fratricide” (Anderson 2006, 199-200). According to Anderson, this concept helped to reshape the local memories by presenting the bloody conflicts of the past as “family feud”: “We become aware of a systematic historiographical campaign deployed by the state mainly through the it’s school systems, to ‘remind’ every young Frenchwoman and Frenchman of a series of antique slaughters which are now inscribed as ‘family history.’ Needing to ‘have already forgotten’ tragedies of which one needs unceasingly to be ‘reminded’ turns out to be a characteristic device in the later construction of national genealogies” (Anderson 2006, 201). The national genealogies, which were intended to create a nation as a unified mnemonic community, already had complex and hybrid systems using sophisticated narrative techniques that allowed members of hostile local communities to transform into “Frenchmen”, “Italians”, “Germans” et cit. From the point of view of a new European mnemonic community, Germans, French, or Italians were becoming the equivalent to the “Parisians”, “Gascons” or “Basque”, or even Catholics and Protestants from the earlier stages of global development. Germans and Frenchmen “should have forgotten” the fratricidal wars of the past to protect the beautiful European “garden” from the intrusion of the barbarians living in their Jungle. Moreover, all the references to the “same blood” ideology should be placed among many narrative techniques used by nation builders. Although the old metaphor of “genetic memory” could be reevaluated with the progress of paleogenetic history, this possibility does not seem to interest the author, who focused on the “narrative turn”. We could suppose that, in the near future, one could evaluate the perceptibility of the individuals or groups for the particular narratives based on their genetic heredity, as we have growing evidence that PTSD could be inherited (Nievergelt et al. 2018). In this case, we could guess that, if a large percentage of the population of the former Soviet Union are descendants of the WWII soldiers who survived after heavy wounds and thus inherited the PTSD, they could be much more perceptible to the certain forms of heroical narratives. Often used sarcastically, the post-Soviet slogan “The grandfathers fought” could be possibly seen in a completely new light with the future research on genetic memory, considered in the most literal sense of the term. Going back to the metaphors, I would like to quote Gilles Deleuze’s favorite poem, which was written by Joë Busquet, a half-paralyzed WWI veteran: “My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it” (Deleuze, 1990, 143). We were born to embody our ancestors’ wounds, both literally and figuratively. However, the way we deal with these wounds may vary. My last objection concerns Ehrlich’s rather implicit idea that the “behavioral patterns” produced by various mnemonic communities should be considered as the products of some sort of cynical manipulation performed by the creators of national narratives. Although French Jacobines or Russian Bolsheviks were certainly working on a new version of collective memory that could replace ancient “prejudices”, they never imagined creating them ex nihilo : on the contrary, they should have been based on what they believed to be real sufferings and the urgent need of the people. French historian of political thought Pierre Rosanvallon pointed out that the Rousseauoist revolutionary paradigm presupposed something like a “sentimental contract” in addition to strictly rational “social contract” (Rosanvallon 2004, 41). Even if the revolutions, including the revolutions in memory, are usually led “from above” they cannot succeed without massive popular support, and when the “revolutionary situation” emerges, it’s often hard to tell who is leading whom. For instance, Staline and everyone else in his place, had previously refused to become the new Russian emperor, but the “lieu de memoire” gradually transformed him into one. Like Sergei Eisenstein’, Ivan the Terrible swore to rule not only on the land controlled by the “Great Duchy of Moscow”, but also to rule equally on “maritime lands that belonged to our forefathers” [2] . He recognized the importance of the mission to unify lost Russian lands. If we take apart the divine mission or Marxist ideas of historical progress, there will be nothing left aside from a gravitation of collective memories. Nation or empire builders are much more of the prisoners of collective memories than creators and cynical manipulators of the masses. As the wise an ancient quote goes, “ ducunt volentem fata, nolentum trahunt” – “Fate leads but the unwilling drags along” (Seneca 1925, 228-229). I believe that we can trace these transformations, which often take grotesque and monstrous forms, to previous periods and observe how they grew out of the various traumatic memories. I found the term “patriotism of despair”, introduced by anthropologist Sergey Alex Oushakine, very elucidating. He researched this term in the Barnaul region in the 1990s and 2000s and came to the following conclusions: “New forms of social kinship emerged through a vocabulary of shared pain: the memory of blood and the memory of suffering seemed to merge in these forms of connectedness. It was this `patriotism of despair` that brought the country, the nation, and the traumatic experience together. A wounded attachment, the patriotism of despair deflected rather than healed pain. It was a promise of a community bound by the solidarity of grief. A community of loss, no doubt, but a community, nonetheless” (Oushakine 2009, 262). For this very reason I found it more probable that a “sentimental contract” based on this sort of shared memory is much more powerful than any official “narrative” in which the governmental manipulators tried to combine elements that can hardy fit together. The despair intensified by shared memory will always produce “patterns of behavior” that will terrify political technologists, professional historians, and the Holy Vatican. To paraphrase Nietzsche, any global memory is only a thin apple peel over a glowing collective memory brazed by shared pain. P.S .: While working on this essay, I made a discovery about my family history on the archival site Podvig Naroda ( https://podvignaroda.ru/?#tab=navHome ). Apart from the entry concerning my grandfather, the medal for courage achieved during the battle that took place on 12 January 1943, I suddenly discovered another entry in the “Irretrievable losses” section. A long list of the soldiers killed in the same battle included my grandfather’s data, his hometown Gzhatsk, the year of his birth, and his elder sister’s address in Moscow. Fortunately, it was a common mistake, as he had been heavily wounded and spent many months in the hospital. In some alternative world my father was never born and in the real world my aunt received a death notification stating that her brother died a heroic death on 12 January 1943 and was buried in the common grave on the board of Chernaya Rechka, in the outskirts of city of Leningrad. Their birthplace was a village near the small town of Gzhatsk in the Smolensk region, where Yuri Gagarin was born, 18 years after my grandfather. Gzhatsk was renamed Gagarin after his premature death but for me Gagarin’s exploit could hardly be separated from what one may call “Soviet Heroic myth”. No matter how huge this leap was for humanity and the professed “global memory”, the fact is that the falling of a small soldier from the town of Gagarin has existential value for me. And this sort of the document will always be more powerful and mind shaking than any history lesson “from the point of view of humanity”. By this I don’t mean my strictly subjective perspective or the existential fear of being never born, but the common value of the shared memories which have pivotal value for the whole “mnemonic community”. It’s no wonder that all the attempts to replace them with some sort of “nobody’s memory” are considered as an existential threat. Whether we wish it or not, we will certainly find ways to deal with this threat. As a poet put it, “Across the peaks of ages, over the heads of governments and poets” Literature Anderson, Benedict. (2006) Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London; New York: Verso. Benda, Julien. (2011) The Treason of the Intellectuals . Translated by R. Aldington. New Brunswick; London: Transaction Publishers. Bell, David A. (2001). The Cult of Nation in France. Inventing Nationalism. 1680-1800. Cambridge, Mas.: Harvard University Press. Deleuze, Gilles. (1990). The Logic of Sense. New York: Columbia University Press. Ehrlich, Sergey (2023). Memory, Identity, and Imagination. The Structure of Behaviour from the Perspective of Memory Studies Figes, Orlando. (2007). The whisperers: private life in Stalin's Russia. London: Allen Lane. Foucault, Michel (1984) What is Enlightenment? In Paul Rabinow(ed) .T h e Foucault Rader , New York ,Pantheon Books , pp . 32-50. Fukuyama, Francis (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press Hanna, Martha (1996). The Mobilization of Intellect. French Scholars and Writers during the Great War. Cambridge, Mas.: Harvard University Press. Latour, Bruno. (2004) Politics of Nature. Cambridge, Mas.: Harvard University Press. Lyotard, François. (1984) The Postmodern Condition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Nievergelt Caroline M. et al. (2018) Genomic Approaches to Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: the Psychiatric Genomic Consortium Initiative. Biol Psychiatry. 2018 May 15;83(10):831-839 [1] The original French name of the chair founded and held by Michel Foucault in College de France was “Histoire des Systems de Pensée”. [2] About the explanations that Staline gave to Eisenstein see Neuberger 2019.
- Sergei Beliakov. Nation, history, memory
Reflections on the article by Serguey Ehrlich “Memory, Identity, and Imagination. The Structure of Behavior from the Perspective of Memory Studies” Annotation. Sergei Beliakov’s article is a response to historian Serguey Ehrlich's article "Memory, Identity, and Imagination" . The Structure of Behavior from the Perspective of Memory Studies". Ehrlich believes that the world of nation-states is unable to respond adequately to the challenges of modernity, and therefore it is necessary to overcome the limitations of national identities and unite them all in a united humanity. This requires deconstructing the structures of collective memory that underlie identity. Sergei Beliakov believes that the plan to deconstruct memory means actual ethnocide and the destruction of ethno-national identities. This is both unacceptable and impossible. A hypothetical attempt would lead to the simplification and impoverishment of world culture, which consists of a multitude of national cultures. It is impossible to preserve them in their entirety when merging them into a single world culture. The realization of such a plan is also impossible because, as Beliakov shows: ethic group, ethnic nation and capitalism, which Ehrlich, following B. Anderson, E. Gellner, and E. Hobsbawm, considers to be recent, artificially constructed projects, are in fact quite ancient, historically formed phenomena. It is either difficult or impossible to deconstruct them through the deconstruction of historical memory. Beliakov points out that an attempt to create a unified identity has already been made in the Soviet Union (an attempt to create a unified Soviet nation). However, this attempt completely failed, and therefore the project proposed by Serguey Ehrlich is utopian. Keywords. Nation, ethnic nation, ethnos, history, historical memory, globalization, nationalism. About the author: Beliakov Sergei S., candidate of History, Associate Professor at the Ural Federal University named after B. N. Yeltsin; Deputy Chief Editor of the magazine «Ural» Contact information: sbeljakov@mail.ru beliakov.sergey@urfu.ru One of Karl Marx's most famous early works Theses on Feuerbach ended with these words: "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, but the point is to change it" (Marks 1955: 4) [1] . We find a reference to these words, somewhat modified, at the end of Serguey Ehrlich’s article. The audacity and scale of what was proposed by Serguey Ehrlich is quite comparable to the most grandiose reconstruction projects proposed by the great visionaries from Plato to the already mentioned Karl Marx. Ehrlich believes that the modern world of nation-states does not meet the current, and much less the future needs of humanity. Nation-states cannot prevent any of the global threats that face humanity. These are the threat of nuclear war, the threat of ecological catastrophe and the threat of growing inequality, which is associated with the development of new technologies and the inevitable loss of jobs for many of those who until recently were engaged in manual or intellectual, but routine labour. The solution to each of these problems does indeed require a radical change in the usual norms and standards of behavior. Thus, one of the causes of the ecological catastrophe is the practice of overconsumption, when people produce and consume much more than necessary, and uncontrollably and irresponsibly spend natural resources. The modern capitalist economy and the established practices of the consumer society push the consuming people to such irresponsible behavior. Finally, there is a fourth threat, which Ehrlich does not include in this list, since, from his point of view, it refers not to the present and future time, but to the past and present. It is about international conflicts and wars between nation-states. And Ehrlich mentions "the two world wars, many armed conflicts, mass terrors, and a wide array of genocides." He believes, however, that the national-state identity is outdated and that it must be replaced by a new identity, a universal one. It is related to the "contemporary reality of the nascent global community." The world will become, or is already becoming, something like Marshall McLuhan's "global village". Ehrlich repeatedly refers to this Canadian thinker. But public consciousness is not yet ready to accept the new reality, people cling to the old world of nation-states, there is a conflict “between the outdated nation-state identity and the contemporary reality of the nascent global community.” People need to be literally remade, to turn French and Germans, Arabs and Jews, Russians and Ukrainians into citizens of this very global village with common values, common myths, common ideas about the world and, most importantly, common identity. And in human identity, the most important role is played by collective memory, which is based on fundamental myths. As a matter of fact, memory is "a collective myth shared by a group"," Serguey Ehrlich quotes Anne Helen Rønning’s "Some Reflections on Myth, History and Memory as Determinants of Narrative". He reinforces this idea with references to the statements of the outstanding anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (the myth " contains practical rules for the guidance of man ") and the famous religious scholar Mircea Eliade, who interpreted myth as “ the paradigmatic model for all human activities ”. But the world is not dominated by the myths of the past, the myths that ensure the existence of nation-states. Therefore, it is necessary to "deconstruct the skeleton of national memory", which will deconstruct national identity itself. Instead, the memory and identity of global humanity will be constructed. Serguey Ehrlich sees this task as feasible, because he considers nations themselves "constructed" artificially and, moreover, relatively recently. In this he entirely follows the ideas of Ernest Gellner (Gellner 2006), Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger (Hobsbawm 1991; The Invention of Tradition 1983) and Benedict Anderson (Anderson 2001). These are ideas about the artificiality of nations and that nations are essentially a by-product and optional product of the modernization and development of capitalism. Ehrlich goes even further than his predecessors, claiming that capitalism is also a nineteenth-century phenomenon, that is, a phenomenon as late as the nation and/or nation-state: " such phenomena of Modernity like nation-state and capitalism are transitory ". And since the "national idea" was introduced into people's consciousness by intellectuals through the construction of national myths, intellectuals can replace it with another, post-national one. The myth of national unity will be replaced by a myth that unites nations into a planetary unity. And such a myth is not seen by Ehrlich, who is neither an ideologue nor a manipulator, but an honest-minded researcher, as a deception. On the contrary, "universal ideals of academic historiography are fully appropriate for the global collective memory of information civilization. From the global perspective memory-identity becomes equivalent to history-truth". Pleasant and noble, but here's what hits us in the eye. Ehrlich quotes several dozen authors, among them many psychologists (up to Vygotsky and Freud), but very rarely refers to the analysis of the historical past. It can be said that the article relies on opinions, on thought constructions, on inferences, but not on historical facts. The article is rather poor in the latter. But the concepts that the author likes are accepted without criticism, as postulates. The views of Gellner, Hobsbawm, and Anderson on the essence and origin of nations are now widespread and almost conventional, but this does not make them any less vulnerable to criticism. But the accuracy or falseness of Ehrlich's own constructions depends on the accuracy or falseness of their views. On terms First of all, a few words must be said about terms. Ehrlich uses the term nation-state, but this concept is too narrow. It cannot be applied to many historically known forms of national identity. It is well known that the nationalist ideal of the nation-state has found little realization anywhere. Such states as Japan and modern Poland, where, respectively, 98% and more than 96% are Japanese and Poles and Japanese and Polish culture reign supreme, are exceptions to the rule. But even in these states there are ethnic minorities that have claimed or are claiming their own statehood, such as the Ainu and Ryukyus in Japan (Low 2012: 57-68). In France in the first half of the twentieth century, many Breton people did not know French, as Simone de Beauvoir noted with surprise (Bovuar 2018: 403). It is therefore possible to speak of a nation-state with great reservations. But there are hundreds of ethnicities and ethnic groups, from a small tribe in Melanesia to multi-million ethnic nations like Poles, Serbs, Ukrainians or Russians, whose existence cannot be doubted. Politicians who deny their existence can (and do) bring trouble on themselves, their country, their neighbors, and perhaps the whole world. We can call them not nation-states, but ethnic nations. The latter term is preferable because it allows us to use the concept of nationalism as well. Benedict Anderson seriously claimed that nations emerge only with the development of "print capitalism," that is, mass commercial book printing in people's languages. Serguey Ehrlich shares his view. But what was there before? Before there were only such "imagined communities" as the dynastic state and the "religious imagined community" (Anderson 2001: 36-45) Let us check. Ethnic nation in the Middle Ages The famous epic poem “La Chanson de Roland” ( Song of Roland ) is one of the first sources where the word "French" appears. It is not a forgery like Macpherson's “Ossian Songs”. There are nine manuscripts of Song of Roland in Old French that have survived. The oldest dates back to the 12th century, but the text was probably written much earlier. It is mentioned in the chronicles of the 11th century. Song of Roland was performed before the famous Battle of Hastings in 1066. So, we have no doubts about the antiquity and authenticity of this source. Although the plot is based on the struggle between Christians and Saracen Muslims, Christians here are not just some kind of "religious community". They are indeed French, the author calls them French. Their king Charles (Charlemagne) is the king or emperor of France. In the heat of battle, Roland, Olivier, and other knights recall "sweet France." Their Saracen enemies also call them French. One of them exclaims: I am going to Ronceval to subdue the French! Roland is dead, if I meet him there, Olivier, the bravest of them all, shall perish, I'll put twelve peers to death with him, The French country shall be desolate forever. (Pesn' o Rolande 1964: 32) Of course, the knights fight for their suzerain king and for the Christian faith, but also for “sweet France”. Loyalty to monarch, faith and nation are not at all mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they combine organically, as different chemical elements can combine in a molecule. The idea of the national superiority of the French is also present in the poem. The French hit their enemies without a miss. The Arabs suffered great casualties: Out of a hundred thousand, two did not survive. Turpin said: “Our people are fearless. There's no other like it. It is written in the Acts of the Franks, that Charles alone had such fighters”. (Pesn' o Rolande 1964: 46) The real Charlemagne was the king of the Germanic-speaking Franks. Charlemagne's capital Aachen is a German city. But we are not interested in the reality of the 8th century, but its perception in the 9th-12th centuries. At that time Charlemagne was already looked at as a French king, he and Margrave Roland began to be perceived as French heroes. Perhaps it should be called a kind of "invention of traditions", but the invention, as we see, was made already in the Middle Ages, adjusting the past to the ideals of the present, and the present was the French identity, which had already appeared in the 11th-12th centuries, although it did not cover the entire population of multi-ethnic France at that time. Under the powerful and glorious King Louis IX of France (13th century), "France and the French began to be spoken of as the new Israel and the new nation of Israel, that is, the God-chosen country and nation" (Malinin 2007: 242). May the remarkable historian and publisher Serguey Ehrlich forgive me, but in light of these words, the phrase about Ernest Renan as "one of the founding fathers of the French nationalism" seems absurd. The modern medievalist Mikhail Dmitriev refers to the words of Pope Clement V, who occupied the papal throne not in Rome but in Avignon and was of French origin. Clement V "wrote as a matter of course that the various kingdoms are founded by God as political entities of the same various peoples according to the division into languages and tribes; and the kingdom of France, like that of the “people of Israel,” is erected for a special divinely chosen people" (Dmitriev 2019: 202). About the real people of Israel we will speak later, but for now I will note that the idea of own people as God's chosen ones is undoubtedly nationalistic. And it was very widespread in those times when religion was still an integral part of the spiritual life of society. In the 16th century in England, John Foxe’s "Book of Martyrs" was a huge success. Since 1571, "a copy of this book should be kept for general use, together with the Bible, in the cathedral churches and residences of archbishops, bishops and abbots". The famous pirate, navigator and naval commander Francis Drake "took it with him to sea" (Makarova 2005: 23). The contemporary researcher Elena Makarova notes that "The book (with illustrations) carried the idea that the English were the chosen people, destined for great deeds and salvation and having a mission to restore the religious purity and unity of the Christian world. The book was to serve as an expression of the devotion of the English to the true religion for which they had suffered before and were prepared to suffer in the future. Foxe pursued the idea, repeated later in the writings of other authors, that England had made a Covenant with God, that it had always been devoted to the true religion in the past, and was now leading the world in the Reformation movement because it was patronized by God" (Makarova 2005: 22-23). The idea of England as the new Israel, of the English as the chosen people was especially popular during the English Revolution. The English were perceived as "a people with the seal of God on them" (Makarova 2005: 46). John Milton exalted the English nation above all others: ”Lords and Commons of England! Think to what nation you belong and what nation you govern: a nation not lazy and dull, but agile, gifted, and possessing a sharp mind; inventive, subtle, and strong in reasoning, capable of rising to the highest stages of human ability" (Milton 1907: 45). The idea of religious chosenness comes to Russia as well. Patriarch Nikon builds the New Jerusalem near Moscow. In Russia from the times of the Moscow kingdom, along with the imperial idea of the Third Rome, there existed the idea of national superiority, the historian of the Russian Orthodox Church Nikolai Kapterev wrote about it. According to him, the Russians already in the 16th-17th centuries formed "a view of themselves as a special, God's chosen people. It was a kind of new Israel, only among whom the right faith and true piety, lost or distorted by all other peoples, were still preserved" (Kapterev 2015). Swedish diplomat Peter Petreius visited Moscow, Novgorod and other Russian cities in 1607-1613. He left a famous work "History of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy" in six books, where he gives such a characteristic: "Russians think that they are the only Christians on earth, and boast that they alone honor, confess and adore God and His merciful Son, and leave all others in the world as non-Christians, pagans and heretics..." (Petrej de Erlezunda 1867: 435). If we turn from the Early Modern period back to the Middle Ages, we will see that the concept of "Russian land" is found, for example, in such a famous monument of Old Russian literature as The Song of Igor's Campaign . After the works of academician A.A. Zaliznyak, the authenticity of this source can be considered quite proven (Zaliznyak 2008). Prince Igor leads “his brave troops against the Kuman land in the name of the Russian land”. Addressing his retinue, he says: "For I wish <…> to break a lance on the limit of the Kuman field; with you, sons of Rus, I wish either to lay down my head or drink helmetful of the Don." "O Russian land, you are already behind the culmen!", – exclaims the author of The Song (Slovo o polku Igoreve 1997) [2] . To think that the Russian land is a "religious imaginary community" is ridiculous, especially if we remember the abundance of pagan connotations in the text of the Song . But let's open another source – The Tale of the Destruction of the Rus’ Land , which dates back to the 13th century. The author begins by praising the greatness and splendor of the Russian land: "Oh, brightly light and beautifully adorned, Russian land!" And then comes the enumeration of the peoples who submitted to the "Christian people." But this is again not a "religious community", because along with pagans (Yatvians, Lithuanians, Cheremis, Karelians), Muslims (Volga Bulgarians), Catholics (Germans, Ugrians-Hungarians) the quite Orthodox "Emperor Manuel of Tsargrad" is mentioned. The Orthodox emperor "from fear great gifts sent <...