Anna Ivanova. Can Academia Speak about Ukraine? Bridging The War, Scholarly Knowledge Production, and Ukrainian Studies
- Nadejda Erlih
- 9 окт.
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Обновлено: 10 окт.

Abstract: This essay examines the state of academic freedom in Ukraine and Ukrainian studies abroad in the context of the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian war. It begins by analyzing the functions and roles of the social sciences under conditions of armed conflict, where their implementation becomes significantly constrained. The analysis highlights the instrumentalization of scholarly knowledge for military and political purposes and explores the impact of war as a “state of exception” (C. Schmitt, G. Agamben) on the academic sphere. Particular attention is given to the increasing militarization of science alongside other domains of social life. Academic (un)freedom is considered within a broader framework of restrictions on human rights and civil liberties during wartime. Drawing on specific cases of violations of academic freedom in Ukraine and in international research on Ukrainian society, the essay outlines the distinctive features of the Ukrainian case while also situating them within wider historical and contemporary contexts. Furthermore, it discusses the role of public intellectuals in the ongoing processes of instrumentalization and militarization of academia and scholarly knowledge. The essay concludes by calling for situating Ukrainian studies within a global context and avoiding the essentialization or romanticization of social processes, emphasizing the need for critical, reflective, and independent scholarship.
Keywords: academic freedom, knowledge production, Ukrainian Studies, intellectuals, Russia-Ukraine war.
Author: Anna Ivanova, Research Assistant at the Graduate Centre for the Study of Culture and PhD Candidate in Sociology, Justus Liebig University Giessen (Germany). Email: anna.ivanova@sowi.uni-giessen.de
А. К. Иванова
Может ли академия говорить об Украине? Связывая войну, производство научного знания и украинистику
Аннотация: Эссе исследует состояние академической свободы в Украине и украинистике за рубежом в контексте продолжающейся российско-украинской войны. Работа начинается с анализа функций и задач социальных наук в условиях вооружённого конфликта, выполнение которых оказывается существенно затруднено. Показано, как научное знание подвергается инструментализации в военных и политических целях, а также рассмотрено влияние войны как «состояния исключения» (К. Шмитт, Дж. Агамбен) на академическую сферу. Особое внимание уделено процессам милитаризации науки наряду с другими областями общественной жизни. Академическая (не)свобода анализируется в более широком контексте ограничения прав и свобод человека в военное время. На примере конкретных случаев нарушения академических свобод в Украине и в зарубежных исследованиях украинского общества демонстрируются особенности украинского кейса. Вместе с тем рассмотрены параллели с ограничениями академической свободы в иных исторических и современных контекстах. Отдельная часть эссе посвящена роли публичных интеллектуалов в процессах инструментализации и милитаризации академического знания. В заключении автор призывает рассматривать исследования Украины в глобальной перспективе, избегая эссенциализации и романтизации общественных процессов. Подчеркивается необходимость критического, рефлексивного и независимого научного подхода, а также организации производства знания таким образом, чтобы под вопрос ставились не только исследуемые объекты, но и сам процесс исследования.
Ключевые слова: академическая свобода, производство знания, украинистика.
Автор: Иванова Анна Константиновна, научный сотрудник Аспирантского центра исследований культуры и аспирантка социологического факультета гиссенского университета им. Юстуса Либига. Гиссен, Германия. Email: anna.ivanova@sowi.uni-giessen.de
By the end of 2022, the first year of this never-ending war, I was invited to the workshop «Unfree Spaces in the Modern World» at the University of Regensburg to discuss the experience of academic unfreedom that had emerged alongside the war in my home country, Ukraine. As an early career scholar holding an «emergency scholarship», I was asked what it was like to do social science research on Ukrainian society during the ongoing invasion. Three years later, I must admit that doing critical research on Ukraine—whether in Germany or elsewhere—has not become easier in terms of academic freedom or its limitations. Over the past few years, as I moved between Germany and Ukraine, I lost to the war my home, my loved ones, my life plans, friendships, a feeling of security, night sleep, and mental well-being. At the same time, I started my research project in a safe Western country and a well-established institution that provided me with resources and opportunities I had never received before. Nevertheless, since the outbreak of the war, unfreedom has infiltrated my life from numerous angles, including academic unfreedom, which is the focus of this essay.