> so that Grand Duke Vladimir would not take Tsargrad from him". It is interesting, that in a very small text twelve ethnic groups are mentioned, including Ugrians (Hungarians) who "strengthened stone walls of the cities with iron gates so that great Vladimir would not subdue them", and Germans. The latter supposedly "rejoiced that they were far away - beyond the Blue Sea" (Slovo o pogibeli Russkoj zemli 1997). A nationalist publicist of the XIX century could have written this way, but the author, unknown to us, lived six hundred years earlier. In the same thirteenth century, the Czech king Ottokar II "in his 'Manifesto to the Poles' with all eloquence" exhorted "to remain faithful to the linguistic and blood kinship of Czechs and Poles in order to “finally shut up the German insatiable mouth” (Hyubner 2001: 42). How can one not ask, following Kurt Hübner, the rhetorical question: "After all this, one really has to ask, where did the well-known cliché about the complete foreignness of national consciousness to the Middle Ages come from?"? (Hyubner 2001: 55) Ethnic nation in the ancient world Anderson and Gellner distinctly contrast the age of nationalism with the eras that preceded it. They contrast it as if they were talking about the world before and after the Big Bang. Meanwhile, it is rather difficult to calculate the epoch of the emergence of ethnic nations or ethnic groups, because no matter what epoch we turn to in written sources, we find ethnic groups there. Bede the Venerable, for example, lived at the turn of the 7th and 8th centuries. His main work in the original language is called Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum (Ecclesiastical History of the English People). His gentis anglorum is either the ethnicity of the Angles (one of the German-speaking tribes that migrated to England) or the entire Anglo-Saxon ethnicity. Despite the political fragmentation (in Britain they created several kingdoms), the Anglo-Saxons, apparently, constituted an ethno-cultural integrity. At least, they differed markedly from the Celtic peoples who inhabited Ireland and Britain - the Scotts, Picts, and Britons. This is the conclusion that the book of Bede the Venerable allows us to draw. He describes how the Britons, suffering from the raids of the Picts and Scots, first seek help from the Romans, and after their withdrawal from the British Isles invite the Anglo-Saxons, who then turn their weapons against the Britons themselves. "Meanwhile, the Saxons and Picts waged war against the Britons" ( Beda Dostopochtennyj 2003 : 25), Bede the Venerable writes. It is quite obvious that ethnic identity plays a role in political unification as well. So we can talk about ethnic nations in this period as well. More than eight hundred years before this book, Gaius Julius Caesar gives a brief but valuable description of the Gauls and the Germans in his The Gallic Wars . They are different ethnic groups with different customs ( Zapiski Yuliya Cezarya 1948 : 3-217). And even half a millennium before Caesar, the "father of history" Herodotus again mentions many different ethnic groups that inhabit different lands and differ from each other in their customs. The ancient Greeks are different from the barbarians, and the latter are extremely diverse. The Scythians are one thing, the Phoenicians, the Egyptians, the Persians are another. All have their own customs, and Herodotus willingly tells about them ( Gerodot 2017). Moreover, Gellner and Anderson's claim that as if in antiquity the state was not interested in the cultural peculiarities of the population is also incorrect. For this, it is enough to recall at least such a phenomenon as Romanization in the Roman Empire. We cannot say that Romanization was violent, generally it was peaceful. But its results were very effective. As noted by Fustel de Coulanges, "Gaul assimilated the customs, lifestyle and even tastes of the Romans. Its cities adopted the appearance of the cities of Italy and Greece. <...> The habits of private life changed as well as public orders. The character of the education of the young changed. In place of the old Druid schools, where even writing was banished, there appeared secular educational institutions where poetry, rhetoric, and mathematics were taught..." ( Fyustel' de Kulanzh 2021: 159, 160). Perhaps any nation-state of the 19th and 20th centuries could take an example from the Romans. However, there were known in antiquity examples and policies of quite a different plan, more reminiscent of the events in the Balkans or Africa in the 20th century. For this you do not even need to be an expert on the history of the ancient world, but it is enough to carefully read the Bible. For example, in the book of Numbers it is said that the children of Israel, having crossed the Jordan, should “drive out all the inhabitants of the land from before you”. If this is not done, “those of them whom you let remain shall be as barbs in your eyes and thorns in your sides, and they shall trouble you in the land where you dwell” (Numbers 33: 52, 55). Many ethnic groups are mentioned in the Bible, from the Hittites to the Philistines, from the Egyptians to the Moabites. The books of Exodus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, and the books of Kings may provide the most abundant food for researchers of ethno-religious nationalism, although the events described in them date back to the end of the second millennium B.C. and the books themselves were apparently written in the first half of the first millennium B.C. And it would be naive to think that the Jews were some strange exception in the ancient world. The history of the relationship between the ancient Greeks and the barbarians will also provide much of interest. As we can see, it is by no means possible to claim that the ethnic nation is a late and transitory phenomenon. Ethnic nations are not a product of modernity at all. Neither nations, nor even nation-states are at all " imagined by ‘philologists’ in the interests of the bourgeoisie “ as Ehrlich writes following Anderson. The bourgeoisie probably has nothing to do with it at all, although a few words should be said about it as well. Capitalism in the ancient world The concept of "capitalism" is only slightly less debatable than the concept of "nation". There are many approaches to its definition. It is not possible to dwell on all of them now, but it is important to note that even such a recognized authority as Max Weber proceeded from the prevailing perceptions of his time (Veber 2017). And his era was a time of Eurocentrism and colonialism. This gave reason to consider the real, authentic capitalism to be the Western capitalism of his era. This allowed to compare all other historical forms with it as a kind of model, and to deny them the right to be considered forms of capitalism if they did not at least in some respects coincide with the model. Moreover, Max Weber and other sociologists and social philosophers, with all their undoubted erudition, were too immersed in the realities of their time; history was of secondary importance to them. I propose to turn to the definition of capitalism given by their contemporary, the outstanding historian of antiquity and archaeologist Mikhail Rostovtsev. A subtle source researcher, a brilliant connoisseur of ancient history, he quite willingly operated with such concepts as "bourgeoisie" and "capitalism". Rostovtsev called "capitalism" "such a form of economy, the purpose of which is not consumption but income generation" (Rostovtsev 2000: 267). That is, he contrasted the commodity economy with the subsistence economy. Rostovtsev, who was often reproached for excessive "modernization" of ancient history, stipulates that capitalism in antiquity "did not yet exist in the forms, that are typical for our time". But we have already spoken about the Eurocentricity of the views that prevailed at that time. Already the first civilization known to us from written sources, the Sumerian civilization, could not exist without developed international trade. Sumer lacked the most important materials: stone, wood, metals. All this had to be imported from neighboring and sometimes quite distant countries. It was possible to get it all militarily, raiding neighbors. "More often, however, such goods were acquired through trade," write the authors of The Cambridge History of Capitalism ( Kembridzhskaya istoriya 2021: 47). In return, the Sumerians could supply high-quality pottery and grain, of which Sumer had a surplus. Sumerian civilization emerges in the fourth millennium BC and gradually declines at the turn of the third and second millennia. The second millennium BC in the Middle East is the heyday of the Bronze Age. The technology of bronze production again required highly developed trade, because copper was mined in some countries (Cyprus), and tin was brought from other countries (from Britain to Central Asia). Numerous economic documents and business correspondence preserved from that era allow us to judge about the high level of development of capitalist relations. There was private property, market economy (although the state could interfere in it), banking, international trade. There were known loans, bills of exchange, accrual of interest, including compound interest (Yankovskaya 2010: 48). The trade association of the Hittite city of Kanisha in the 19th and 18th centuries BC was engaged in wholesale trade. The association was poly-ethnic, it "was attended by envoys of countries from all over the world (Yankovskaya 2010: 47)," wrote orientalist-assyriologist Ninel Yankovskaya. It wasn’t just the nobles who were consumers. During excavations in Crete, imported "precious things" were found "not only in the main palaces <...> but also in ordinary dwellings and ordinary burials." "Judging from the transactions of the Kanishites, specimens of tools and weapons, raw materials for crafts, including tons of copper, bronze, white and dyed wool, hides, and honey, were in circulation; fine fabrics and precious utensils filled the flow of 'living money' along with incense." The traders' profits were "fabulous" (Yankovskaya 2010: 47, 49, 46). More than a thousand years later, the New Babylonian kingdom also had a fully capitalist economy. The authors of The Cambridge History of Capitalism chose the so-called "long sixth century" B.C. (from the end of the 7th century to 484 BC) to analyze. More than 20,000 cuneiform tablets remain from this period. At this time, Mesopotamian agricultural production "had a clear market orientation." Most of the workers were wage laborers, paid in silver for their labor. The famous temple farms of Babylonia sold up to half of their produce on the market for silver. "The economy was more monetized than ever before - silver not only served as a means of payment in large transactions, but also worked in everyday settlements. Few among the urban population could remain completely apart from the monetary economy. Consumption patterns suggest a substantially higher level of wealth than in earlier periods of Babylonian history" ( Kembridzhskaya istoriya 2021: 51). The economy in the period of Classical Greece and Hellenistic era was also quite capitalistic, and "thanks to sea transportation and a highly developed trade network, trade with distant countries was not only in expensive goods, but also in bulk quantities of consumer goods" ( Kembridzhskaya istoriya 2021: 84 ). Aristotle in Politics talks about how people managed to get rich. For example, the famous philosopher, mathematician and astronomer Thales of Miletus decided on the basis of astronomical observations that in the coming year there would be a large harvest of olives. So he leased all the oil mills in Miletus and on Chios. When the big harvest of olives was gathered, it appeared that Thales was a monopolist. And he began to sublet the oil mills on his own terms, thus enriching himself. A certain man in Syracuse "bought all the iron from the iron-making workshops for the money given to him on interest, and then, when the traders from the harbors arrived, began to sell iron as a monopolist, with a small extra charge on its usual price. And yet he made a hundred from fifty talents" (Aristotel’ 1983: 397). Note that the Syracusan conducted the operation on the money "given on interest", that is, on credit. These transactions are typical for the capitalist mode of trade and finance, which in one form or another are common in our time as well. Thales lived in the 7th-6th centuries BC, Aristotle - in the 4th century BC. According to Mikhail Rostovtsev, "the commercial capitalism characteristic of Greek cities, observed there as early as the 4th century, reaches in Hellenistic states such a degree of development, which is comparable to what we see in the economic history of Europe in the 19th-20th centuries. The Hellenistic cities of the East had a large local market and conducted a significant and constantly expanding foreign trade in conditions of mutual competition" (Rostovtsev 2000: 21). Let us recall the famous parable about talents from the Gospel of Matthew, which is usually dated to the middle of the 1st century A.D. One very rich man instructed his servants to manage his funds wisely. He gave one servant 5 talents of silver, another 2 talents, and a third 1 talent. The first servant " traded with them, and he made five talents more", the second servant also “made two talents more", and the third servant did not put the silver into circulation, but buried his talent in the ground. The discontented master praised the first two servants, and said to the third: "You wicked and slothful servant! <...> you ought to have invested my money with the bankers, and at my coming I should have received what was my own with interest." (Matthew 25: 14-27). Usually, everyone is interested in the allegorical meaning of Christ's parable, but I am interested in the literal one. I mean how the socio-economic realities of early Roman Judea are reflected in the text of the Gospel. As we can see, the master required the servants to invest their money to get a profit. Judging from the fact that the evangelist relates this parable, financial transactions, investments, deposits, and loans were common and socially approved. This is a completely capitalistic relationship. If this was the case in the provinces, it would be strange to suppose that it was otherwise in Italy itself. Rostovtzev found already in the Roman Republic of the 2nd to 1st centuries BC the "capitalism of almost the same type that was widespread in the East before and during the Hellenistic period." Moreover, "the most important branch of trade was not the sale of luxury goods, but the exchange of such products of everyday consumption as bread, fish, vegetable oil, wine, flax, hemp, wool, construction wood, metals..." (Rostovtsev 2000: 51). In large, rich, comfortable cities a wealthy urban class was formed: "Most of its representatives were landowners; some owned rental houses and various shops, others were engaged in usury and banking". In Rome itself, "deals were concluded at the daily exchange meetings near the temple of Castor in the Forum <...> Here it was cramped with people, in the crowd there was a lively trade in shares of the companies for the repayment of taxes, all kinds of goods, which were sold both for cash and on credit, land located in Italy and the provinces, houses and shops located in Rome and other cities, ships and trading houses, slaves and livestock. In the shops located near the Forum and in the neighboring streets, thousands of free artisans and workshop owners, thousands of slaves, clerks and laborers, who worked for rich capitalists, manufactured their goods and sold them to customers" (Rostovtsev 2000: 47). Symbolically, over the bakery in Pompeii was inscribed: "salve lucrum" - "Long live profit", or "Hello, profit" ( Kembridzhskaya istoriya 2021: 73 ). As we can see, capitalist relations of the ancient world were widespread. Perhaps, it is not even worth wasting time and telling about the trade operations of Italian cities in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, they are quite well known to historians. At the same time, in my opinion, we cannot speak of any influence of this intensive trade and financial activity on the formation of identities. Paradoxically, culture divides people, while trade brings them closer together. Fernand Braudel wrote that as late as the 16th century the Mediterranean world was culturally and politically divided, but constituted a economic unity, which even wars between Spaniards and Turks, Christians and Muslims could not destroy. Merchant ships crossed the line that separated the Christian and Muslim parts of the Mediterranean. In 1500, Christian merchants were trading "in Syria, in Egypt, in Istanbul, and in North Africa; later, the Levantine merchants, Turks, Armenians would spread to the Adriatic basin. The economy, invading everywhere, moving money and exchanges around, led to a certain unity, whereas the rest was conducive to disunity..." (Brodel 2019: 202) Brodel writes that this was also the case in antiquity (Brodel 2019: 203). It is hard to disagree with him. This was the case in the Bronze Age, in the Hellenistic period, and in the Roman Empire, and it will remain so today. It is not without reason that big capital usually quickly becomes international. Oligarchs acquire assets in other countries, change citizenship depending on what is more profitable now. This does not mean that capitalists are deprived of national identity. Billionaire Oleg Tinkov wrote that he felt himself a Russian and Orthodox person when he settled in the United States for a long time (Tin’kov 2010). He has now renounced his Russian citizenship for political reasons, but has clearly retained his Russian identity. Another billionaire, Mikhail Fridman, once walked across the Arabah desert, thus repeating part of the way his Jewish ancestors, according to the Bible, walked from Egypt to Canaan (Korobov 2013). At the same time, Fridman was born in what was then Soviet Ukraine, lived for many years in London, held a jazz festival in Ukrainian Lviv, and owned the largest private bank in Russia. Fridman's business partner German Khan, a native of Kiev who now lives in Russia, also walked through the desert with Fridman. People of many different nations trade on stock exchanges. Trading unites them, not divides them. Capitalists are the most influential supporters of globalization, which is so sweet to Serguey Ehrlich's heart. In any case, we see that capitalism (in the broad sense of the word) has existed for a very long time, just as the ethnic nation has. These are ancient and quite stable phenomena. They cannot be destroyed by the purposeful activity of some volunteer intellectuals, about whom Serguey Ehrlich writes. The attempt to deconstruct nations and capitalism will, at best, simply fail. At worst, it will lead to dangerous and hard-to-predict consequences. Memory or historical memory? Serguey Ehrlich is absolutely correct in pointing out the crucial role of memory (I would say historical memory) in the formation of identity. I would like to object to something else - the exaggeration of the role of intellectuals in the formation of identity and collective memory. I am speaking about those philologists, or more about historians, allegedly bought by capitalists and the state. At the behest of capitalists, they invent the myth of collective kinship to unite people in the interests of the same capitalists. But concepts of collective kinship and historical memory of common ancestors are known among many peoples since antiquity. It is not so important whether this kinship really existed or not. It is important that the true or false memory of it was extremely significant for people. Let us turn again to the Bible. Marriage with foreigners is so discouraged that Lot's daughters prefer to sleep with their own father and have a child by him (Gen 19: 31-38). Incest appears to be a lesser evil than marriage to men of a different ethnicity. Abraham does not want his son Isaac to marry "a native, a Canaanite woman." He sends his servant to find Isaac a bride "in my country" (Gen 24:2-4). As we know, this bride is Abraham's relative Rebekah. In turn, when the time comes for Isaac and Rebekah's son Jacob to marry, a bride of the right ethnicity is again sought. The marriage of their eldest son, Esau, who is married to two Hittite women, is strongly disliked by his parents. Rebekah says to Isaac, “ I loathe my life because of the Hittite women. If Jacob marries one of the Hittite women like these, one of the women of the land, what good will my life be to me? ” (Gen 27:46) Isaac is of the same opinion, he warns against mixing with another ethnic group: " You must not take a wife from the Canaanite women. " (Gen 28: 1). Now, thanks to research on genetic geography, we know that notions of 'ethnic purity' are of course among the myths (Genetic Heritage 2015). But this myth was one that played a role in the formation of identity. But there were other elements of historical memory that shaped the identity of the ancient Jewish people, e.g. the idea of God's covenant with Abraham and then with Moses, the observance of the Torah, etc. In this case, religion helped to preserve and retransmit historical memory, but, as I have already said, it was not exclusively religious, but ethno-religious identity. There were other ways, not related to religion, of preserving historical memory and shaping identity. The great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko was a vivid figure of Ukrainian nationalism, its symbol, a kind of national "deity". Shevchenko's poetry is deeply national. However, Shevchenko's identity could not be formed by the Ukrainian school or the press, because in the Russian Empire of Shevchenko's time there was neither yet. Until he was twenty-three years old, he did not socialize even with the then few Ukrainian intellectuals (Zhur 1996: 29-38). And a person's identity is apparently formed by the age of fourteen or fifteen (Beliakov 2022: 352-356). So how did Shevchenko's identity take shape? He himself did not hide it. His identity was formed by the village environment of his childhood and youth. From childhood he heard native Ukrainian speech, listened and sang folk songs and thoughts about the recent and more distant past. Shevchenko himself frankly and sincerely told in the poem "Haidamaky", how together with others he listened to the stories of his grandfather. And he told about the events of his childhood: about Koliiivshchyna (Ukrainian uprising in 1768 against the Poles, accompanied by Jewish pogroms), about how atamans Zaliznyak and Honta "punished" the Poles. And the poet thanks his grandfather, who preserved in his hundred-year-old head the glory of kozak haidamaks (Shevchenko 2003: 187). An important role in the identity of Shevchenko's contemporary, prominent Russian thinker Alexander Herzen, was played by the memory of the War of 1812, the Russian victory over Napoleon and the fire of Moscow. This memory was not created by state propaganda, which had not yet had time to arise. His family and friends were contemporaries and participants in these events. Here is how Herzen wrote himself about his national education and formation of memory: "I still, as through a dream, remember the traces of the fire, which remained until the early twenties, large charred houses without frames, without roofs, collapsed walls, fenced wastelands, the remains of stoves and pipes on them. The stories about the fire of Moscow, the Battle of Borodino, Berezina, the capture of Paris were my lullaby, my childhood fairy tales, my Iliad and Odyssey. My mother and our servants, my father and Vera Artamonovna, returned ceaselessly to the formidable time that had struck them so recently, so near, and so abruptly. Then the returning generals and officers began to visit Moscow. My father's old comrades in arms in the Izmailovsky regiment, now participants, covered with the glory of the bloody struggle which had just ended, often came to see us. They rested from their labors and deeds by telling about them. It was indeed the most brilliant time of the St. Petersburg period; the consciousness of strength gave new life, business and cares seemed to be put off till tomorrow, weekdays, now one wanted to feast on the joys of victory. Here I heard even more about the war than from Vera Artamonovna. I loved Count Miloradovich's stories, he spoke with extreme vividness, with sharp facial expressions, with loud laughter, and more than once I fell asleep to them on the sofa behind his back" (Herzen 1956: 22). Herzen and Shevchenko learned about the events, contemporaries and/or participants of which were their family members, relatives or just family friends. But here is an example of historical memory that has been held for centuries. In Russia, an important element of historical memory is the heroic defense of the town of Kozelsk in the spring of 1238. The small town fought against the huge and then invincible Mongol army of Batu Khan and his commander Subutai for seven weeks. Much longer than any other town in Russia. Nowadays one learns about it from school textbooks and teachers' stories. However, for 700 years the memory of the defense of Kozelsk was passed from generation to generation. Apparently, it was not all-Russian, but local, regional memory. But it existed. Proof of this is an episode, which is usually not included in history textbooks. However, the inhabitants of Kozelsk and its surroundings remembered it. During the siege the Mongols from Batu Khan’s army were supplied with food by the inhabitants of one of the neighboring villages. Moreover, according to the legend, a woman from this village for a cheap gift (beads or a mirror) probably showed a secret passage, by which the Mongols managed to take Kozelsk in the end. Even the name of this village Deshovki (from the Russian word "cheap") was interpreted in this way: its inhabitants or the woman sold themselves cheaply to the enemies. The memory was preserved so firmly that even at the beginning of the 20th century the residents of Kozelsk did not marry girls from this village and did not allow its residents to marry girls from Kozelsk (Beliakov 2013: 665-666). As we can see, there are ancient and quite stable mechanisms of formation and retransmission of historical memory, in addition to state propaganda and the efforts of nationally minded intellectuals. These mechanisms in many respects still need to be studied. And what will Serguey Ehrlich do with these mechanisms? An attempt to destroy them and replace ethno-national identity with a universal one would mean real ethnocide. It would mean the destruction of a real (not fictitious or "imagined") identity. It would be not the murder of a person, but the cultural "murder" of entire nations. The Russian historian Lev Gumilev drew attention back in the 1970s to the fact that humanity - the anthroposphere - is actually disintegrating into a mosaic ethnosphere (Gumilev 1993: 104). Gumilev, unfortunately, is little known in the West, and his reputation in Russia is ambiguous, but his thought is undoubtedly correct. And the elimination of the entire ethnosphere seems to be a task as dangerous as it is unrealizable. Toward the shores of Utopia According to Serguey Ehrlich, an important factor of unification should be a "global memory" of the "traumatic experience" of the past. In doing so, strangers will become one's own. People will learn to accept other people's tragedy as their own. He cites the memory of the Holocaust as an example. I am not sure that people around the world will accept as their own the tragedy of the Jewish people during World War II. How is the Holocaust viewed in the Middle East now? And what do people in China, Indonesia, Vietnam know about it? In early 2012, on the Russian entertainment channel MuzTV, during the show "Insanely Beautiful," two Moscow students said that "the Holocaust is wallpaper glue." Of course, the girls were enlightened, taken on a tour of Auschwitz-Birkenau. Now they know what the Holocaust is. But it is not certain that it will be possible to educate the entire world population in the same way. However, even if this succeeds, Serguey Ehrlich and his supporters will face an even more difficult problem. What about the memory of the Armenian genocide? The very mentioning of it will cause a quarrel with Turks and Azerbaijanis. And the refusal to mention it will cause Armenian outrage. When millions of Turks and Azerbaijanis accept the tragedy of 1915 as their own, I will agree with Serguey Ehrlich. But now, such a majestic and touching picture can exist only in the imagination. I would add: in a sufficiently developed, rich imagination. Serguey Ehrlich, as a professional and highly qualified historian, realizes that politicians and military leaders cannot become part of the common historical memory of mankind. Winston Churchill is a hero to the British, but to the people of India and Kenya he is a colonizer and a criminal. General Alexander Suvorov is a hero to the Russians, but to the Poles he is a cruel conqueror and enemy. Therefore, Ehrlich proposes to turn to cultural, not political, figures. It is they who should play the most important role in the formation of universal memory. It is not a coincidence that the chapter devoted to this idea is called "Shakespeare is ours!" Yes, the example of Shakespeare is apt. He is one of those authors who proved to be close and understandable not only to the English and most Europeans in general, but also to the Russians and Japanese. His success in continental Europe was not hindered even by the glorification of the conqueror Henry V, who almost eliminated the French statehood. But not all national geniuses are as understood and sought after outside the national culture as Shakespeare. Say, the above-mentioned Shevchenko is a genius of Ukrainian culture. But his poems lose a lot in translation even into the close Russian language, they lose their power, musicality, melody, charm. The same happens with the poems of many poets. And prose writers are not always translatable. For example, in the list of Russian authors, which Ehrlich proposes to include in the universal pantheon, Andrei Platonov is absent. This is one of the great Russian writers, but his language is almost impossible to adequately translate. For the Russians the chief genius is not Tolstoy or Dostoevsky, but Pushkin. But there is no place for him, as I can see, as well as for Lermontov. Here is what Serguey Ehrlich writes: " For Russians the prime rank of national memory luminaries should be Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, Tchaikovsky and Shostakovich, the creators of Russian medieval icons and Russian avant-garde paintings, Mendeleev and Bakhtin, Zvorykin and the Russian explorers of the Universe ." Why are Russian icon painters and representatives of the Russian avant-garde on this list? Probably because their works are now the most demanded on the "market" of world art. But is it due to their skill and originality, or simply to fashion, which plays a colossal role not only in art and literature, but also in the humanities? It offends me that this list does not include representatives of Russian portrait painting of the 18th and early 19th centuries. Let's reсall at least the paintings from Dmitry Levitsky's series "Smolian women". The painter subtly conveyed in the portraits of these young girls mincing manners and naive coquetry, characteristic of that era, together with their naivety and directness. Each is unique. They are not geniuses of thought or luminaries of science, but an ordinary, very young girl has a personality, and each is a whole world. And all this we see in the picture of the artist, and not in the explanations of an art historian, as it often happens with the works of artists of the 20th century. Take the portrait of the rich man, philanthropist and horticulturist Prokofi Demidov by the same Levitsky, or the portrait of Empress Catherine II on a walk, a painting by Vasily Borovikovsky. Before us are living, original people. They are depicted in such detail, so expressive that the pictures show us the characters, habits, tastes of Demidov and Catherine no worse than a good historian or biographer could do. Maria Lopukhina in Borovikovsky's portrait became almost a Russian Mona Lisa. This is an incredible, mysterious picture. The artist's model died young, but, as the Russian poet Yakov Polonsky wrote: "Borovikovsky saved her beauty". So part of her soul has not flown away from us, And this look and this beauty of body Will attract indifferent offspring to her, To teach them to love, to suffer, to forgive, to be silent. And all this should be exchanged for Kandinsky's colored strokes, for Malevich's geometric figures, which are conventionally admired? Serguey Ehrlich has not written what will remain in his new global world, say, of French art. I will assume by analogy with Russian art that the Impressionists of the late 19th century and the School of Paris of the first half of the 20th century will remain. What about Poussin? Watteau? Boucher? Ingres? Are they to be consigned to the dumping ground of art history? Even these examples show how impoverished the world culture will become if a universal "pantheon of memory" emerges from the inflorescence of national cultures, and everything that will not be included in it will be discarded as of little value for the united humanity. A very sad utopia. But it is a utopia, indeed. We can speak about it quite confidently. The fact is that in the history of mankind there was an attempt to create a common identity with a common memory, a system of values and a pantheon of heroes. And Serguey Ehrlich knows this very well. He even writes about how the Soviet Union of the 1920s tried to "create an identity using the international values of the future world revolution and denying the “accursed past of Russian autocracy” and nationalist feelings." The poet Vladimir Mayakovsky expressed this idea in a lapidary but extremely precise way in his poem "To Comrade Netta, a Steamboat and a Man": "in a world without Russias, without Latvias, to live as a single human community". The ideals of Mayakovsky and Ehrlich coincide in this. Both are supporters of internationalism and opponents not only of nationalism, but also of bourgeoisie. However, the Soviet experiment failed. And not only because Stalin decided to scrap it and replace internationalism with "patriotic education." As David Brandenberger convincingly showed in his works Stalin's Russocentrism (Brandenberger 2017) and National Bolshevism (Brandenberger 2002), Stalin's turn in national policy was tactical and pragmatic. In the late 1920s, according to the Joint State Political Directorate , a great many people in the USSR were not ready to fight for the interests of the world proletariat and for Bolshevik power. International values did not take root well, did not become native or at least simply meaningful. Therefore, Stalin had to turn to a more effective way to mobilize the population, which turned out to be "Russocentrism". But this does not mean that the project of creating an international socialist community was left in the past. It was pursued in parallel. The creation of a unified Soviet literature was part of the project of creating a Soviet nation: "...Soviet literature is not only the literature of the Russian language, it is an all-union literature. Since the literatures of our fraternal republics, differing from us only in language, live and work in the light and under the beneficial influence of the same idea that unites the entire world of workers fragmented by capitalism, it is clear that we have no right to ignore the literary creativity of the national minorities only because we are more numerous" ( Stenograficheskij otchet 1934: 15), - Maxim Gorky, one of the ideologists of Stalin's regime, said on August 17, 1934 at the first congress of Soviet writers. Russian writers and translators translated Georgian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Uzbek, and Tajik (in fact, Tajik-Persian) authors into Russian for many years. These books were published in large print runs, and the translators earned a rich life by Soviet standards, as the state spared no expense in educating the united Soviet people. From 1939 a literary miscellany was published, and from 1955 a monthly magazine called Druzhba Narodov (Friendship of Peoples). It specialized precisely in the publication of translations by writers of the nations of the USSR. The results were rather disappointing. Books by translated Ukrainian, Tajik, Uzbek, and Lithuanian authors were rarely successful among readers. Students of philology scornfully referred to the course of literature of the peoples of the USSR as "wild literature," which was, of course, the truest expression of xenophobia. And although the Soviet constitution of 1977 spoke of the Soviet people as a new historical community, the collapse of the USSR and violent inter-ethnic conflicts showed that the experiment to create a pan-Soviet (and in the long run, a world-wide) community of people had utterly failed. Is it worth going the way of Lenin, Mayakovsky and Gorky again? It is well known where this path leads. Epilogue But what about the response to the challenges of the modern world? Nuclear threat, global ecological catastrophe, growing inequality associated with the development of new technologies? Of course, it is much easier to respond to these challenges together than separately. But nothing can be done. When the plague pandemic swept the world in the 14th century, it would have been easier to cope with it if people had united. Then it would have been possible to establish a more or less effective quarantine system. Alas, in the 21st century we are almost as far from unification as in the 14th century. The recent coronavirus pandemic showed that. So it will be up to individual nations and states to fight pollution and the threat of nuclear conflict, although they will surely be able (and sometimes still are) to cooperate in the name of common interests. Perhaps I partially agree with only one of Serguey Ehrlich's ideas. It concerns the third threat. It is not so much about inequality as about the fact that millions of people will soon lose their jobs. But they will have the opportunity to change routine labor into creative work. Actually, this is a long-standing and almost utopian idea, but nowadays its realization is becoming a reality. In Russia there is now a real boom of interest not in reading, but in literary creativity itself. Various writing courses are extremely popular. I have been working in a literary magazine for twenty years, and for many years I have been taking part in various literary seminars and festivals. According to my observations, there are now more than a hundred good prose writers in Russia and about the same number, if not more, of good poets. In addition, there are several times as many who are capable of writing at least one good short story, a good poem, or a book of memoirs. Most of them will never become famous writers, but they find joy in the very process of creation and succeed in creative work. And besides literature there are many other spheres of activity where people have an opportunity for creative self-realization. Serguey Ehrlich writes as if in a capitalist nation-state the privilege of creative activity belongs to the chosen ones. The situation will change only in a new world, not divided into nation-states. But reality, as we can see, tells a different story. So the answer to this challenge will be given not by the united humanity, but by each country separately. This is quite natural, especially since the development of countries is far from being synchronized. Even Russia and European countries live in different historical times, let alone other countries and regions. It is better to go into the future separately, but peacefully. Bibliography Anderson 2001 – Anderson B. Voobrazhaemye soobschestva. Razmyshleniya ob istokax i rasprostranenii nazionalizma. Moscow, 2001 ( Андерсон Б. Воображаемые сообщества. Размышления об истоках и распространении национализма. М., 2001). Aristotel’ 1983 – Aristotel’. Sochineniya: v 4 tomah. T. 4. Moscow, 1983 (Аристотель. Сочинения: В 4 томах. Т. 4. М., 1983). Beliakov 2013 – Beliakov S.S. Gumilev syn Gumileva. Moscow, 2013 (Беляков 2013 — Беляков С.С. Гумилев сын Гумилева. М., 2013). Beliakov 2022 – Beliakov S.S. Parizhskiye mal’chiki v stalinskoy Moskve. Moscow, 2022 (Беляков С.С. Парижские мальчики в сталинской Москве. М., 2022). Beda Dostopochtennyj 2003 – Beda Dostopochtennyj. Cerkovnaya istoriya naroda anglov. St. Petersburg , 2003 (Беда Достопочтенный. Церковная история народа англов. СПб, 2003). Biblia. Knigi Sviachennogo Pisaniya kanonicheskiye / Sovremenny russky perevod. Moscow, 2011 (Библия. Книги Священного Писания канонические /Современный русский перевод. М., 2011). Bovuar 2018 – Bovuar de S. Zrelost’. Moscow, 2018 (Бовуар де С. Зрелость. М., 2018.) Brandenberger 2017 – Brandenberger D. Stalinskij russocentrism. Sovetskaya massovaya kultura I formirovaniye russkogo nacionalnogo samosoznaniya (1931-1956). Moscow, 2017 (Бранденбергер Д. Сталинский руссоцентризм. Советская массовая культура и формирование русского национального самосознания (1931–1956 гг.). М., 2017). Brandenberger 2002 — Brandenberger D. National Bolshevism. Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian Identity, 1931 — 1956. Harvard University Press, 2002. Brodel' 2019 – Brodel' F. Mirovoe i pereferijnoe prostranstva // Fukuyama F., Brodel' F. Triumf globalizma. Konec istorii ili nachalo? M., 2018. (Бродель Ф. Мировое и переферийное пространства // Фукуяма Ф., Бродель Ф. Триумф глобализма. Конец истории или начало? М., 2019). Dmitriev 2019 — Dmitriev M.V. «Srednevekov'e» i «modernost'»? Dve neobhodimye illyuzii v kontekste voprosa o «nacional'nom». (Дмитриев М.В. «Средневековье» и «модерность»? Две необходимые иллюзии в контексте вопроса о «национальном»). Vox medii aevi. 2019. Vol. 2(5). S. 192–208. URL: http://voxmediiaevi.com/2019-2-dmitriev Foxe — Fox J. Book of Martyrs, containing an Account of the Sufferings and Death of the Protestants in the Reign of Queen Mary. URL: https://pdflake.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Foxes-Book-of-Martyrs-PDF.pdf Fyustel' de Kulanzh 2021 — Fyustel' de Kulanzh N.D. Rimskaya Galliya. Moscow, 2021 (Фюстель де Куланж — Фюстель де Куланж Н.Д. Римская Галлия. М., 2021). Gellner 1992 – Gellner E. Prishestviey nacionalisma. Mify nacii I klassa. Mezhdunarodny filosofsky zhurnal. 1992. №1. (Геллнер Э. Пришествие национализма. Мифы нации и класса // Международный философский журнал. 1992. № 1). Gellner 2006 — Gellner E. Nations and Nationalism. Second edition. Introduction by John Breuilly. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 2006. Genetic Heritage 2015 — Kushniarevich A, Utevska O, Chuhryaeva M, Agdzhoyan A, Dibirova K, Uktveryte I, et al. (2015) Genetic Heritage of the Balto-Slavic Speaking Populations: A Synthesis of Autosomal, Mitochondrial and Y-Chromosomal Data. PLoS ONE 10(9). URL: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0135820 Gerodot 2017 — Gerodot. Istoriya. Moscow, 2017 (Геродот. История. М., 2017). Gercen 1956 — Gercen A.I. Byloe i dumy. 1852-1868 Chasti I-III // Gercen A.I. Sobranie sochinenij v 30 t. T. 8. Moscow, 1956 (Герцен А.И. Былое и думы. 1852-1868 Части I-III // Герцен А.И. Собрание сочинений в 30 т. Т. 8. М., 1956). Gumilev 1993 – Gumilev L.N. Etnosfera: istoria ludej i istoria prirody. Moscow, 1993. Hobsbawm 1991 — Hobsbawm E. J. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge University Press, 1991. Hyubner 2001 — Hyubner K. Naciya: ot zabveniya k vozrozhdeniyu. Moscow, 2001 (Хюбнер К. Нация: от забвения к возрождению. М., 2001). Kapterev 2015 — Kapterev N.F. Sobranie sochinenij. T. 1. 2015 (Каптерев Н.Ф. Собрание сочинений. Т. 1. 2015). URL: https://www.litres.ru/book/nikolay-kapterev/sobranie-sochineniy-tom-1-11828804/ Kembridzhskaya istoriya 2021 — Kembridzhskaya istoriya kapitalizma. Tom 1: Pod"em kapitalizma: ot drevnih istokov do 1848 goda / Pod red. Larri Nila i Dzheffri Uil'yamsona. Moscow, 2021. (Кембриджская история капитализма. Том 1: Подъем капитализма: от древних истоков до 1848 года / Под ред. Ларри Нила и Джеффри Уильямсона. М., 2021). Korobov 2013 — Korobov P. Hod verblyudom. Rossijskie milliardery otmetili Pesah v pustyni. Kommersant. 2013. № 55. (Коробов П. Ход верблюдом. Российские миллиардеры отметили Песах в пустыни // Коммерсантъ. 2013. № 55). Low 2012 — Low 2012 — Low M. Physical Anthropology in Japan: The Ainu and the Search for the Origins of the Japanese. Current Anthropology, Vol. 53, No. S5. April 2012. pp. S57-S68. URL: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/662334 Makarova 2005 — Makarova E.A. Nacional'naya mysl' i nacional'noe soznanie v Anglii // Nacional'naya ideya v Zapadnoj Evrope v Novoe vremya. Ocherki istorii / Otv. redaktor V. S. Bondarchuk. Moscow, 2005 (Макарова Е.