In this paper, I present my observations and conclusions on the state of academic freedom in Ukraine and Ukrainian studies. The essay begins by examining the functions of the social sciences in times of war. It then contextualizes academic (un)freedom within the broader framework of wartime restrictions on human rights and liberties. The discussion proceeds to the state of Ukrainian Studies as a field, and concludes with a call to situate research on Ukraine within a global context. The essay was conceived in a rudimentary form after the aforementioned workshop and has since been revised many times over the following years, as I had the opportunity to observe and participate in the development of Ukrainian studies in Germany and other EU states. It was also inevitably shaped by my regular trips home to Kharkiv, where I could—albeit already in the role of an outsider— get a grasp of the Ukrainian academia.
For this reason, I want to emphasize that this text is not that much about academic freedom in Ukraine per se, but rather about academic freedom in Ukrainian studies, which are inevitably connected to the political and academic developments in the country. Second, this essay deals primarily with the social sciences and the humanities, the field in which I work. Unfortunately, I cannot speak to the situation in other disciplines, which are also affected by the war. And finally, I debated for a long time whether to include personal details about my experience with the war in this essay. On the one hand, they help clarify the perspective I bring and the context in which I find myself. On the other hand, the last thing I want is to be accused of being emotionally compromised or of seeking sympathy. My intention in sharing these brief personal reflections is not to dwell on these concerns but to clarify my positionality and to make it clear that the war has affected all spheres of my life, leaving no possibility of distancing myself from that experience. As a scholar working within the critical tradition, I feel the need to declare that in advance. In conclusion, both in these brief reflections on my personal experience and in my analysis of academic (un)freedom in Ukrainian studies, I want to underline that there is nothing to romanticize, glorify, or celebrate about the war. It must be stopped—immediately.
Social Science — Catalyst for Change or an Instrument of War?
I began my PhD, much like my Master's and Bachelor's many years ago, driven by a somewhat naive desire to explore what was happening in Ukraine and around it. As a citizen of a post-Soviet state, I had many basic questions about the society I lived in: Why doesn’t it align with the constitutionally declared principles of democracy, freedom, and human rights? Why is it so deeply polarized? Why do inequality and poverty continue to grow? Why can’t we come to terms with the past, as well as with the vision of the future? I believed that social science could offer some answers. To a certain extent, it did.
However, when the war started, all these questions seemed to lose relevance. As I stayed with my family in the cellar of our old family house during the first shelling of Kharkiv — ironically, the same cellar my grandfather hid in eighty years earlier during a different war—I found myself wondering what could possibly explain what was happening. Could social science provide any answers? What explanations or solutions could it offer? Do we, as researchers, have any tools that could explain, prevent, or stop a war? For decades, social scientists around the world have studied society, trying to explain its developments. But where has that knowledge gotten us? We can now retrospectively evaluate past predictions — this one was wrong, that one was right. But what is the point of doing so if this knowledge, even accurately describing the causes and nature of the war, could neither prevent it nor contribute to its end?
During these years — so far, the most terrifying years of my life — I have witnessed the various manifestations of war: tanks and rocket launchers burning on the next street; my grandfather, born during one war, evacuated only to die in a strange home during another; my beloved hometown left desolate, without electricity, water supply, or mobile connection; the house, where generations of my family grew up, bombed to rubble; a family member walking dozens of kilometers under constant shelling to escape an occupied village; a missile crashing into our block of flats one night while my family was sleeping; my neighbors living in their ruinated houses; our huge silly dog buried in a crater left by an artillery shell; friends fleeing the country legally and illegally, as well as those who stayed behind, concealing themselves in their apartments to evade conscription; sounds of explosions accompanying my every stay in Kharkov; my father’s coffin staying in the churchyard battered by shell fragments. What disciplines, theoretical frameworks, research paradigms, and methodological approaches are capable of accounting for this experience? How much more pressing does the question become when such grief is multiplied across millions of Ukrainians?
In the middle of the last century, Adorno stated (1983: 34) that writing poetry after Auschwitz was impossible and barbaric (and later reformulated the statement into the question of whether life after it is possible at all (Adorno 2004: 363)). When I encountered this idea for the first time as a Bachelor's student, I had no way of knowing what he meant. After all, here we are, living after Auschwitz, writing poetry, books, and music, creating films. About Auschwitz, too. “What kind of strange question did Adorno pose?” I thought back then. When the war started, I immediately understood what he meant. Among other arguments, Adorno highlighted the destructive dimensions of culture that not only allowed but also fueled and justified all the crimes of the war. As the war in Ukraine started, we can now see that the social sciences and the humanities share this very potential.
As a Ukrainian sociologist, Illia Kononov (2024), writes referring to the historical dimension of research, the war gave a particularly repressive quality to the negatively oriented against each other politics of historical memory in both belligerent countries. This does not equate the aggressor and the victim but moves the academic, public, and political discussion toward etatism and securitization, turning history (and, I would add – social science) into a weapon of information warfare. As a Marxist, I have always thought of social science research in three steps: first, describe the object of study; then, explain how and why it operates and interacts with other forces; and finally, think about how it can be transformed for the better. As Marx stated in his famous 11th thesis on Feuerbach, «Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it» (Marx 1969: 15). And so the war happened, and here we are, philosophers, sociologists, historians, political scientists, and anthropologists. What have we been able to change? What power does social science have if it has allowed such a nightmare to happen? Worse still, what can be said about those who justify war with the help of science?
By its very nature, with its positivist drive to «objectively» explain reality, sociology is particularly susceptible to being instrumentalized by political powers for purposes of propaganda and manipulation. Since the comprehension of the past, present and future in Ukraine and Russia has been subordinated to the interests of politically dominant groups and brought under state control (Kononov 2024), the social sciences and humanities have turned into a tool of struggle in this war. As Kononov accurately noted:
«This created the ground for dehumanizing the opponents, which resulted in terror against civilians, in the destruction of Ukraine's energy and life-support infrastructure, and the brutal treatment of prisoners. The fields of historical memory production of the ruling classes in both countries are retro-oriented, raising the figures of various obscurantists from the gloom of the past. History is deprived of integrity, and turned into a Manichean narrative of the struggle between absolute good and evil. This deprives culture of creative impulses for development and leads to its barbarization» (Kononov 2024: 125).
While history, when instrumentalized, can be mobilized to present a particular vision of reality as timeless and immutable, sociology offers the mechanisms through which this vision is naturalized, normalized, and anchored in the current social order. So, I ask myself — What is the point of doing social science if it is not only unable to fulfill its basic functions but also becomes an instrument of war?
(Ukrainian) Academia in the State of Exception
The restriction of academic freedoms — autonomy and independence in choosing topics, methodologies, and approaches to research; the ability to freely and safely discuss and publish results; the right to determine teaching themes and formats without external interference (Akerlind, Kayrooz 2003: 333) — represents only one sphere that undergoes dramatic curtailment during wartime. Using the language of Carl Schmitt (2021) and Giorgio Agamben (2005), war can be described as the paradigmatic Ausnahmezustand/state of exception, a situation that permits the suspension of the legal system and declares extraordinary measures due to an emergency or a serious crisis that poses an existential threat to the state or its integrity. In such a situation, the sovereign, often described as a state or its institutions, prevails over all others and may violate fundamental laws and norms in the face of crisis (Schmitt 2021). Moreover, these restrictions extend not only to legal limitations but also penetrate so deeply into human existence that they may even regulate one’s right to life itself (Agamben 1998).