А. Национальная мысль и национальное сознание в Англии // Национальная идея в Западной Европе в Новое время. Очерки истории / Отв. редактор В. С. Бондарчук. — М., 2005). Malinin 2007 — Malinin Yu.P. Lyudovik Svyatoj. Zhan de Zhuanvil'. Kniga blagochestivyh rechenij i dobryh deyanij nashego svyatogo korolya Lyudovika / izd. podg. G. F. Cybul'ko, Yu. P. Malinin, A. YU. Karachinskij. St. Petersburg , 2007 (Малинин Ю.П. Людовик Святой // Жан де Жуанвиль. Книга благочестивых речений и добрых деяний нашего святого короля Людовика / изд. подг. Г. Ф. Цыбулько, Ю. П. Малинин, А. Ю. Карачинский. СПб., 2007). Marks 1955 — Marks K., Engel's F. Sochineniya. Moscow, 1955. T. 3 (Маркс К., Энгельс Ф. Сочинения. М., 1955. Т. 3). Mil'ton 1907 — Mil'tonDzh. O svobodepechati. Rech' kAnglijskomuparlamentu (Areopagitika). St. Petersburg , 1907. (Мильтон Дж. О свободе печати. Речь к Английскому парламенту (Ареопаги тика) / Полн. пер. с англ. под ред. П.Когана, с предисл. А. Рождественского. СПб., 1907). Pesn' o Rolande 1964 — Pesn' o Rolande. Starofrancuzskij geroicheskij epos. Moscow—Leningrad, 1964 (Песнь о Роланде. Старофранцузский героический эпос. М.—Л., 1964). Petrej de Erlezunda 1867 — Petrej de Erlezunda P. Istoriya o velikom knyazhestve Moskovskom, proiskhozhdenii velikih russkih knyazej, nedavnih smutah, proizvedennyh tam tremya Lzhedmitriyami, o o moskovskih zakonah, pravah, vere i obryadah, kotoruyu sobral, opisal i obnarodoval Petr Petrej de Erlezunda v Lejpcige 1860 goda . Moscow, 1867. (Chteniya v Imperatorskom Obshchestve Istorii i Drevnostej Rossijskih pri Moskovskom Universitete 1865–67) (Петрей де Ерлезунда П. История о великом княжестве Московском, происхождении великих русских князей, недавних смутах, произведенных там тремя Лжедмитриями, о о московских законах, правах, вере и обрядах, которую собрал, описал и обнародовал Петр Петрей де Ерлезунда в Лейпциге 1860 года / Пер. с немецкого А.Н. Шемякина. М., 1867. (Чтения в Императорском Обществе Истории и Древностей Российских при Московском Университете 1865–67). Rostovcev 2000 — Rostovcev M.I. Obshchestvo i hozyajstvo v Rimskoj imperii. T.1. Moscow, 2000 (Ростовцев М.И. Общество и хозяйство в Римской империи. Т.1. М., 2000). Shevchenko 2003 — Shevchenko T.G. Zіbrannya tvorіv: U 6 t. T. 1: Poezіya 1837-1847. Kyev, 2003. (Шевченко Т.Г. Зібрання творів: У 6 т. К., 2003. Т. 1: Поезія 1837-1847. — С. 128–190). Slovo o polku Igoreve 1997 — Slovo o polku Igoreve. Podgotovka teksta, perevod i kommentarii O. V. Tvorogova. Biblioteka literatury drevnej Rusi. T. 4. URL: http://lib.pushkinskijdom.ru/Default.aspx?tabid=4877 (СловоополкуИгореве. Подготовка текста, перевод и комментарии О. В. Творогова // Библиотека литературы древней Руси. Т. 4). URL: http://lib.pushkinskijdom.ru/Default.aspx?tabid=4877 Slovo o pogibeli Russkoj zemli 1997 — Slovo o pogibeli Russkoj zemli posle smerti velikogo knyazya Yaroslava. Biblioteka literatury drevnej Rusi. T. 5. URL: http://lib.pushkinskijdom.ru/Default.aspx?tabid=4953 (Слово о погибели Русской земли после смерти великого князя Ярослава // Библиотека литературы древней Руси. Т. 5). URL: http://lib.pushkinskijdom.ru/Default.aspx?tabid=4953 Stenograficheskij otchet 1934 — Stenograficheskij otchet. Pervyj vsesoyuznyj s"ezd sovetskih pisatelej. Moscow, 1934. (Первыйвсесоюзныйсъездсоветскихписателей 1934. Стенографическийотчет. М,. 1934). The Invention of Tradition 1983 — The Invention of Tradition / Ed. by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. Cambridge University Press, 1983. Tin'kov 2010 — Tin'kov O.Yu. Ya takoj kak vse. M., 2010 (Тиньков 2010 — Тиньков О.Ю. Я такой как все. Moscow, 2010). Veber 2017 – Veber M. Hozyajstvennaya etika mirovyh religij: Opyty sravnitelnoy sociologii religii. Konfucianstvo I daocism. St. Petersburg , 2017 (Вебер М. Хозяйственная этика мировых религий: Опыты сравнительной социологии религии. Конфуцианство и даосизм. СПб., 2017). Yankovskaya 2010 — Yankovskaya N.B. Ojkumena amarnskoj epohi i Krit. Istoriya i sovremennost'. 2010. № 1. (Янковская Н.Б. Ойкумена амарнской эпохи и Крит // История и современность. 2010. № 1. С. 35–60). Zaliznyak 2008 — Zaliznyak A.A. «Slovo o polku Igoreve»: vzglyad lingvista. — 3-e izd. dop. Moscow, 2008 (Зализняк А.А. «Слово о полку Игореве»: взгляд лингвиста. — 3-е изд. доп. М., 2008). Zapiski Yuliya Cezarya 1948 — Zapiski Yuliya Cezarya i ego prodolzhatelej o Gall'skoj vojne, ob Aleksandrijskoj vojne, ob Afrikanskoj vojne. M.—L., 1948 (Записки Юлия Цезаря и его продолжателей о Галльской войне, об Александрийской войне, об Африканской войне. Moscow—Leningrad, 1948). Zhur P.V. Trudy I dni Kobzar’a. Leningrad, 1996. [1] Quotations from Russian-language sources (with the exception of The Song of Igor's Campaign, which is quoted in Vladimir Nabokov's translation) translated by Serguey Sirotin. [2] “The Song of Igor's Campaign” is translated by Vladimir Nabokov. URL: http://slovoopolku.ru/translation_nabokov
- Marianne Hirsch. Memory for the Future: Response to Serguey Ehrlich, “Memory, Identity, Imagination: The Structure of Behaviour from the Perspective of Memory Studies”
26.07.2023 Marianne Hirsch, Columbia University Serguey Ehrlich’s erudite, far-reaching and visionary article is an invitation to a series of dialogues with colleagues across the globe and across a broad disciplinary and theoretical spectrum. There is much that I admire and agree with in this ambitious work, and there is much more that I learned from reading it in the conversational mode that Ehrlich so generously models. Like some of his other respondents, I feel qualified to engage just a few of his many insights and analyses and will focus on those that speak most directly to my own current work. I appreciate the way in which memory studies becomes a point of departure and a lens for this expansive philosophical and historical analysis of human and planetary evolution in the longue durée. The aim is not just to account for the past history of structures of behavior that have led to repeated catastrophe: it is to imagine a group identity and a structure of behavior for a sustainable future. This invocation of the imagination, and of the “remembering-imagining system” as a tool for change is most promising. Ehrich sees memory specifically as a “form of behavior” that structures identity across time. In this view, memory persists and is transmitted and identity takes shape through narrative and myth. Narrative structures shift across broadly drawn historical periods that move from pre-state hunter-gatherer societies, through state agrarian and industrial societies, to what he envisions as post-nation state global information civilizations in the future. Each of these social formations has a dominant shaping narrative form, each with an ethical orientation: the fairy tale with its “myth of booty,” the heroic myth of “other-sacrifice,” and the imagined restoration or instantiation of a universalist myth of “altruism” and “self-sacrifice” that will enable a sustainable planetary future. That global future, one that Ehrlich believes we can and must imagine, is cosmopolitan, post-national, post-capitalist and global. In using memory studies as a lens through which to imagine this kind of future, Ehrlich restores to the field some of the socially critical potential and the belief in the possibility of social change that defined its beginnings in the 1980’s. And yet, I want to suggest that Ehrlich’s reliance on what he himself criticizes as “intellectuals’ stubborn devotion to outdated terminology” and to a fixed set of narrative templates or “schemata” (Erll) might actually undermine the scope of the “mnemonic imagination” ( Keightley and Pickering) that he enjoins us to practice. In his book Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (1995), Andreas Huyssen explains the turn to memory and the past at the end of the twentieth century as being motivated by a disillusionment with myths of progress and modernization, and with teleological views of history. Turning to the past through the study of collective and culturalmemory offered a way to contest official histories and to enlarge the present with forgotten and suppressed stories that might offer alternative pathways to possible futures. I have argued that contesting official histories, questioning the traditional structures of archives and the principles of selection and collection on which they rely, interrogating the formation of canons and the conventions of history writing – all these opened the way to reimagine not only history’s teleology and the future, but also the past itself. But to do so, must we not also question the morphologies (Propp), the narrative templates and schemata, the “pre-existing expressive forms” (Warburg) that have come down to us? Do we not have to work to unfix their determinative powers? I worry that however satisfying it is to find and identify them, Ehrlich’s reliance on these schemata delimits rather than opening the future he invites us to envision. Can we interrupt cycles of violence, racism and injustice, can we stop the repetition wars, genocides and other human-made catastrophes that have come to seem inevitable by returning to traditional structures of thinking, telling and writing? I am not convinced that going back to one specified primal trauma (in Ehrlich’s case, drawing on Freud, cannibalism) and to attempt to work it through will actually achieve the desired progressive goal of a sustainable communal life. Nor does the idea of “self-sacrifice” sound to me as a compelling goal—the Christian overtones of this term are hard to overlook. Feminist, queer, Black as well as post-and decolonial theories and the movements for radical social change they have accompanied have taught us that change needs to start with our structures of thought and feeling and with language itself. It might seem presumptuous to add additional texts to Ehrlich’s impressive bibliography, a multi-disciplinary bibliography that is quite comprehensive as far as classic European texts are concerned. Other traditions offer different paths to imagining , however, and might prove useful to this project. Works that use different “remembering-imagining systems” to eschew traditional Euro-centric narratives and mythologies include Ariella Aïsha Azoulay’s Potential History: Unlearning Imperialism , for example. Potential history is the study not just of what was, but also of what might have been, and thus what might still be. Her methodology of “unlearning” is precisely suited to opening different trajectories than the ones that dominant imperial relations have instantiated. I would also go to the writings of Saidiya Hartman – “Venus in Two Acts” and Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments , for example – and the forms of what she calls “critical fabulation” that help her encounter an archive of victimization of Black life. Through “critical fabulation” Hartman allows herself to imagine the subjectivities of people who appear in ships’ manifests or court records as enslaved subjects, victims, or criminals. She imagines their hopes and dreams, the futures they themselves might have envisioned in their own present. This is again a “remembering-imagining” methodology that rewrites expected narratives. As a last example for the kind of “solidarity” (rather than “self-sacrifice”) that Ehrlich would have us imagine, I would turn to Judith Butler’s work, particularly the recent The Force of Nonviolence: An Ethico-Political Bind . The book’s extensive critique of individualism and elaboration of the notion of grievability, as well as the discussion of theories of non-violence from Ghandi to Einstein, lead Butler to ask what would make us want and need to “preserve the life of the other?” In Butler’s reading it would be an acknowledgment of our shared vulnerability as humans living in bodies and in time. But that vulnerability is also differentially distributed, depending on uneven power and resources in a world in which some lives are grievable and others not. Butler’s call to a “new egalitarian imaginary that apprehends the interdependency of lives” is congruent with Ehrlich’s invocation of the imagination. But the feminist social movements with which the book ends rely not on “self-sacrifice” but on solidarity, accompaniment, care and repair.
- Serguey Ehrlich. Memory, Identity, and Imagination. The Structure of Behaviour from the Perspective of Memory Studies. Part I
Remembering the past to imagine the future (Schacter et al, 2007) Abstract: Author suggests the new approach to memory studies, where memory is a component of the guidance and control subsystem of behaviour, that is mental structure initiating practical activities: 1) It is possible to represent that subsystem as a ‘molecule,’ which consists of three ‘atoms’: memory (past/experience), identity (present/ritual), and imagination (future/program); 2) ‘Atoms’ have common triple-layered narrative ‘nucleus’: specific narrative , schematic narrative template , and base mythic narrative ; 3) The core of ‘nucleus’ consists of three base mythic narratives: the fairy tale (myth of booty), the heroic myth (myth of others-sacrifice), and the myth of self-sacrifice ; 4) ‘Fundamental particles’ of base mythic narratives are self-sacrifice (altruism), others-sacrifice , and booty , which represent the condensed experience of human evolution. We can call them ‘primal phenomena.’ Booty is the source of cannibalistic primal trauma , which is still not worked through and is fraught with unmotivated violence and conspicuous consumption, others-sacrifice is the origin of primal religion , and self-sacrifice is the primal phenomenon of sustainable society. The focus of analysis is the ‘nucleus’ of narrativity. Narratives are ‘carriers’ of memory, identity, and imagination. We can reduce the number of specific narratives to three base mythic narratives: the fairy tale is adequate for kin (family), the heroic myth is adequate for folk (nation), and the myth of self-sacrifice (Prometheus and Christ) is adequate for the global humanity. Comparing those narratives we can point out three main effects. Firstly , memory becomes deeper and encompasses a longer timeline, consequently expanding from ‘progenitors’ (the fairy tale) through ‘state founders’ and ‘Paleolithic ancestors’ (the heroic myth) to the ‘Big Bang’ (the myth of self-sacrifice). Secondly , identity, which presumes solidarity and altruism, becomes broader by including much more people in the number of ‘our own’: ‘kin’ (family), ‘folk’ (nation), and ‘humankind.’ Ethics, which are closely connected to solidarity and altruism, are gradually shifting from selfish values of survival to altruistic post-materialist values of self-expression. Thirdly , imagination creates more and more ambitious goals of behaviour. We can distinguish historical epochs based on the domination of one of those three co-existing base mythic narratives: 1) In the pre-state hunter-gathering society it was the fairy tale; 2) In the state agrarian and industrial societies it is the heroic myth; 3) In the post-state information society it will be the myth of self-sacrifice, which is a singular reliable tool to create memory, identity, and imagination, which are adequate for our nascent Global Age. The author is aware that he suggests a dream, but he also believes that history is the embodiment of competing dreams. Therefore this essay is an invitation to discussion: ‘Hit me but listen to me.’ Keywords: the guidance and control subsystem of behaviour, memory, identity, imagination, specific narrative, schematic narrative template, base mythic narrative, the fairy tale (myth of booty), the heroic myth (myth of others-sacrifice), the myth of self-sacrifice, self-sacrifice, others-sacrifice, booty, cannibalistic primal trauma, unmotivated violence, conspicuous consumption, primal religion, children sacrifice, primal phenomenon of sustainable society, altruism, egoism, ritual and program. Bio: Serguey Ehrlich, 1961, PhD, the chief editor of The Historical Expertise (Moldova). E-mail: nestorhistoria2017@gmail.com Declaration of Conflicting Interest: The Author declares that there is no conflict of interest. Acknowledgements: I am very grateful to Stefan Berger, Astrid Erll, Natalija Majsova, Boris Mironov, Dmitry Panchenko, Milica Popovic, Ann Rigney, Victor Shnirelman, James Wertsch, and Tyler Wertsch for their very insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper, but of course the usual disclaimers apply. I would like to acknowledge the important contribution made by Oleg and Sharon Pekar towards translation of my essay. Contents Memory as a Component of a Subsystem of Behaviour How Does the ‘Space of Experience’ Destroy our ‘Horizon of Expectation’? Why Memory? Is History a Part of Memory? The Structure of Behaviour Booty as Primal Trauma Others-Sacrifice as Primal Religion Self-Sacrifice as ‘the Prime Phenomenon of All Past and Future World-History’ Structural Concordances between Three Base Mythic Narratives and the Concepts of Marshall Mcluhan, Jan Assmann, Abraham Maslow, Georges Dumézil, and Fernand Braudel The Rat Ethics of the Fairy Tales The Deception of Heroic Myth The Dead End of Modernity The Transformation from Quantity to Quality ‘I Felt Sorry for Humans’ or ‘For their Sakes I Sanctify Myself’ ‘That Holiest-of-Holies Holocaust of the Jews’ Shakespeare is Ours! Witch-Hunts of Today? Narodniks of the Global Scale Bibliography Memory as a Component of a Subsystem of Behaviour Astrid Erll (2008: 2) regrets that ‘despite two decades of intensive research, the design of a conceptual toolbox for cultural memory studies is still at a fledgling stage.’ The main reason of that desperate situation is that current memory studies are ‘more practiced than theorized’ (Confino, 2008: 78). The problem is exacerbated, believes Erll (2008: 2, italics added), by the fact that research is practiced ‘within an array of different disciplines and national academic cultures, with their own vocabularies, methods, and traditions.’ I completely agree that the dominant ‘atheoretical’ trend is an impediment to the progress of our discipline. At the same time I believe that the multidisciplinary nature of memory studies triggering permanent conceptual divergence is an advantage, which permits easily appropriate ‘an array’ of insights from different disciplines and shape on their grounds unexpected theoretical frameworks allowing to observe memory from various angles. In my opinion the seminal Reinhart Koselleck’s dichotomy ‘space of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectation’ is an exemplary case showing how the concept of an adjacent discipline could be adjusted to the requirements of memory studies and provide a promising starting point for a new theoretical approach grasping collective/cultural memory from an unusual perspective. Koselleck (2004: 256–259) argues that it is impossible to master the process of history analyzing only the ‘space of experience.’ For ‘deciphering history in its generality’ we should also take into account the ‘horizon of expectation’: ‘[T]hese two categories … indicate an anthropological condition without which history is neither possible nor conceivable.’ That means history has a double framework: experience-past and expectation-future. Kosellek writes further that it is possible to reduce ‘the conceptual couple “experience” and “expectation”’ constructing ‘history from the modalities of memory and hope’ (Koselleck, 2004: 256–259). In my opinion choosing hope, that is a dream of better future, as a counterconcept of memory Kosellek shows the right direction for our search but not the final point, because hope has a sluggish nature, we can call it a dream in the ‘passive voice,’ therefore it could not be a trigger of purposeful behaviour. For the successful pursuit of happiness we should transform our dream in ‘active voice’ and create a detailed image of better future as an objective of our behaviour. Therefore the reliable counterconcept of memory is not hope, but imagination . The first objection against using imagination as a counterconcept of memory assumes that meaning of the word ‘imagination’ is broader than future. Yes, it is possible to imagine something that already exists or existed, but we either never saw or have forgotten its image. Nonetheless the principal semantic area of the word ‘imagination’ relates to something that eventually could be real in the future. The main reason to prefer ‘imagination’ to Koselleks’ ‘hope’ is the practice of cognitive neuroscience revealing ‘striking similarities between remembering the past and imagining or simulating the future, including the finding that a common brain network underlies both memory and imagination’ (Schacter et al, 2012: 677). More and more scholars treat memory and imagination as ‘the conceptual couple,’ where both terms mutually affect each other: ‘Memory acts on the imagination and imagination works with the material provided by memory,’ write the authors of the term ‘mnemonic imagination’ (Keightley and Pickering, 2017: 2; Keightley and Pickering 2012). The interplay of both phenomena is not only a metaphor, it is confirmed by neuroscience research (Persinger and De Sano, 1986; Schacter et al, 2007). Therefore Martin Conway and his colleagues (2016: 256–257, italics added) rightly believes that ‘in terms of understanding the brain basis of remembering and imagining it seems that both memories and episodic simulations of the future are mediated in large part by the same neural networks,’ hence ‘ we should be using the term remembering-imagining system (RIS) rather than simply memory system.’ [1] In frameworks of memory studies the ‘conceptual couple’ memory-past and imagination-future has a mediation—identity-present, because ‘identity’ subsumes not only common descent in the past, but also common fate in the future. Memory, identity, and imagination are three elements of the guidance and control subsystem of behavior forming the general scheme of mental prerequisites of practical activities, where individuals and groups: 1) Constitute themselves as subjects of behaviour through common identity (rituals); 2) Imagine objectives (programs) of their behaviour; 3) Try to achieve imagined objectives using patterns of behaviour (experience) from the stores of memory . The guidance and control subsystem of behaviour (further abbreviated as ‘behaviour’) is not a linear sequence where memory creates identity and identity creates imagination, it is a triangle where three elements affect each other simultaneously. Metaphorically speaking behaviour is a molecule containing three atoms (memory, identity, and imagination) in the process of their permanent interaction. My analysis is inspired by Kosellek’s insights regarding double framework of the process of history. So there is a valid question, why I replaced all three his concepts: ‘history’ to ‘behaviour’, ‘space of experience’ to ‘memory’ and ‘horizon of expectation’ to ‘imagination’ and added the third framework of ‘identity’? That is done simply because the German historian elaborated terminology for the needs of ‘conceptual history.’ It is impossible to apply directly his historical terminology to the field of memory studies, which is related not to ‘ objective ’ process of history ( a look from outside, where society’s temporal changes is driven by ‘fateful’ forces alienated from people: nature, economy, politics and so on), but to ‘ subjective ’ process of behaviour (a look from inside, where the driving forces of society’s temporal changes are intentions and efforts of society’s members). From that perspective the core of behaviour is subjectivelyexperienced past, present, and future, that is memory, identity, and imagination. That triple framework opens a new promising perspective for our research because it allows studying memory as a component of the guidance and control subsystem (memory-identity-imagination) of behaviour. How Does the ‘Space of Experience’ Destroy our ‘Horizon of Expectation’? Let us grasp the current global situation using above mentioned behavioural framework of memory studies. The transition from the industrial society of nation-states to the information society of global humanity, is hampered by inertia of Durkheimian ‘collective representations.’ Both ‘elites’ and ‘masses’ still believe that if identity of the nation-state is not the crown of social creation, it is a necessary evil. The consensus of grim ‘realists’ is generated by disappointment with the idea of progress which inspired Jules Verne’s contemporaries. The existence under the nuclear sword of Damocles compels the ‘risk society’ (Ulrich Beck) people to stop imagining the future and live for today ( Hartog, 2015). The obsolete but still dominating memory (‘space of experience’) of Modernity destroys the imagination (‘horizon of expectation’) of Global Age. This resulted in a paradoxical situation. Industrial Modernity, an identity ‘container’ of which is the nation-state, has led to the emergence of nuclear threat, growing environmental degradation, social inequality, and other global challenges, which cannot be solved within the national framework. At the same time, fearing of the future, which is based on those threats, does not allow us to do away with ‘short-term thinking’ (Guldi and Armitage, 2014) and imagine the global community capable of solving global threats effectively. One of the ‘side-effects’ of that fearing of the future is the common practice of reflecting our present inside the obsolete frameworks of Modernity. More than forty years ago Alvin Toffler (1980: 18) described in The Third Wave ‘the old civilization in which many of us grew up,’ and presented ‘a careful, comprehensive picture of the new civilization bursting into being in our midst. So profoundly revolutionary is this new civilization that it challenges all our old assumptions. Old ways of thinking, old formulas, dogmas, and ideologies, no matter how cherished or how useful in the past, no longer fit the facts.’ From the context it is clear that ‘the old civilization’ is industrial society or Modernity and ‘the new civilization’ is information society. I am sure that it is impossible to overcome the ‘old ways of thinking’ until we are applying the concept of Modernity to our time. It is not neutral, but it is the biased container of theories, which correspond to passing away industrial era and do not fit to requirements of nascent information civilization. Despite that, most of social thinkers still are trying to ‘pour new wine into old furs’ adjusting new adjectives to already outworn Modernity: ‘high modernity’ (Anthony Giddens), ‘second modernity’ (Ulrich Beck), ‘late and liquid modernity’ (Zygmunt Bauman), and so on. In my opinion even the concept ‘postmodernity’ (Jean-François Lyotard) does not allow to get rid of ‘old ways of thinking’ completely. The stubborn devotion of intellectuals to the outdated terminology could be partly explained by the etymology of the word ‘modernity,’ which is a derivation from the Latin adverb modo ‘presently, just now.’ For sure that name plays the deceptive role, because first of all we reflect the world existing ‘just now’ around us. That terminological pitfall is an important reason why we have not realized clearly how deep is the rupture between industrial and information stages. Therefore we are not able to elaborate effectively the new forms of memory, identity, and imagination suitable to our global mode of existence. To solve the problem we should use the term ‘Modernity,’ overloading with ‘industrial’ meanings, only as a signifier of the epoch between, roughly speaking, the beginning of seventeenth and the end of twentieth centuries and, how it was coined by Toffler (1980: 183), call our ‘just now’ the ‘information society,’ or ‘information era/stage/civilization’, and so on, which correctly render the essence of our time. Correct terminology will help ‘to diminish the control that the [national] past exercises upon the [global] future’ (Kuipers, 2011: 2). Benedict Anderson (2006) argues that identity of nation-state was imagined by scholars, writers and artists of the nineteenth century who ahead of time shaped memory in accordance with their representations of the future. Julien Benda (2011: 79, italics added) in The Treason of the Intellectuals writes that ‘highbrows’ of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ‘have praised the efforts of men to feel conscious of themselves in their nation and race… and have made them ashamed of every aspiration to feel conscious of themselves as men in the general sense . ’ That is intellectuals instilling people with the national framework of imagination have betrayed the universal values of international Respublica Literaria of Early Modernity. We can interpret their volunteer degradation from mankind vision as a sacrifice for the sake of their nations: limiting themselves they widened identity, solidarity, and altruism of common people from local framework to national one. Unfortunately in the twentieth century the national memory, identity, and imagination brought poisoned fruit: the two world wars, many armed conflicts, mass terrors, and a wide array of genocides. To overcome the powerful momentum of nation-state memory, identity, and imagination we should remember that ‘constructors’ of nation-state were able to solve much more complex problems than we need to solve. ‘National idea’ of Modernity was ingrained in the public consciousness by intellectuals before the industrial basis of nation-state was developed significantly. Now the technologies of information civilization are far ahead of our ability to imagine an adequate identity for this type of society. The intellectuals of the twenty-first century should acknowledge the global needs, remind the universal vision of their spiritual ancestors of Renaissance and Enlightenment, stop playing by the rules of two previous centuries, activate their imagination because ‘[i]t is no extravagance to formulate the problem of the future ... in terms of imagination’ (Ricoeur, 1996: 3), and systematically work on reshaping obsolete national identity into global one: ‘I am a human being,’ must be the prevailing identification of everyone. Why Memory? What role does memory play in the process of the global identity creation? It should not be questioned: which came first, the chicken or the egg? Memory, identity, and imagination fulfill equally important and interconnected functions in the process of behaviour. Memory has the paramount importance in my research because I look from the perspective of memory studies. That approach reveals that in the framework of behaviour memory communicates with its ‘counterparts’: 1) as a base of group identity ; 2) and as a trigger of imagination , when memory often provides samples how to do it the other way. ‘Making the past into our past’ (Wertsch, 2021: 92, italics in the original) memory is functioning as a base of group identity. Why ‘concretion of identity’ (Assmann, 1995: 125) is much more based on memory then on images of the future? It is because identity is a synonym of transtemporal stability (‘sameness’/‘self-same’) [2] and it is memory that ‘creates the assumption of stability that demarcates identity’ (Giesen, 2004: 109). The important reason why identity ‘gravitates’ to memory could be reconstructed in accordance with insights of Paul Connerton (1989) and Jan Assmann (2011) that identity is shaped by commemorative rituals , when unfamiliar people share common emotions. ‘Invariance’ intrinsic to ritual ‘implies certainty’ ( Rappaport, 1979: 209) and ‘ certainty’ in its turn assumes a stable social order. The aim of ritual is persistent overcoming of current chaos (instability) and reestablishing of primordial cosmos [3] that is not simply stable but unchangeable sacral order of illud tempus , to which the myth of the ‘eternal return’ (Mircea Eliade) leads. Hence the stable mythologized past becomes the source of identity through mediation of allegedly unchangeable commemorative rituals. If images of the stable past does not know the word ‘if’, unstable ‘Proteus’ images of the future consists predominantly of manifold ‘if.’ Therefore the allegedly logical idea of building identity exclusively based on imagined common goals, which always are not completely rooted in our common past, does not work in practice because it denies the stable ‘historical continuity.’ Thus, in the Soviet Union of 1920s there was an attempt to create identity by using the international values of future world revolution and denying the ‘damned past of Russian autocracy.’ Bolshevik leaders believed that the history narratives, which are permeated by ‘bourgeois-nationalist feelings,’ would be an obstacle in achieving the goal of the Third (Communist) International. Subsequently history in high schools was excluded and replaced by sociology. But in 1930s Stalin realized that ‘patriotic education’ is an indispensable instrument for the strengthening of military spirit. History, in other words the nationalist value of Russian collective memory, was reinstated in the high school curriculum instead of sociology, which was prohibited as a ‘bourgeois pseudoscience’ (Titarenko and Zdravomyslova, 2017: 33–41). The national memory of Modernity is a mainstay of the nation-state: ‘No memory, no identity; no identity, no nation’ (Smith, 1996: 383). Not only nation but every group exists as long as there is consent to a common identity, which presumes solidarity and altruism. [4] Imagination is an important instrument of radical social changes. In that relation memory is also indispensable because of existence of a ‘short-circuit between memory and imagination’ (Ricoeur, 2006: 5), which provides ‘the very apparatus that enables change’ (Erll, 2011a: 174). Memory-imagination interplay means that studying collective representations of the past, which Durkheim’s disciple Maurice Halbwachs calls ‘collective memory,’ could provide fruitful insights for the ‘future thinking’ (Schacter et al, 2012: 688), regarding an ‘imagined community’ of the global information civilization. George Santayana’s maxim that ‘those who do not remember the past is destined to repeat it’ assumes that when we have ‘the more knowledge and understanding’ of the past, ‘the better we can shape the future’ (Bickford and Sodaro, 2010: 77). [5] McLuhan’s ‘global village’ designers are facing a double task. At first, it is necessary to deconstruct the skeleton of national memory and to show that identity based on that memory shapes patterns of behaviour that are unable to respond adequately to the challenges of the global information civilization. Subsequently, we should imagine the memory and identity of a future society, where the collective future needs are ‘the directive function’ for ‘shaping the collective past in the context of collective identity’ (Szpunar and Szpunar, 2016: 383). That means we should remind the patterns of human experience, which contain ‘viable sprouts’ of the informational global community. Is History a Part of Memory? Double meaning of the word ‘history’ (the process of temporal changes and an academic discipline studying past) creates a lot of confusions. From the perspective of temporal changes memory has its own history, which is an indispensable part of history of behaviour. In the same time it is impossible to discuss memory outside its relations with history as an academic discipline. [6] These words not only are frequently synonyms in common language, but some scholars argue that ‘boundary between history and memory is by nature porous’ (Fogu and Kansteiner, 2006: 302) and hence historiography is ‘by nature’ not an instrument of studying memory, but a subject of memory studies. There is a lot of evidence that supports this approach. Stefan Berger persuasively argues that professional historiography is a product of nineteenth-century nation-states and professionalization of historians was strongly motivated by striving to gain symbolic and other capital from their corporate position ‘as the only one that can speak authoritatively about the past’ (Berger, 2019). Historians, as the main experts in the field of society’s relations with its past, played and still play a leading role in the shaping of national collective memory, identity and imagination (Berger with Conrad, 2015). [7] In my opinion, that evidence proves only one thing: that many of historians are members of a ‘dishonest legion’ of scholars from different disciplines both in the humanities and natural science, who betray truth guided by ‘such non-rational factors as rhetoric, propaganda, and personal prejudice’ (Broad and Wade, 1983: 9). It is true that all scholars as members of their mnemonic communities are affected by powerful narratives, which are based on national, class, religious, and other interests. Therefore a historian must permanently make a choice between the universal narratives of science and the group memory narratives. [8] When, for example, he/she is seriously engaging with his/her nation-state memory narratives he/she turns out to be an agent of national memory regardless to his/her investment in historical studies. Some alchemists made a contribution to the early stages of chemistry development, but that does not allow them to be called ‘chemists.’ From the perspective of academic standards it does not matter if a scholar either wittingly or unwittingly chooses between Hayden Whites’ emplotment, argument, and ideology ‘ modes ,’ because reflexivity and self-reflexivity are parts and parcels of our profession. [9] There is a need to specify that the thesis of ‘unconscious’ choice of the nation-state ‘grand narrative’ (Jean-François Lyotard) is very dubious, simply because in most cases that choice is still a profitable business. Therefore, we should not ‘reify’ the desperate reality when historians promote nationalist propaganda under the name of science, but we must sustain standards of the historical discipline in accordance with the requirements of the Weberian ideal type of academic profession, in which the central principle ‘consists in the search for truth’ (Popper, 1992: 4). [10] Claudio Fogu, Wulf Kansteiner, Stefan Berger, and others suggest not separate rigidly history and memory looking from the subjective perspective of agents of institutionalized remembering, many of whom are biased by their national background. Astrid Erll (2008: 7) puts forward ‘dissolving the useless opposition of history vs. memory in favor of a notion of different modes of remembering in culture’ relying on the objective argument that both ‘modes of remembering’ have a common feature: ‘[T]he past is not given, but must instead continually be re-constructed and re-presented.’ This argument assumes that some modes of knowledge directly operates with ‘objective reality given to us in sensation’ (Vladimir Lenin) and others like history and memory has access to ‘objective reality’ only through reconstructions. I believe that not only history and memory, but every form of representation of reality including the so called ‘exact science’ represent not given things but namely reconstructions of past, existing, and future objects of reality. Hence the argument to reconstruction is not relevant, because it is not a specific attribute of ‘remembering in culture.’ I am not sure that we would receive new insights ‘dissolving the useless opposition’ between history and existing forms of memory, but blurring the borders between them we create a real risky to lose specific of two ‘ different modes of remembering.’ Uniting memory and history simply because their common field is the past we imitate people who would unify astrology and astronomy on the grounds that both have as their subject ‘the starry sky above.’ In answering the question, ‘Why is history not a part of premodern and modern forms of memory?’ the first point to note is that history is seeking the truth about the past, which is universal for humankind, and memory is responsible for the shaping of particular groups’ identities through examples of ‘usable past’ (Van Wyck Brooks, 1918) or ‘contemporized past’ (Assmann 1995: 129) and ‘practical past’ (White, 1914). For the agents of memory it does not matter whether their ‘heroic examples’ are facts or fakes. [11] In its turn the honest historians are indifferent to how their research might affect any group identity: ‘History is willing to change a narrative in order to be loyal to facts, whereas collective remembering is willing to change information (even facts) in order to be loyal to a narrative’ (Wertsch and Roediger, 2008: 324). Therefore Pierre Nora (1998: 8) argues that ‘memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition.’ [12] The boundary between unbiased history and biased memory is not ‘porous,’ there is ‘the growing gap between collective memory and the body of facts established by historical research’ (Shapira 1996: 22). History-truth is in principal conflict with memory-identity, because the universal truth of history is not compatible with ‘private’ identities of numerous mnemonic communities. The ardent French patriot Ernest Renan (1990: 11) openly warned his co-citizens of ‘progress in historical studies’, which ‘often constitutes a danger for [the principle of] nationality,’ and from his nationalist perspective he was absolutely right. [13] Every group falls apart if it loses its identity-solidarity. That is why the nation-state is suspicious of people looking for the universal historical truth and pays a lot of attention to the shaping of the national memory. My opponents could ask: ‘Why do you persuade that the nation-state memory narratives are not compatible with the standards of historical profession and, at the same time, you argue that reshaping of collective memory in accordance with the needs of global information civilization is a part of our professional duties? Are there no contradictions in your statements? Humanities become ‘scientific’ when we look at the world from the entire humankind perspective. I believe the universal and objective perspective of the historical discipline is extrinsic to the multitude of ‘partial’ and biased nation-state memories, but universal ideals of academic historiography are fully appropriate for the global collective memory of information civilization. From the global perspective memory- identity becomes equivalent to history-truth, therefore ‘history can be represented as the universal memory of the human species’ ( Halbwachs, 1980: 84). Yes, history is memory of the future! In that sense the historian is a prophet, who, contrary to Friedrich Schlegel, looking not only back but also forward. By searching for truth, he/she fearlessly destroys the nation-state memory, identity, and imagination and creates instead the global ones. Therefore, he/she brings the triumph of the global information civilization closer. The Structure of Behaviour Memory, identity, and imagination are ‘atoms’ in the ‘molecule’ of behaviour. Atoms consist of nucleus and electrons. What entity can we call ‘nucleus’ of memory, identity, and imagination? Answering that question from the perspective of memory studies we should first of all find a phenomenon, which allows designating individual and collective mnemonic forms as two types of one memory concept. That phenomenon we are looking for is the ‘nucleus’. Reflecting that problem we assume that memory has individual and also collective or at least collected nature (Olick, 1999), [14] but this assumption is still under discussion. Susan Sontag (2003: 85) insists: ‘All memory is individual.’ Not only irresponsible public intellectuals, but some rigorous scholars are skeptical towards the Halbwachsian concept of ‘collective memory’ (Bell, 2003; Gedi and Elam, 1996; Klein, 2000; Novick, 2007). [15] Their criticism is partly justified, because the reference to ‘the perspective of the group’ as a carrier of collective memory (Halbwachs, 1992: 40) is pretty vague and it does not explain how individual and collective forms affect each other. We urgently need much more reliable carrier that is mediation tool between individual and collective memories. The decisive step in that direction is done by James Wertsch (2002; 2021). The heritage of Ernst Cassirer and Lev Vygotsky regarding the mediation role of natural and artificial languages, allows him to argue that narrative is a carrier or a mediation tool of collective and individual memory. Wertsch’s narrative approach shifts the focus of analysis from the Nora’s lieux de mémoire , that is external ‘ spatial expressions of memory’ (Kansteiner 2002: 191, italics added), to the essential temporal interplay of its collective and individual forms: 1) Individuals string ‘the meat’ of personal experiences on the ‘skewer’ of collective narrative; [16] 2) At the same time, publicly shared personal experience, which is structured by the collective narrative, changes that narrative itself. [17] Astrid Erll (2011a: 108) represents that process as a permanent exchange between collective ‘cultural schemata’ and their ‘individual actualization.’ [18] That prolonged Bakhtinian dialogism between collective narratives and personal experiences creates the subject of ‘mnemohistory’ (Assmann, 1997: 9) or ‘the history of the memory’ (Olick, 2007: 87). [19] It is crucial to specify that dialogic interaction of collective and individual memories is possible only through mediation of narrative. Erll (2011: 4) splits the history of memory studies in two phases: the first one was inaugurated in 1920s – 1930s by Maurice Halbwachs and others, who established the subject of collective memory; the second one was proclaimed in 1980s by Pierre Nora and other researchers delving ‘national remembrance and traumatic events’ (Erll, 2011a: 172). Erll (2011: 4–5, 15) also puts a question regarding the main trends of the future third phase of memory studies and ushers that it will be the dominance of ‘transcultural memory’: ‘Such an approach means moving away from site-bound, nation-bound, and in a naïve sense, cultures-bound research and displaying an interest in the mnemonic dynamics unfolding across and beyond boundaries.’ Yes, overcoming of ‘nation-bound’ is an important feature of the third phase, but, in my opinion, its essence is not limited by the transcultural agenda. Narrative nature of memory is another principal trend of current memory studies, which has been started in 2002, when the Wertsch’s book Voices of Collective Remembering was published. It is remarkable that Erll (2011a: 147) is a zealous proponent of the narrative approach claiming that ‘the world of cultural memory is a world of narrative,’ but a long-term ‘unnarrative’ momentum of our discipline does not let her announce the ‘narrative turn,’ because in the field of memory studies it still plays a marginal role. In my opinion the main reason of that is the heritage of Halbwachs (1925), who never mentioned the word ‘narrative’ in his fundamental book « Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire ». It is surprising, because psychologists use narrative as the main tool providing access to individual memory at least from the end of nineteenth century (Straub, 2006: 215). So it would be logical to implement that instrument to the field of collective memory. And it did was implemented by Frederic Bartlett (1932) in the classical book Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology dedicated to the role of narrative schemata in the shaping of collective memory, but his ideas were interpreted without paying enough attention to the fact that schemata has a narrative nature. Halbwachs won Bartlett because Pierre Nora, the main founder of the ‘memory turn’ in current cultural studies, continues the Halbwachsian ‘unnarrative’ tradition through seductive but in reality obfuscating metaphor of sites (realms) of memory with obvious references to the mnemonic method of loci of Antiquity. There is an intermediation between « Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire » and « Les lieux de mémoire ». I mean « La topographie légendaire des Évangiles en Terre sainte » (Halbwachs, 1941), an attempt of the author to apply his own theoretical concept to the specific memory case. Ignoring the narrative nature of memory he does not have a better way to capture it than pinning the evidence of Gospels to the map of Holy Land. It seems plausible that the Halbwachsian topographic principle inspired lieux de mémoire of Nora. The ‘spatial’ sites of memory could be interpreted through temporal lenses of narratology as ‘discourses materialized’ (Schein, 1997: 663), because every commemorative site has its name subsuming a specific narrative with its own ritual. With that perspective the Nora concept allows ‘cataloguing’ the places where narratives are periodically transformed into performances. It is an important but limited function of lieux de mémoire. Nora over-expends heuristic capabilities of his approach inventing the class of so-called ‘immaterial’ sites of memory like Jeanne d’Arc’s legend and La Marseillaise . In my opinion to call them ‘sites’ means to multiply entities without necessity, because they have obvious narratives nature. There is no lieu de mémoire without its own narrative unfolded in time. Time is primary in relation to space. In this sense, the concept of sites of memory is a kind of ‘derivative’ of narrative and therefore it is an auxiliary tool for the study of rituals of commemoration. The concept of ‘immaterial sites of memory’ rather looks like a disciplinary expansion of Pierre Nora’s ‘school’ without the necessary theoretical prerequisites and mimics the geocentric Ptolemaic model, where the planets’ orbits have been calculated through cumbersome system of ‘epicycles and deferents.’ The Earth of lieux de mémoire circulates around the Sun of narratio , but not vice versa . Therefore the narrative approach should play the leading role in memory studies. Anyway it is not coincidental that narrative turn in memory studies was heralded by the psychologist Wertsch. It is better late than never. I hope the subjects of narrative nucleus of memory and mediating function of narrative tools will become the focusof cultural memory research soon enough. Memory narratives are not just in forma tion, but primarily per forma nces, that is, instructions to what we should and should not do: ‘[T]he ideal narratio is said to be the narratio that is the most reliable guide for our actions’ (Ankersmit, 1983: 33) It is a kind of ‘authoritative discourse’, which ‘demands our unconditional allegiance’ (Bakhtin, 1981: 343). Memory narratives as ‘equipment for living’ (Burke 1998; Wertsch 2021: 25–29) perform an important socializing function, providing ethical patterns, namely ‘beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 2013: 9), therefore mnemonic community is always a moral community. [20] Every commemoration ritual not only transmits a ‘moral message,’ but also proves the ‘moral consensus’ among members of mnemonic community (Winter, 2008: 62). Memory has been given a sacral status in order to increase its performative power (Klein, 2000: 129). Erroneously named ‘history’ it provides ‘sanctification of social beginnings’ (Schwartz 1982: 376) and becomes the core of ‘civil religion’ (Bella, 1967). That function of memory narratives is paramount because ‘a society can live only if its institutions rest on potent collective beliefs ’ (Halbwachs, 1992, 187, italics added). A believer’s duty is to follow without any doubts the instructions of the sacral narrative, which effects through affects rather than rational knowledge, generating ‘strong emotional attachment’ to his own group (Wertsch, 2008: 49). Bronislaw Malinowski (1948: 79) argues that myth ‘contains practical rules for the guidance of man.’ [21] Mircea Eliade (1987: 97–98) defines myth as a sacred pattern, ‘the paradigmatic model for all human activities.’ Maurice Halbwachs (1992, 59) prescribes a similar function to memory, it provides ‘models, examples, and elements of teaching,’ which shapes ‘the general attitude of the group.’ Jan Asmmann (1995: 132) points out that one of the functions of ‘cultural memory’ is ‘providing rules of conduct.’ The cognate approach of those authors allows us to identify both phenomena: ‘Memory is a collective myth shared by a group,’ which is ‘inherited through storytelling’ (Rønning, 2009: 149). [22] That storytelling has three main objectives: 1) Memory . Mythic narratives answer the question ‘What should we remember as patterns of our behaviour?’; 2) Identity . Mythic narratives indicate whom we should consider being ‘our own’ and who are the ‘strangers’ and prescribe how to treat both ‘close’ and ‘distant’ ones; 3) Imagination . Mythic narratives designate goals we should achieve. Therefore narrative is a nucleus of all three ‘atoms’ of behaviour: memory-past, identity-present, and imagination-future. Memory is experience that is narrative in the past tense. Identity is ritual that is narrative in the present tense. [23] And imagination is program that is narrative in the future tense. Narratives are programs of our practical behaviour. In its turn human deeds inspired by those programs are preserved in new narratives and through their mediation impact next iterations of practice. The permanent interchange between narratives and practices: ‘Speech is the mirror of action’ (Solon), creates the ‘perpetual motion machine’ of our life. There exists the structural concordance between them as mental and practical sides of the process of behaviour: ‘[T]he narrative mode is very close in form to the structure of action itself’ (Carr, 2008: 20). The world of narratives has its own structure. Wertsch (2021: 76), fruitfully unfolding ideas of Bartlett (1932), argues that in accordance with ‘numerous findings in psychology and cognitive science showing that human memory is weak on details but good at retaining general outlines of past events’ it is possible to reduce the multitude of specific narratives to the limited number of schematic narrative templates. [24] How many narrative templates are there? There is a multitude of answers: according to Uther (2004) there are 2399 basic plots, according to Poldi (1921)—36, according to Tobias (2012)—20, according to Booker (2006)—7, and so on. Josef Campbell (2004: 28), following van Gennep, [25] reduces all myths and fairy tales to a singular narrative structure of the ‘ monomyth ’: [26] ‘separation—initiation—return.’ Despite his hyper-reductionist approach Campbell (2004: 28) points out, that fairy tales and myths differ by their imagined end purposes, namely to whom (to his own kin, to his own folk or to all humankind) the hero brings ‘boons’ sacrificing his own life. That subdivision of the ‘monomyth’ is very productive because ‘only the end can finally determine meaning’ of entire narrative (Brooks, 1984: 22). Therefore, from the perspective of the boons’ recipients target group ( kin , folk or humankind ) the limited number of schematic narrative templates can also be reduced to three base mythic narratives , the traditional names of which are replaced in accordance with their imagined final goals, inspiring people with common identity to achieve them through the process of behaviour: the fairy tale ( myth of booty ), [27] the heroic myth ( myth of others-sacrifice ), and the myth of self-sacrifice . There is a common confusion in identification of sacrifice and self-sacrifice: ‘A chivalric ideal of male sacrifice based on the Passion of Jesus Christ’ (Frantzen 2004: From the inside flap). It is a perverted adaptation of Christ atoning for our sins, which is a symbol of the fearless non-violent behaviour facing death and it is not relevant to the heroic military deeds. In the context of my essay I split the generalizing term sacrifice into two opposites: 1) the artificial term others-sacrifice (human sacrifice, immolation, offering) means the ritually motivated act of killing other humans; 2) for a sacrificing of oneself I use the existing term self-sacrifice . In my essay the terms ‘self-sacrifice’ and ‘altruism’ are synonyms in accordance with the definition of Pitirim Sorokin (1960: 62, italics added): ‘Real altruism begins … when an individual freely sacrifices his rightful interests in favour of the well-being of another.’ Each subsequent base mythic narrative expands in its time, space, and purpose frames: memory becomes deeper, identity , which assumes solidarity and altruism, broadens the circle of ‘our own’ people and finally it results in changing the ethical norms, [28] and imagination creates more and more ambitious common goals: 1) ‘The kin (family)’ base mythic narrative is the fairy tale (myth of booty), which consists of three main elements: self-sacrifice , where the hero has a physical or mental [29] fight [30] to the death with a monster; [31] others-sacrifice , where the hero defeats the monster; and returning home with booty . Self-sacrifice and others-sacrifice are means, where booty is a goal; 2) ‘The folk (nation)’ base mythic narrative is the heroic myth (myth of others-sacrifice), which consists of self-sacrifice and others-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice is a means, where others-sacrifice is a goal; 3) ‘The humankind’ base mythic narrative is the myth of self-sacrifice, which consists of a singular element, where self-sacrifice is a goal without any means. Now we are able to represent the full structure of behaviour: 1) The ‘molecule’ of the guidance and control subsystem of behaviour consists of three ‘atoms’: memory , identity , and imagination ; 2) ‘Atoms’ have common triple-layered narrative ‘nucleus’: specific narrative , narrative template , and base mythic narrative ; 3) The core of ‘nucleus’ consists of three base mythic narratives, where names are defined by their goals: the fairy tale (myth of booty), the heroic myth (myth of others-sacrifice), and the myth of self-sacrifice ; 4) ‘Quarks’ or ‘fundamental particles’ of base mythic narratives are self-sacrifice , others-sacrifice , and booty . Three ‘fundamental particles’ represent condensed experience of millions years of humankind evolution and they still powerfully govern our behaviour even in the situations when we are not able to realize that, because ‘the mental residue of those primaeval times has become a heritage which, with each new generation, needs only to be awakened , not to be re-acquired ’ (Freud, 1939: 208, italics added). Analyzing the ways self-sacrifice, others-sacrifice, and booty exert on our behaviour we should change the metaphorical pattern. Metaphors of molecular physics render well the spatial structure of behaviour, but to represent it as a process of temporal changes we need organic metaphors, which allow translate the ‘fundamental particle’ as the ‘ prime phenomenon .’ Oswald Spengler (1927: 105, italics added) applies that term, which is ‘the deep, and scarcely appreciated, idea of Goethe’ to ‘all the formations of man’s history, whether fully matured, cut off in the prime, half opened or stifled in the seed .’ [32] What ‘societal plants’ grow from the ‘seeds’ of self-sacrifice, others-sacrifice, and booty? Booty as Primal Trauma The wars, revolutions, and other extremal situations, when police control is not ubiquitous, are always accompanied with violence. The significant part of war crimes has no rational background and looks like a sadistic embodiment of refined ‘arts for arts’ sake. There was an obvious criminal motivation of East European peasants, who robbed their Jewish neighbors during the Second World War. The perpetrators also had the reasons to murder robbed people achieving a goal to get rid of the witnesses. But why did they torture their victims, most of whom were children, women, and elderly people? There could be a common explanation that peasants were so brutal because they got only elementary education, therefore atrocities were strongly affected by the medieval prejudices against the Jews. That explanation does not work in the case of heinous Nazis crimes. Germans were very well educated. Before 1933 German universities, science, literature, and arts had leading positions in the world. [33] Why then did Germans not only rob and murder, but also torture Jewish, Roma, Polish, Soviet, and other civilians and prisoners of war? In that case we also have the simple answer: Germans were indoctrinated by the Nazis anti-human racial ideology. Using the ideological pattern can we say that Soviet soldiers committed robberies, rapes, and torture of German and other civilians because they were brainwashed by the cruel ideology of class fighting against the bourgeoisie and Russian soldiers—the hears of Soviet victors of Nazis made the analogical crimes during the recent invasion of Ukraine because in result of a long-term media campaign they have been infected by resentment regarding lost grandeur of the collapsed Soviet Empire? It is possible adding to ‘spiritual’ reasons (prejudices, ideologies, and resentment) the ‘materialistic’ motives: before and during the Second World War majority of Germans and East Europeans were totally frustrated by the Great Depression, the Soviet people were ruined by the brutal ‘collectivization’ and most of Putin’s regime soldiers, who committed atrocities in Ukraine, were recruited from severely depressed regions of Russia. Those reasons are not applicable to people from the country with the world’s largest economy, which assigns itself the role of an international watchdog of liberty and human rights. Why American soldiers were involved in mass torture in Vietnam (Rejali, 2007) and Iraq (Hersh, 2004)? Susan Sontag (2004) points out that an attempt of the American government to present the Abu Ghraib atrocities as the case of an isolated group of mentally unbalanced military servicemen is an obvious lie. She argues that Abu Ghraib is a lens exposing the longing for violence, which permeated the American society, where the ‘primeval’ initiations are omnipresent: ‘From the harsh torments inflicted on incoming students in many American suburban high schools ... to the hazing rituals of physical brutality and sexual humiliation in college fraternities and on sports teams.’ This relates not only to poor and middle classes, but to wealthy people as well. Sontag only mentions the scandalous Skull and Bones initiation ceremony. Ron Rosenbaum (2001) reports that it ‘has bonded diplomats, media moguls, bankers and spies into a lifelong, multi-generational fellowship far more influential than any fraternity.’ Among members of that secret society are a few generations of Bush family. The ceremony is accompanied by the slogans: ‘The hangman equals death. The devil equals death. Death equals death’ and looks like the Satanic mass from the Stanley Kubrick’s Eyes Wide Shut . That independent of wealth and ideology sadistic obsession is a worldwide phenomenon. I believe Sontag is totally right putting torture-humiliation-dehumanization complex into the context of pre-modern and more precisely primeval rituals of initiation, which means that the omnipresent atrocities of Modernity are the consequences of a trauma of early humankind which we still have not worked through. That argument explains why the intensive and continuous efforts of German elites to cure their society from venomous Nazis heritage has only provided limited results (Olick, 2016), which is now under a threat from the growing popularity of far-right. Bronislaw Malinowski (1948: 121) suggests that ‘anthropology should be … the study of our own mentality in the distant perspective borrowed from Stone Age man … [T]o see ourselves from a distance, we may be able to gain a new sense of proportion with regard to our own institutions, beliefs, and customs.’ If we are really concerned about ‘Never again’ we should follow that insight of one of the fathers of social anthropology searching for historical roots of Slavery, Gulag, Holocaust, and other awful collective traumas of our distant and recent past. This is a duty of specialists in memory studies. Sigmund Freud (1939: 159) asserts that ‘the archaic heritage of mankind includes … also … memory-traces of the experiences of former generations.’ A reliable carrier of ‘the archaic heritage’ is the fairy tale. The central episode of it is fighting till death with a monster for booty. The monster signifies not only wild carnivores, which presented the big danger for primeval hunter-gatherers; it is also an ‘avatar’ of ‘strangers’ who were competitors of ‘our’ community in control of territories for hunting, fishing, and gathering. In the situation of the Later Stone Age permanent starvation (Harris, 1978: 29–40) it was the fight with two-legged ‘monsters’ whether to acquire booty for food or to become the food of adversaries because captured enemies have been eaten by winners. [34] ‘Under conditions where portable wealth does not exist; where food is too perishable and too clumsy to be accumulated and transported; where slavery is of no value because every individual consumes exactly as much as he produces’ (Malinowski, 1948: 296) a singular trophy of winners were bodies of defeated enemies. Those cannibalistic acts were reimagined as sacrificial rituals. [35] To motivate ‘our people’ for such a ‘mortal combat’ our enemies must be presented as non-human monsters to whom the human treatment is unacceptable and who instead deserve torture and humiliation. For instance Native Americans believed regarding captured enemies that ‘their death might be the slower, their pain the more exquisite’ (Knowles, 1940: 158). The gloating torture of captured people was inverted fear of hunter-gatherers, who just happily escaped the fate of been eaten by their enemies. Dehumanization and ‘objectification’ of victims is an eternal rule of perpetrators. [36] Therefore it is not strange that the endo-ethnonyms (the way to call themselves) of many primeval ethnicities mean ‘person,’ ‘people,’ ‘human,’ or ‘humankind’ (Proschan, 1997), exemplifying what it means to be human. That is ‘strangers’ are excluded from the humankind and as a subclass of ‘two-legged carnivorous’ could be aligned with their four-legged fellows and both should be symbolized as nonhuman ‘monsters’. Cannibalism is strictly prohibited worldwide in nowadays except some exotic hunter-gatherers tribes (Raffaele, 2006). From the perspective of Christianity it is the biggest sin, because ‘the cannibal is a diabolical figure in the most profound sense, an anti-Divinity’ (Avramescu, 2011: 135). The taboo imposed by religion, moral, and criminal law is so strong that we do not dare to reflect on abhorrent patterns of our primeval ancestors’ behaviour. Our repulsion repressed that abominable heritage from our consciousness, in other words eliminates it from the public and academic discussions. Therefore the cannibalistic complex of our Paleolithic ancestors is the primal trauma of humankind, which is still not realized and hence is not worked through. [37] Even legendary anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1948: 296) argues that ‘[h]uman man-hunting in search of anatomic trophies, the various types of armed bodysnatching for cannibalism, actual or mystical, as food for men and food for gods’ must be ‘kept apart from constructive or organized systems of warfare.’ His classification proves that the famous anthropologist appreciated ‘human man-hunting’ as an exotic deviation of the main trends of social evolution. That means the Stone Age cannibalistic violence ‘stifled in the seed’ of modern war crimes still represents a blind spot for the competent analysis. But that is repressed does not mean that does not exist. [38] On the contrary, living into the hellish underground of subconscious space secures survival of that insufferable collective experience of cannibalism during thousands of years. Unfortunately it breaks through subconscious terrain not only as nightmares, chilling folktales, myths, and arts. Any weakening of the state control wages the mass atrocities towards ‘strangers,’ who usually are defenseless children, women, elderly people, and captured prisoners, dehumanized by their perpetrators in efforts to justify the violence committed against them. [39] I should point out that usual explanation of perpetrators motivation by unbridled ‘animalistic instincts’ is totally wrong because carnivores are cruel but they do not have sadistic intentions. Torture is an exclusive traumatic product of our culture. My colleague Mark Tkaciuk aptly names such a destructive behaviour the social gravity . In accordance with his interpretation, in the critical situations of wars, revolutions, starvations, epidemics, and other social disasters people immediately retrieve the cultural patterns of the Stone Age as it is shockingly described by William Golding in Lord of the Flies . ‘Gravity’ means that it is difficult to cope with that challenge. Because it is ‘social’ we have a chance to overcome the sadistic longing for atrocities of many of our contemporaries. Thorstein Veblen, who coined the term ‘conspicuous consumption’ in The Theory of the Leisure Class , shows that the obsession of consumption, which in our era of welfare society is urgently threatening to destroy all non-renewable natural resources sustaining our existence, is another consequence of collective primal trauma. He writes that ruling strata of traditional society are inherited a ‘predatory habit of life (war or the hunting of large game or both)’ of primeval people (Veblen, 2009: 11). Barbaric warriors and medieval nobility were people of ‘exploit,’ whose main businesses were hunting and war. They shaped the main patterns of conspicuous consumption, which are inherited by the modern class of bourgeoisie . Veblen argues that when arrogant fat cats of our days prefigure themselves as aristocrats they in reality imitate the behaviour of our ‘ savage ’ ancestors for whom hunting was the war against four-legged ‘monsters’ and war was the hunting for two-legged ‘ones.’ Primeval fear to be eaten by monsters triggers not only sadistic complex of torture but conspicuous consumption as well, which has similar nature with the stress-overeating . Demonstrating through excessive consumption their prosperity people unconsciously defend themselves of not working through primeval fears. The title of Nancy Fraser’s book Cannibal Capitalism exposes the savage ‘birthmark’ of that civilized ‘mode of production,’ which uses conspicuous consumption caused by the primal trauma as a lure for satisfaction its insatiable passion to the permanent expansion: ‘[C]apital’s expansionist drive is a brute and blind compulsion, and it is hardwired into the system’ (Fraser, 2021). Now the level of capitalist expansion achieved the scale, which threatens to destroy the natural environment, that is cannibalize our lives. I believe that the one of important duties of Academia should be working through the ‘metaphysical guilt’ (Karl Jaspers) of the Stone Age, the collective primal trauma inherited of cannibalistic practice of hunter-gatherers, which unfortunately still not discussed in current memory studies. Proliferating ‘trauma industry’ of last decades does not pay any attention to the key point of all perpetrations of the world history, namely the primal trauma of cannibalism and permanent fear that it had once created. The ‘side-effect’ of that not worked through fear is ruinous conspicuous consumption. Aby Warburg insists that ‘science can predict and thus master fear’ (as cited in Gombrich, 1970: 302). Memory studies could help mastering that fear through public discussion about origins and long lasting effects of the collective primal trauma. Its remembering should become a part of globally mediated prospective memory (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2013) or premediation (Grusin, 2010) preventing the ‘negative anthropology’ (Ulrich Sonnemann) of the future genocides and mass torture which potentially could be triggered by repressed memory of the collective cannibalistic primal trauma. Others-Sacrifice as Primal Religion The instrumental approach, which is directly related to the ‘primal phenomenon’ of others-sacrifice, is suggested by Max Weber (2001). His famous The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism , where he argues that religion affects many spheres of social life is considered as ‘one of the most fruitful examinations of the relations between religion and social theory’ (Tawney, 1960: 261). But it is impossible to define the branching tree of religious ideas and practices as the prime phenomenon ‘stifled in the seed.’ Trying to find the phenomenon shaping the nucleus of religion or, using authentic biblical term ‘faith,’ we would face an inevitable choice: what is the ‘prime,’ that is more substantial, a word of prayer or an act of sacrifice ? Intellectuals are cherished by the first verse of The Gospel of John : ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God’ (John 1:1) . That prophetic spiritual dictum is common to the myths of origin of different primeval people, where objects of material world are created through their naming (Rappaport, 1979: 201). The profound insight of our distant ancestors was far ahead of their cruel time, it becomes partly corresponding to reality only in information civilization. The primeval people, who mainly struggled for survival, for that reason were much more materialistic than we are. For them actions spoke ‘louder than words’: ‘[P]rimitive man has to a very limited extent the purely artistic or scientific interest in nature; there is but little room for symbolism in his ideas and tales; and myth, in fact, is not an idle rhapsody. … [T]he savage … is, above all, actively engaged in a number of practical pursuits, and has to struggle with various difficulties; all his interests are tuned up to this general pragmatic outlook’ (Malinowski, 1948: 75, 76). Therefore in searching for an authentic prime phenomenon we should refer to another biblical wisdom: ‘Faith without works is dead.’ The author clarifies what he means under work of faith: ‘Was not Abraham our father justified by works when he offered Isaac his son on the altar?’ ( James 2: 20–21). Abraham’s offering of the own child is a paradigmatic sacrifice , the religious phenomenon which ‘is well attested in the ancient world, especially in times of crisis’ (Hays, 2011: 181) by oral, written, and archaeological sources from Mediterranean region (Boehm, 2004; Brown, 1991; Burkert, 1983; Holway 2012; Tucker, 1999), different Slavic nations (Dragomanov and Wardrop, 1892), India (Manring, 2018; Snodgrass, 2004), China (Lu, 2009), Northern, Central, and South America (James, 2002; Tung and Knudson, 2010), and so on. Unfortunately we cannot say that it is the yesterday of humanity, because it is still in practice in different places on our planet (McDougal, 2006; Moodley, 2015). Sigmud Freud (1939: 94) argues ‘that religious phenomena are to be understood … as a return of long forgotten important happenings in the primaeval history of the human family.’ What kind of ‘long forgotten’ social practice is hidden behind a repulsive ritual of child sacrifice? A hint is contained in another paradigmatic child sacrifice: ‘For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son’ (John 3:16). Irreligious modern people receive the words of sacrificing Son of God during the Last Supper: ‘Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life’ (John 6:54), only in the metaphorical way, but according to the decision of Fourth Council of the Lateran (1215) the Catholic Church insists on literal understanding of Eucharist (Holy Communion) as a transubstantiation of bread and wine into flesh and blood of Our Savior. That interpretation involves theologians of Catholicism in permanent defense against the accusations of their Protestant opponents representing ‘the Catholics as cannibals who threatened to swallow up both Christ and the true religion. In numerous Protestant tracts, the Catholic mass was turned into a bloodthirsty rite, in which the priests ate God over and over again’ (Kilgour, 1990: 83). Devoted children of the Catholic Church also found similarities between Eucharist ritual and cannibalistic practice. Among them are the members of the Uruguayan rugby team ‘Old Christians,’ who survived in Andes during 72 days eating their mates, who died after the plane crash on 13 October 1972. They justified themselves ‘that drawing life from the bodies of their dead friends was like drawing spiritual strength from the body of Christ when they took Communion’ (Parrado and Rause, 2007). That example of self-justification let us assume that worldwide known religious ritual of child sacrifice is a product of justifying rethinking of the so called filial cannibalism (Lu, 2009) carried out by primeval people. Not only believers noticed the link between cannibalism and sacrificing rituals. Sigmund Freud (2004:164, 165) has the same approach. In accordance with his classical work Totem and Taboo transition from the ‘primal horde’ to a ‘social organization’ started when brothers ‘killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde’: ‘The totem meal, [40] which is perhaps mankind’s earliest festival, would thus be a repetition and a commemoration of this memorable and criminal deed, which was the beginning of so many things—of social organization, of moral restrictions and of religion.’ In my opinion Freud’s intuition regarding cannibalistic-sacrificing complex is a powerful insight. But why does he believe that ‘primæval deed’ of our culture was an act of patricide (geronticide) instead of infanticide, which plays so prominent role (Kronos eating his children and sacrifices of Isaac and Jesus are only a few among many examples) in the oldest layers of religious consciousness? Why did not he take into consideration another version of the origin of paternalistic cult of totem as a kind of ‘Stockholm syndrome’ of people, who in their childhood witnessed abominable scenes of devouring of their siblings by their own parents and who inverted their fears to be eaten into unlimited gratitude to their omnipotent ogre fathers? Or why is it impossible to represent ‘the totem meal’ as a celebration of the glorious deed, when children sacrifice was abolished and replaced by an animal, which was treated as a clan protector of the cannibalistic sin and therefore it was given traits of an almighty father? Those assumptions are not less plausible than sophisticated interpretations of Freud and they could be supported by large amount of evidence. In that context it is not surprising that creating his legendary concept of Oedipus complex ‘the Viennese charlatan’ (Vladimir Nabokov) ignores the beginning of the mythical story, when Laius attempted the murder of his own son. Defending his biased theory Freud also chose not to mention the paradigmatic sacrifice of Abraham [41] and to distort the meaning of Christ self-sacrifice: ‘There can be no doubt that in the Christian myth the original sin was one against God the Father. If, however, Christ redeemed mankind from the burden of original sin by sacrificing of his own life, we are driven to conclude that the sin was a murder’ (Freud, 2004:178). Formulating without a doubt that ‘original sin’ of Adam was not a disobedience to the prohibition of eating the forbidden fruit, but a cannibalistic murdering of God the Father, the father of psychoanalysis should repress the traces of his ‘meager Jewish religious education’ (McGrath, 1991). Writing his last book Moses and Monotheism Freud had a nice opportunity to improve his own knowledge of biblical wisdom, but the scandalous conclusion of his ‘treatise’ that the ‘father’ of Jewish nation was killed by his ‘spiritual children,’ who rejected the refined religion of Egyptian sun god Aton and adopted the Midianite cult of volcanic ‘narrow-minded, … violent and blood-thirsty’ god Yahweh, shows that the author of Moses was not able to overcome the biased patricide concept. He insists that the main idea of Moses is linked up ‘with conclusions laid down twenty-five years ago in Totem and Taboo ’ (Freud, 1939: 80, 85). Surprisingly, Freud points out in his biblical ‘treatise’ that myths and legends of different ancient folks contain the common schematic narrative template A Ruler Orders to Get Rid of a Baby (in most cases his own child): ‘The best known names in the series beginning with Sargon of Agade are Moses, Cyrus and Romulus. But besides these … [there are] Oedipus, Kama, Paris, Telephos, Perseus, Heracles, Gilgamesh, Amphion, Zethos and others.’ On another page he mentions ‘the early history of Jesus, where King Herod assumes the role of Pharaoh’. Providing that impressive sample Freud does not pay any attention to the fact that the murderous ‘challenge’ was initiated by fathers. In obsession with his theory of the patricide origin of culture Freud forgets that Christ is not God the Father, but Son of God and equates the ‘Christian Communion where the believer symbolically incorporates the blood and flesh of his God’ with devouring of the ‘primal horde’ father (Freud, 1939: 17, 22, 135). That is why he was not able to duly appreciate numerous evidence of children sacrifice (Isaac and Jesus are only two among many), which contain the texts of Old and New Testaments. His biased perspective diverts Freud of ‘naïve reading’ of Torah and the Gospels. [42] Instead he suggests too much sophisticated interpretations of original sin and Moses death, drawing on an ‘arbitrary way’ to treat the sources: ‘I use Biblical tradition here in such an autocratic and arbitrary way, draw on it for confirmation whenever it is convenient and dismiss its evidence without scruple when it contradicts my conclusions’ (Freud 1939: 45). Aviezer Tucker (1999: 43) argues that ignoring obvious facts the beloved Jewish son Sigmund imitates the biblical Isaac, who also was not able to ascribe to his worshipped father the murdering intentions. Therefore Freud, who ‘shared the paternalistic cultural values of his historical milieu,’ may have been ready ‘to accept the discovery of immoral, guilty wishes on his own part, but not the guilt of the accusing father.’ Yes, the Freudian theory of culture has the factual base and the myth of Oedipus appeared not as pure fantasy. Even among modern hunter-gatherers the practice to get rid of the old members of a community, who are appreciated as extra mouths to feed, still exists (Harris, 1978: 25; Willerslev, 2013: 148). But that practice could not shake the ground of the ‘down-to-earth’ primeval people surviving in the situation of permanent starvation and instill in their ‘numb’ souls the religious ‘fear and trembling,’ as Søren Kierkegaard argues regarding the Abraham’s sacrifice of his own child. Not only during the Stone Age, but also in early state-societies in times of a great danger existed the tradition of the ‘powerful sacrifice,’ when victims were children. The obvious example is a Phoenician city Carthage, where people believed that gods would be pleased by offerings if victims are not alien adults but ‘their own youngest children’ (Brown, 1991: 169). I am not sure if there exists any ritual to sacrifice elderly people in critical situations. Therefore it is not occasional that in religious sources geronticide plays less significant role in comparison to ubiquitous infanticide. Because that Freud has to construct his theory on the base of the Sophocles play Oedipus Rex , where there are no cannibalistic meanings, which are paramount for Totem and Taboo , since he was not able to find another reliable mythical story related to his sophisticated idea of child’s desire for the opposite-sex parent and jealousy toward the same-sex parent. Furthermore proving his biased patricide concept of culture the author had to distort the plot of Oedipus’s story. Researchers point out ‘Freud’s selective reading of the Oedipus legend, from which he suppressed the origins of the tragedy in the sins of Oedipus’s father, Laius—notably Laius’s attempt to murder his son—in order to focus on the purely intrapsychic drama, Oedipus’s love of his mother and hatred of his father’ (Robinson, 1993: 147). In my opinion it is not plausible that geronticide could have more significant impact on religious representations of primeval people than sacrificing of their own off-springs. It means that, despite Freud’s claim, ‘the beginning ... of religion’ was infanticide. The ideology of decolonization creates another obstacle to the approach, which establishes the link between the origin of religion and filial cannibalism . Academic proponents of the politically correct decolonizing concept argue that evidence of ritual cannibalism was a kind of ‘blood libel.’ Since the Age of Discovery Europeans used it for dehumanization of the native population of conquered overseas lands. That strategy provided to colonizers the moral right to enslave and exterminate ‘abhorrent monsters’ of the human race (Arens, 1979). Opponents of ‘ultra-decolonizing’ approach agree that colonizers did exaggerate the number of cannibalistic cases in their reports, but do not accept total denial of the phenomenon of ritual cannibalism among native people and provide convincing evidence that such rituals did exist (Sahlins, 2003). Denying the ritual cannibalism the zealous critics of colonialism from Academia reiterate behaviour of the left Western intellectuals, who in 1930s denied the existence of Gulag, because from their point of view it would discredit the ‘progressive’ idea of socialism (Partington, 2008). Even ‘deniers’ of human sacrifices recognize cases of starvation cannibalism proved by the huge number of evidence. It is directly related to our primeval ancestors. About 50 to 30 thousand years ago they mastered the technologies, which allowed hunting mammoths and other big game successfully and getting results of food abundance (Harris, 1978: 17). It is not fully clear why the extinctions of most of great mammals occurred after that ‘Golden Age.’ Was it an effect of climate changes or herbivores giants were simply ‘overkilled’ by humans (Martin, 2005: 48–57)? Anyway before the transition to agriculture around 15 to 10 thousand years ago ancient hunter-gatherers survived during a long period of permanent starvation. Earth population decreased number of times and paleoanthropological data show that people, who lived during the so called Later Stone Age crisis, were affected by poor nutrition (Harris, 1978: 29–40). Primeval people lived then under a permanent threat of death by famine. Infanticide was their common practice of reducing number of eaters (Chapman, 1980; Harris, 1978: 24–25). In the situations of cruel starvation, when hunter-gatherers devoured their own children as a last food resource, they chose a single remedy for protection of their despaired minds and reimagined their ‘ daddy sin’ as a sacrifice for the sake of transcendental numina that are spirits and deities presiding over things and spaces. Rudolf Otto (1958: 14), who coined the famous term ‘numinous’ from that Latin word, believes that primeval people experienced mysterium tremendum or ‘ur-emotion’ in that bloodthirsty ‘starting-point for the entire religious development in history.’ Of course, he is right, but Rane Willerslev (2013: 151), who calls sacrificing act the ‘sacrificial trickery,’ is right as well. Piously deceiving numina our Later Stone Age ancestors eating their own children made the same that ‘civilized’ people did when they ate animals sacrificed for the sake of gods. The ancient Romans called that habit pars pro toto : 1) Ancient Greeks ascribed to Prometheus their own trickery when they burned on altars only bones and fat of sacrificed animals; 2) The Bible Leviticus and Numbers books contain precise prescriptions how to share sacrificed animals and other food between Yahweh, priests and sacrificers (Harris, 1978: 131); 3) An integral feature of the Vedic sacrificial system is “[t]he presentation of the smaller, the less adequate, and the abbreviated as the “equal” of the larger’ (Smith and Doniger, 1989: 206). In epochs, when sacrificing rituals were recorded in Holy books of different ancient civilizations, the abominable habit of children devouring became inappropriate, and therefore they were symbolically replaced by animals (Snodgrass, 2004: 82). [43] If we take that into consideration it would not be difficult to reconstruct how cannibalistic practices of Later Stone Age’s primeval people were transformed into the ritual of child sacrifice. Abhorrent devouring acts of our Paleolithic ancestors instilled horror religiosus (Kierkegaard, 2005: 44) into the souls of believers of all time and nations. Booty and others-sacrifice both are cannibalistic traumas of Humankind. But there are three principal differences between them: 1) Booty is ‘external’ cannibalism—devouring of prisoners, others-sacrifice is ‘internal’cannibalism—devouring of own children; 2) Torturing of prisoners is a by-product of the full fairy-tale plot: the self-sacrifice—the others-sacrifice—the booty. Sacrificing of children is a shortened fairy tale, where the self-sacrifice is eliminated; 3) Cannibalistic trauma of booty is not yet worked through and is fraught with atrocities and conspicuous consumption. The heinous trauma of others-sacrifice in the form of devouring own children has found productive or at least therapeutic output through different religious practices helping to treat that ‘neurosis of mankind’ (Freud, 1936: 91). Self-Sacrifice as ‘the Prime Phenomenon of All Past and Future World-History’ [44] The ‘work’ of child cannibalistic sacrifice is an important type of others-sacrifice. It is the prime phenomenon of religion , but contrary to Freud’s claim it is not the prime phenomenon of social organization , because the plot of child sacrifice—the others-sacrifice and the booty—is a misleading and not viable concept, which diverts people from realistic solutions of their problems. Cannibalistic acts of children sacrifice, which were committed by primeval people in desperate situations of mortal famine, inverted the usual behaviour of hunter-gatherers, when adults searching for food for their children sacrificed their own lives struggling with wild animals and bloodthirsty neighbors. The filial cannibalism ‘flipping faith into trickery’ (Willerslev, 2013: 151) could not be the prime phenomenon of social organization, because sustainable life requires valid premises. Therefore others-sacrifice has as opposition self-sacrifice : 1) When hunter-gatherers drew on their own strength they sacrificed themselves for the sake of children and other members of their community. This is why Son of Man announced that the goal of His self-sacrifice was not for the sake of God, but for the sake of people : ‘And for their sakes I sanctify myself’ (John 17:19); 2) When primeval people were frustrated and lost faith in themselves, they sacrificed their off-springs for the sake of gods in full correspondence with the aphorism coined by Marx: ‘Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.’ Therefore religion, according to Marxist terminology, is one of the forms of ideology that is ‘false consciousness,’ which represents reality through its distortions. The phenomena of others-sacrifice and self-sacrifice sanctify opposite types of behaviour: 1) Others-sacrifice, where the fate of the victim depends exclusively on the will of the sacrificer, provides the patterns of despotic treatment in different forms of communities from family to state. Self-sacrifice is the pattern of freedom : ‘And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free’ (John 8:32); 2) Others-sacrifice assumes the formula do ut des (I give that you might give). This trading with gods sanctifies so called equivalent exchange (alienation and appropriation) between people. Self-sacrifice, that is, self-giving proclaims the abolition of alienation or, metaphorically speaking, the expulsion of merchants from the temple of sociality; 3) Others-sacrifice creates the antisocial patterns for egoistic (selfish) behaviour. Self-sacrifice creates the prosocial patterns for altruistic behaviour, which, using the expression coined by Auguste Comte, means ‘to live for others.’ In Latin ‘religio’ means ‘bond.’ Through self-sacrifice we establish bond with people and through others-sacrifice we establish bond with gods . [45] Which one is primal to maintain the society? There is a Russian proverb: ‘Trust in God, but do not stumble yourself’ (God helps those, who help themselves). From that not poisoned by transcendent opiates perspective others-sacrifice is not simply inverted, but perverted self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice is, not by chance, the starting point of all three basic myth narratives: the fairy tale, the heroic myth, and the myth of self-sacrifice. That is without self-sacrifice, which is ‘the basis of all human institutions’ (Benda, 2011: 127), is impossible to bring others-sacrifice and catch booty. It is the prime phenomenon , which holds entire construction of every human community of past, present, and future. Without self-sacrifice humankind is doomed to extinction. Among all religions there is an important exclusion. Christianity is a singular religion, which exhibits self-sacrifice. Yes, from the perspective of others-sacrifice it is possible to say that God the Father committed the sacrifice of his Son, because He did not stop the hangmen the same way as He held back the hand of Abraham sacrificing Isaac. But there is a principal difference between two paradigmatic sacrifices. Not only Isaac himself never expressed that he is ready to lay his life down, but no one was interested to know his opinion regarding his own fate. This is an obvious case of the familial despotism. The victim of others-sacrifice is always an object of violation. [46] Jesus really was an initiator and agent of sacrifice, because He laid down His life willingly: ‘No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father’ (John 10:18). ‘Commandment’ in that context means not the ‘order,’ but the ‘license’ to solve His fate in accordance with His own will. Therefore the sacrifice of Christ is a paradigm of self-sacrifice. It is not surprising that Western civilization based on Christian values achieved the leading position in the World. Despite Christianity, as a religion, also distorts reality its self-sacrificing ‘engine’ ensures more effective everyday behaviour in comparison to unchristian societies. Self-sacrifice ‘by definition’ shapes realistic mental and practical patterns, that is, experimental relations with nature and theoretical reflection of those relations. It is not surprising that the first bursts of science, which is the driving force of industrial and information societies, appeared in the cradles of Eastern civilizations much earlier than in Europe, but only Europeans were able to establish that form of knowledge as a developed institution transforming it in a kind of terrestrial religion of entire Humankind. Sir Edward Burnett Tylor argues that ‘magic is a pseudo-science.’ Rephrasing his dictum we can call science a true-magic . This ‘magic’ allowed Europeans to be the first who started disenchanting and mastering nature and society. Nowadays the Western Civilization is in a deep crisis. Muslim, Indian, and Far East competitors are attacking from different directions. But they are able to do that only by using Western technologies and gradually transforming themselves in accordance to Western standards. Meanwhile the main reason of current Decline of the West is not the ‘westernization’ of competitors, but the process of ‘dewesternization’ of the West itself. I should point out that not the ‘abolition’ of religion is a trigger of the current degradation. The main reason of that desperate process is the total renouncement of self-sacrificing (altruistic) behaviour, which ‘in our type of culture … is understood to be deviant behavior’ (Weinstein, 2004: 55). Our longing for comfort, the egoistic state of spirit, which Jean-Luc Nancy (1991) defines as ‘unsacrificeable,’ erodes the mainstay of our civilization. To overcome that dangerous trend we firstly should reflect the current situation aiming to restore not the dead letter of religion, but the vital spirit of altruistic self-sacrifice. Structural Concordances between Three Base Mythic Narratives and the Concepts of Marshall Mcluhan, Jan Assmann, Abraham Maslow, Georges Dumézil, and Fernand Braudel The heuristic potential of academic concepts is often revealed through their conformity to the concepts of adjacent disciplines. The core of the guidance and control subsystem of behaviour consists of three base mythic narratives, which are careers, that is mediation tools , of memory, identity, and imagination. Let us search from the perspective of memory studies similarities between triple mythic narrative structure (the fairy tale, the heroic myth, and the myth of self-sacrifice) and the theory of media studies. Siegfried J. Schmidt (2008: 197–198) differs ‘communication instruments (such as language and pictures)’ and ‘technological devices’ (such as oral, written, print, and electric media). Unfortunately, linguistic communication instruments including narratives are still not fully appreciated by researchers. Even the prophet of ‘electric Age of Information’ Marshall McLuhan (1994: 36) predominantly reduces media of information to their ‘technological devices’ or ‘conduits.’ [47] Expounding his legendary concept: ‘The medium is the message,’ he structures those tools imitating Matryoshka (the Russian nesting doll): the content of electronic media is print, the content of print media is writing, the content of writing media is speech, and the content of speech is ‘an actual process of thought, which is in itself nonverbal’ (McLuhan, 1994: 7–8). [48] In my opinion, McLuhan’s Matryoshka contains a confusion, because it homogenizes two kinds of media, which perform principally different functions: communication instruments (‘speech’ and ‘thought’) and technological devices (‘writing,’ ‘print,’ and ‘electricity’). It is possible to define the main function of communication instruments (narrative is one of them) as ‘packaging of information’ and, respectively, of technological devices as preservation and transportation of ‘packs with information.’ The difference between these kinds of information media could be clarified through the analogy with means of transport. We can travel using different means: by foot, horses, motorcars, railways, planes, and so on. Of course, our choice of transport would affect time and expenses, but anyhow we can reach a destination. We can make a similar choice for delivering our messages packaged by communication instruments; in that case the choice of technological devices would also affect time and expenses for their delivering. [49] Therefore, as an example, the communication instrument ‘speech,’ which the Canadian media-guru negligently jointed to the sample of technological devices, [50] could be delivered in the forms of oral speech, written speech, printed speech, and speech aired by radio, television, and other electronic media. [51] In accordance with that the main motto coined by McLuhan should be rephrased: communication instruments are the messages of technological devices . Discussing McLuhan’s concept we did not divert from the issue of memory narratives because one of the main functions of technological devices is preservation of messages of communication instruments or ‘linguistic codifications of experience’ (McLuhan, 1994: 140). They act as ‘a store of perception and as a transmitter of the perceptions and experience of one person or of one generation to another’ (McLuhan, 1994: 139, italics added). [52] Every technological medium of information has its own memory ‘store’: oral— folklore , written— archive , print— library , electronic—audio and video collections . The internet is not simply the main ‘conduit’ of electronic media, it becomes a ‘single medium’ (Kittler 1997: 31) of the global information civilization, embracing all existed depositories of information. Totality of media stores constitutes the cultural heritage . Therefore different kinds of memory narratives serve as media between people and their heritage. In this sense, ‘the medium is the memory’ (Erll, 2011a: 115). McLuhan points out that every type of technological devices creates the framework of communication for different historical epochs: oral media for limited archaic communities, writing media for elites of Antiquity and Medieval Age, print media for all citizens of Modern nation-states [53] and electronic media for the cosmopolitan residents of the ‘global village.’ That proves the existence of interdependence between those types of technological devices of information media and three base mythic narratives of memory, identity, and imagination: the message of oral media is the fairy tale, the message of writing and print media is the heroic myth, and the message of electronic media is the myth of self-sacrifice. Looking at narrative [54] as a mediation tool transforms it into an important subject of media studies. That approach creates common ground for interdisciplinary memory-media research. [55] Concept of three base mythic narratives as media tools also correlates with concepts of memory studies (Jan Assmann), psychology (Abraham Maslow), sociology (Georges Dumezil), and history (Fernand Braudel). In the function of media three base mythic narratives are related to Jan Assmann’s (2010b: 122) communicative (social), political, and cultural forms of collective memory. From that perspective the fairy tale is a ‘carrier’ of the communicative (social) memory and subsequently the heroic myth and the myth of self-sacrifice are ‘carriers’ of the political and cultural memories. Three base mythic narratives are also congruent with some levels of the so-called Abraham Maslow’s pyramid of personal needs (Rouse, 2004) and the elements of the Georges Dumezil’s (1958) social ‘Indo-European triad’: 1) Maslow’s material (physiological) needs/ the fairy tale/ Dumézil’s ‘laborers’; 2) Maslow’s security need/ the heroic myth/ Dumézil’s ‘warriors’; 3) Maslow’s need for self-actualization/ [56] the myth of self-sacrifice/ Dumézil’s ‘priests.’ We can notice the conformity of the three triads. In all those cases, the base mythic narratives are mediation tools between personal needs and social functions. Just as personal needs coexist within the structure of individual consciousness and social functions coexist in the structure of society, the coexistence of narratives of the fairy tale, the heroic myth, and the myth of self-sacrifice involves interactions of family, nation, and humankind frameworks [57] of memory, identity, and imagination in our souls as well as in the social space. McLuhan’s Matryoshka-like model of interdependence of information media technological devices is fully applicable to narrative structure: the content of specific narrative is the schematic narrative template and the content of schematic narrative template is the base mythic narrative. The concept of base mythic narrative allows to embrace the universe of ‘narrativity’ in its full plenitude, starting from the volatile surface of specific narratives through schematic narrative templates to inert deep structure of base mythic narratives. That three-leveled typology corresponds to triadic temporal model of Fernand Braudel: 1) Specific narrative/ event; 2) Schematic narrative template/ cyclical phase (conjuncture); 3) Base mythic narrative/ the longue durée (structure). From the perspective of the longue durée we can distinguish historical epochs based on the domination of one of those three co-existing base mythic narratives [58] : 1) In the pre-state hunter-gathering society it was the fairy tale; 2) In the state agrarian and industrial societies it is the heroic myth; 3) In the post-state information society it will be the myth of self-sacrifice. Part II of the article [1] Karl K. Szpunar and Kathleen B. McDermott (2007) discuss a few cases of neurological research regarding amnesic patients’ ability to ‘form mental images of novel experiences that might take place in the future in a familiar setting, such as a possible event in their lives over the next weekend. These patients were markedly impaired in their ability to do this—their mental images were vague and highly fragmented when compared to those reported by a control group of people of the same average age and level of education but without amnesia.’ [2] Cf. ‘When it considers its own past, the group feels strongly that it has remained the same and becomes conscious of its identity through time’ (Halbwachs, 1980: 85, italics added). [3] Cf. Ritual ‘mend[s] ever again worlds forever breaking apart under the blows of usage,’ and ritual ‘does more than remind individuals of an underlying order. It establishes that order’ (Rappoport, 1979: 197, 206). [4] Cf. ‘To share an identity with other people is to feel in solidarity with them’ (Hollinger 2006: 23). [5] Cf. ‘The ever-improvingknowledge of the past should throw light upon and open up the chancesfor future development’ (Straub, 2008: 217); ‘[T]he rationality of our actions gives some indication of the adequacy of our insight into the past (Ankersmit, 1983: 35). [6] See a detailed review of different academic approaches to that problem (Erll, 2011a: 38–45). [7] Julien Benda (2011: 72) writes about the ‘clerks’, he means ‘the poets, the novelists, the dramatists, the artists,’ who invested themselves ‘at the service of political passions’ and contributed a lot in waging the First World War. He points out: ‘But there are other “clerks” in whom this derogation from the disinterested activity of the mind is far more shocking, “clerks” whose influence on the laymen is much more profound by reason of the prestige attached to their functions. I mean the historians.’ Paul Connerton (1989: 16) writes about ‘the great German scholars’ of nineteenth and the first half of twentieth centuries Niebuhr and Savigny, Ranke and Mommsen, Troeltsch and Meinecke, whose historical activities are ‘part of the history of nationalism’: ‘They rejected any form of political universalism … Constructing a canon of historical research, they are at the same time participating in the formation of a political identity and giving shape to the memory of a particular culture.’ [8] Cf. ‘Scholars should be able to demonstrate how to break out of the cage of collective identity’ (Erll, 2020: 555). [9] Cf. ‘The historian certainly means to be objective and impartial’ (Halbwachs, 1980: 83). [10] Cf. ‘Historians do not always live up to their own standards and retain biases, but these standards nonetheless remain at the core of historians’ aspirations’ (Wertsch, 2021: 93). [11] Cf. ‘Collective memory, is essentially a reconstruction of the past that adapts the image of historical facts to the beliefs and spiritual needs of the present, where the knowledge of [historical facts] originally was secondary’ (Halbwachs, 1941: 9); ‘Collective memories always are biased in presenting the group’s past in a more positive light and dismissing those memories that do not serve the present goals of the group’ (Isurin, 2022: 94). [12] Cf. ‘Where history is concerned, memory increasingly functions as antonym rather than synonym; contrary rather than complement and replacement rather than supplement’ (Klein, 2000: 128f.). [13] Cf. an opposite opinion: [W]e cannot allow any … reflection to induce us to put the truth aside in favour of what are supposed to be national interests’ (Freud, 1939: 11) [14] Cf. regarding another mental substance tightly connected to memory: ‘[T]he content of the unconscious is collective anyhow, a general possession of mankind’ (Freud, 1939: 212). [15] Cf. ‘What miraculous procedure is responsible for the transformation, which takes place by the mere transition from a single individual to a group of individuals?’ (Gedi and Elam 1996: 38). [16] Cf. ‘Major plotlines … help us “string” past events in our minds, thereby providing them with historical meaning’ (Zerubavel, 2003: 13); ‘Voices of individual experience are “co-authored” by the narrative tools provided by a community’ (Wertsch, 2021: 198). [17] Cf. ‘Over time, individual distinct memories can become shared collective memories (Isurin, 2022: 34). Orlando Figes (2007: 636) points out that Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago not only became the collective narrative for other survivors, but it was so strongly internalized by them that even erased their real experience: ‘The victims of repression frequently lacked a clear conceptual grasp of their own experience, having no structural framework or understanding of the political context in which to make sense of their memories. This gap reinforced their inclination to substitute … coherent and clear memories [of Solzhenitsyn and other writers] for their own confused and fragmentary recollections.’ [18] Cf. ‘The memories “liberated” in narrative psychotherapy (or other social contexts) are embedded into an autobiographical narrative, which follows a broadly standardized scheme. This example makes it obvious to whatextent even the most intimate recollections and personal memories are constituted and encoded culturally’ (Straub, 2008: 225). [19] Cf. ‘One may say that the individual remembers by placing himself in the perspective of the group, but one may also affirm that the memory of the group realizes and manifests itself in individual memories’ (Halbwachs, 1992: 40); ‘In combination, these two reinforce one another: each individual story helps to shape a larger history by providing it with detail, depth, and nuance, and, in turn, each story is enhanced and given broader meaning through its contextualization within a larger historical matrix’ (Hirsch and Spitzer, 2015, 18). [20] Cf. ‘Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too’ (White, 1987: 24). [21] Cf. ‘Myth was their [Ancient Greeks] great teacher in all matters of the spirit. There they learned morality and conduct’ (Finley, 1965: 284); ‘[M]yths present a model or charter for human behaviour and that the world of myth provides guidance for crucial elements in human existence — war and peace, life and death, truth and falsehood, good and evil’ (Bolle, Buxton, and Smith, 2020). [22] Cf. ‘Collective memory’ is ‘a misleading new name for the old familiar “myth” which can be identified, in its turn, with “collective” or “social” stereotypes’ (Gedi and Elam, 1996: 47). [23] Discussing mythic core of memory we should not forget that ritual is inextricably tied to myth. Paul Connerton (1989: 78) calls ritual ceremonies ‘mnemonics of the body,’ therefore we can call mythic narratives ‘mnemonics of the mind.’ That means there are two kinds of memory: narrated ‘mythic’ memory and performed ‘ritualistic’ ones (Rappaport, 1979: 175). Connerton (1989) and Jan Assmann (2011) argue that function of ritual is shaping of collective identity, without which community is broken. Hence identity, which is an idea/value/belief of group belongingness ‘ permeated by emotions’ (Davies 2018: 55), is based on ritual memory . Of course myth and ritual are not ‘one and the same’ ( Leach, 1970: 13), but they are corporeal (non-discursive numinous experience) and mental (discursive meaning of sacred) sides (Rappaport, 1979: 217) of the same process of consolidation of mnemonic community. At least in the field of commemoration both phenomena are ‘counterparts’: ‘myth implies ritual, ritual implies myth’ (Leach, 1970: 13). That means identity-ritual is performed myth of memory and conversely memory-myth is narrated ritual of identity. [24] Cf. ‘[P]rimary framework allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms’ (Goffman, 1980: 21). [25] Cf. ‘A complete scheme of rites of passage theoretically includes preliminal rites (rites of separation), liminal rites (rites of transition), and postliminal rites (rites of incorporation)’ (van Gennep, 1960: 11). [26] Campbell highlights that the author of the term is James Joyce (1939: 581). [27] Vladimir Propp (1968: 90, 100) points out, that fairy tales are myths, which lost their sacral nature. Therefore, the ancient myths, which at a later stage degenerated to the fairy tales, allow us to view them as the myths of booty. [28] Prince Kropotkin (2021: 178) tightly connects ethics with solidarity (‘mutual-aid’) and altruism: ‘The ethical progress of our race, viewed in its broad lines, appears as a gradual extension of the mutual-aid principles from the tribe to always larger and larger agglomerations, so as to finally embrace one day the whole of mankind, without respect to its diverse creeds, languages, and races.’ [29] For instance, the Sphinx strangled and devoured anyone who could not answer her riddle. After having heard Oedipus’ right answer the Sphinx killed herself by throwing herself from her high rock into the sea. [30] In that point the basic plot is bifurcated between ‘ forza (force), plots of the body, and forda (fraud), plots of the mind’ (Tobias, 2012: 34). Arnold van Gennep (1960: 17–18, italics added) notices that between neighboring tribes and ancient states there were so called ‘marches’/’marques’, unpopulated sacral zones ‘deserts, marshes, and most frequently virgin forests’, which ‘were used for market places or battlefields .’ Hence they were topoi of fraud or force that is culminating points of fairy tale’s plot. [31] The Aby Warburg’s vague insights: ‘The struggle with the monster as the germ of logical construction’; ‘The dialectic of the monster as the foundation of a sociological theory of energy’; ‘From the monstrous complex to the ordering symbol’ (as cited in Gombrich, 1970: 261–262), should be thoroughly reflected, because in my opinion they point out the crucial role that narratives of fairy tale and heroic myth play in our minds . [32] What does the author of Decline of the West assume under, using his organicist terminology, a ‘seed’ of every ‘matured society’? On different pages of his opus magnum it means different phenomena: ‘culture,’ ‘style,’ and ‘arts’ (Spengler, 1927: 105, 205, 281), but each of them is too complex to be considered as a ‘seed’ of the ‘societal plant.’ [33] Cf. ‘The utmost barbarism had happened in the nation that had previously grounded its identity on Kultur. … The triumphant notion of a German Kulturnation was replaced by the traumatizing disclosure of the Holocaust; the nation that gave birth to a prodigious Weltliteratur had procreated also the unspeakable and inconceivable horror of the extermination camps’ (Giesen, 2004: 120, italics as in original). [34] Cf. ‘In some cultures parts of the bodies of defeated enemies have been eaten simply to degrade them and demonstrate the completeness of the victory’ (Ellwood, 2007: 73); ‘In some regions an intrusion on the part of a stranger, against the rules of intertribal law, and breaking through the normal dividing line, was dangerous to the intruder. He was liable to be killed or enslaved; at times he served as the piece de resistance in a cannibalrepast. In other words, the execution of such a trespasser was determined by tribal law, by the value of his corpse for the tribal kitchen, or of his head to the collection of a head-hunting specialist’ (Malinowski, 1948: 286). [35] Cf. ‘Sometimes the victima were also victi , defeated enemies who … were now turned into slaves and doomed to be sacrificed to the Gods’ (Giesen, 2004: 59); ‘Where the positive form of human sacrifice exists there is, generally, an actual or symbolic eating of the sacrificial victim’ (Obeyesekere, 2005: 261). [36] Cf. ‘The perpetrator, who dehumanizes other subjects, extending his control over the world into a realm that should be exempted from such treatment—the subjectivity of others’ (Giesen, 2004: 7). [37] In accordance with a ‘formal definition’ of Neil Smelser (2004: 44, italics added) cultural trauma is ‘a memory accepted and publicly given credence by a relevant membership group and evoking an event or situation which is a) laden with negative affect, b) represented as indelible, and c) regarded as threatening a society’s existence or violating one or more of its fundamental cultural presuppositions.’ The case of primal trauma of booty, which still has not been accepted publicly, proves that a ‘formal definition’ of cultural trauma should be extended. [38] Cf. ‘The forgotten material is not extinguished, only “repressed”; its traces are extant in the memory in their original freshness’ (Freud, 1939: 152). [39] Cf. ‘Whenever recent events produce impressions or experiences which are so much like the repressed material that they have the power to awaken it. Thus the recent material gets strengthened by the latent energy of the repressed, and the repressed material produces its effect behind the recent material and with its help’ (Freud, 1939: 153). [40] ‘The totem meal ceremony rites,’ as Kurt Caswell (2008: 175) explains, is ‘an ancient sacrificial ritual in which the members of a clan affirm their identification with their god.’ [41] Cf. the memoirs of Serge Moscovici, who got traditional Jewish education and unlike Freud was deeply upset by Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac: ‘It is difficult for me to express my fear and indignation when I thought about the little boy facing death. Did God have the right to order this sacrifice? I discussed this with my friend: it was a denial of justice, an abuse of a child by adults. So they can do with us what they want?’ (Moscovici, 1997: 50–51). [42] Jan Assman (2018: 154) notices that Freud was not the ‘careful reader of the Bible.’ [43] The Brahmana, one of the Vedic books explains that an animal sacrifice is a substitute to human sacrifice: ‘The man is the sacrifice because it is the man who offers it. And each time he offers it, the sacrifice takes the shape of the man. Therefore the sacrifice is the man’ (SB 1.3.2.1; 3.5.3.1, as cited in Smith and Doniger, 1989: 198). [44] Spengler, 1927: 105. [45] Cf. ‘In the violent act of sacrifice … the trauma of killing a member of the community merges with the triumphant construction of a bond between community and deity ’ (Giesen, 2004: 23, italics added). [46] The priests of all religions try to convince that sacrifice is not a ritual killing because allegedly the victim ‘willingly sacrificed itself’ (Smith and Doniger, 1989: 210). [47] Cf. ‘Type 1 regards media as conduits , or methods of transmitting information; and type 2 regards them as languages. … Media of type 1 include TV, radio, the Internet, the gramophone, the telephone—all distinct types of technologies—as well as cultural channels, such as books and newspapers. Media of type 2 would be language, sound, image’ (Ryan, 2006: 17, italics in the original). [48] The statement regarding the ‘nonverbal’ nature of the ‘process of thought’ is an exaggeration, because in psychology exists the term ‘inner speech,’ which is defined as ‘verbal thinking’ (Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015: 91). [49] Erving Goffman (1980: 24) provides an example of the checkers practice, when players are able to render the same message, using different technological devices: ‘a move can equally well be made by voice, gesture, or the mails, or by physically shifting a checker by the fist, any combination of fingers, or the right elbow. [50] It is remarkable that sometimes the author of Understanding Media feels that a communication instrument ‘speech’ is heterogeneous to technological devices and replaces it by more suitable expressions: ‘sound,’ ‘oral culture,’ ‘ear culture,’ ‘audile-tactile perception,’ and so on (McLuhan, 1994: 16, 27, 32, 45). [51] Cf. ‘[Story] is independent of the techniques that bear it along. It may be transposed from one to another medium without losing its essential properties’ (Bremond, 1973: 12, as cited in Ryan, 2006: 3–4). [52] Cf. ‘Media technologies allow for the dissemination, from a spatial point of view, and the storage, from a temporal point of view, of the contents of cultural memory’ (Erll, 2011a: 122). [53] Cf. ‘The sacred scriptures of legalist scholarship were originally handwritten and accessible only to a devoted professional elite. Civil society’s public sphere, in contrast, presupposed printed texts that could be reproducedand spread at relatively low cost’ (Giesen, 2004: 102). [54] Mary-Laure Ryan (2006: 15–16) points out that narrative tools are applicable not only to verbal messages but also to non-verbal (music, painting, architecture and so on). [55] Cf. ‘Media construct and create, shape, and distort memories’ (Erll 2018: 309). [56] That triadic perspective allows to present ‘love and belonging and esteem needs’ of Maslow’s needs hierarchy as a part of the self-actualization area. Cf. the other triadic reducing approach to Maslow’s needs hierarchy (Alderfer, 1972). [57] Chiara De Cesare and Ann Rigney (2014: 20) call that interplay ‘multi-scalarity.’ [58] Cf. ‘Historical periods are defined not only by the events that occurred in them, but also by the dominant narratives that frame them’ (Pisanty, 2021: 190).