The militarization of social sciences and the humanities as an «exception» during the war is not a rare case. Throughout human history, war has repeatedly intertwined with academia and instrumentalized it in the service of military interests in many ways. Firstly, war—especially prolonged one—and its preparations require the reallocation of all resources toward its demands, placing military needs above other areas of social life, including science and education. For example, on the eve of World War I, Germany exhibited a dense interweaving of military and academic life: students and professors often had previous military experience, they openly declared their readiness to die for the Kaiser and the Reich, and university lectures were suffused with patriotic content. This atmosphere helped prepare the ground and mobilize society, including the academic community, for participation in the war. When it finally broke out, professors and students volunteered enthusiastically, demonstrating their unity and serving as a moral compass for the broader masses (Маурер 2013).
Secondly, history provides numerous cases in which research agendas and scientific findings were subordinated to the military interests and objectives of the state. The most striking example is the German Reich, where research activities were placed at the service of the fascist state engaged in war and ethnic cleansing. For instance, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel) developed concepts for strengthening Germany’s economic self-sufficiency, proposed plans for reorganizing the occupied Polish territories, and took part in the project Kriegseinsatz der Geisteswissenschaften («The Wartime Deployment of the Humanities»), which sought to provide intellectual justification for the National Socialist idea of a “new European order” that was to emerge as the outcome of the war (Thoß 2020). Humboldt University in Berlin also played a key role, not only in serving the needs of the Nazi authorities but in actively participating in the planning of violence. It contributed to the drafting of Generalplan Ost, which envisioned the demographic, economic, spatial, and cultural reorganization of the region (Müller 2022). Similar activities were carried out at the universities of Bonn, Münster, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Cologne, Göttingen, Leipzig, and Würzburg (Супян 2025). United under the slogan «neben dem besten Soldaten der Welt der beste Wissenschaftler der Welt zu stehen habe»[1], they saw their mission as fighting for the Reich and Lebensraum (Junginger 2000: 62). Whereas, the predecessor of the contemporary German Research Foundation (DFG) covered the publishing costs, conference, and exhibition, issuing multiple research grants (Супян 2025).
Lastly, war not only militarizes society and subordinates science to its own interests, but also brings about restrictions on academic freedom, functioning as a means of fostering social and ideological cohesion, mobilization, and control. A more contemporary example of restrictions on academic freedom can be found in the American «War on Terror» declared in the aftermath of 9/11, which had significant consequences for free inquiry. Faculty members who criticized U.S. foreign policy faced reprimands, pressure, and threats of dismissal, including those who held tenure (Bird, Brandt 2002). According to Bird and Brandt (2002: 435), the «chilly climate for speech» extended not only to the wider public but also to academic debates. It became virtually impossible to criticize U.S. international politics or the «War on Terror» specifically, and such comments were branded as support for terrorism and a betrayal of national unity. Even pacifists publicly affirmed that there was «no sane alternative but to support the war» (Bird, Brandt 2002: 434). This atmosphere of fear and political tension led to a widespread tendency toward self-censorship among scholars. The dominant discourse on the «War on Terror» and the 9/11 attacks allowed no room for divergent assessments within academia. In addition, there were attempts to categorize and restrict certain research as «sensitive», limitations on the publication of research results, and prohibitions preventing some foreign nationals from collaborating with U.S. researchers or receiving education and training at U.S. colleges and universities (Keel 2004).
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that academic freedom is wholly impossible or inadmissible in times of war. History provides examples, thanks to particular circumstances, where exceptions occurred. For instance, Mykhailo Minakov (2023: 71-72) notes that despite ideological repression and pervasive Germanophobia, Soviet universities on the eve of, during, and immediately after World War II exhibited interest in German classical philosophy, conducting research, leading critical debates, and defending dissertations on Kant and Hegel. Similarly, in the United States during the Cold War—amid total anti-communism, heightened self-censorship, and the dismissal of scholars suspected of sympathizing with the Soviet Union or communist ideals—there remained islands of leftist thought. The leftist sociologist C. Wright Mills, for example, retained his position at Columbia University and continued his work, critiquing the ideological climate of the 1950s and 1960s (Chasin 1990). Yet such cases should be regarded as rare exceptions rather than the norm.
Today, the state of academic freedom worldwide leaves much to be desired. Report of the Scholars at Risk Academic Freedom Monitoring Project «Free to Think» (SAR 2024) highlights frequent and pervasive attacks on academic freedom occurring against the backdrop of eroding liberal norms, democratic backsliding, and the rise of authoritarianism. These tendencies are not confined to states traditionally regarded as weak democracies or authoritarian regimes; academic censorship is also on the rise in liberal democracies. The report identifies key threats to academic development: armed conflicts; legislative regulations undermining the autonomy of universities and research institutions and hindering international collaboration; rising authoritarianism that silences dissent; and the penalization, arrest, and prosecution of scholars and students. From this, one can conclude that academic freedom is in global decline. These attacks inflict deep harm not only on higher education communities at individual and institutional levels but also reshape the social dynamics of the societies concerned, depriving them of the benefits of free knowledge production and the development of solutions to social problems—including those that triggered the decline of academic autonomy and freedom in the first place.
The situation regarding academic freedom in Russia, which initiated the war in Ukraine, remains very poor too. Since 1999, when the Academic Freedom Index reached its peak of 0.82, it has shown a steady decline, with a sharp drop from 0.32 in 2021 to 0.21 by 2024 (AFI 2025). With the onset of the war, Russia has witnessed the militarization of science and education: schools and universities host meetings with veterans and participants of the «Special Military Operation» (SMO) (Козенко 2024), organize workshops on weaving camouflage nets and assembling drones (Кузнецова 2025; «Важные истории» 2023), introduce military training into curricula (Рыкова 2024). «SMO» veterans and their families are granted preferential access to higher education (Шимаев 2025). In addition, 287 Russian university presidents released a public statement in support of the Russian military assault on Ukraine. In it, they declared that «universities have always been a pillar of the state», and therefore, «it is especially important in these days to support our country, our army that defends our security, and our President» (Российский союз ректоров 2022).
At the same time, the Russian government has significantly intensified pressure on universities and scholars, severely restricting academic freedom through both the suppression of dissent and policies aimed at deepening indoctrination and curbing alternative viewpoints. As Ilya Matveev and Evgeny Roshchin note (2025), foremost, these changes involve structural transformations of the academy into an instrument for «re-educating» Russian society along conservative and nationalist lines. They also highlight the intertwining of the academia with state power, through the appointment of Kremlin-affiliated individuals to leadership positions, the ideologization of curricula, the severing of ties with Western institutions, and the reorientation toward “friendly” countries. Another mechanism for reducing university autonomy and curbing academic freedom has been the repression of individual scholars, implemented through the criminalization of anti-war views, dismissals, and the inclusion of academics on «foreign agent» lists. There have also been cases of arrests. For example, in 2023, the Russian sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky was detained and later sentenced to five years in prison (BBC 2024).
At the same time, Dmitry Dubrovsky observes that Russia still contains «spaces where free scholarly inquiry and relative autonomy within research institutions are possible» (Дубровский 2022: 17), noting that restrictions on freedom primarily affect publicly active academics. Matveev and Roshchin share a similar perspective, pointing to the existence of «hidden transcripts»—various forms of below-the-radar resistance practiced domestically—as well as open (and sometimes even institutionalized) opposition to restrictions on academic freedom abroad, which by the fourth year of the war had manifested in online initiatives, conferences, and even entire universities established overseas (Халип 2024).
The situation in Ukraine differs in many respects, although it also presents some similarities. Since the war is led primarily on Ukrainian territory, the state of civil rights and freedoms can be described through the lens of an Ausnahmezustand in a much more pronounced form, as the contrasts with pre-war peaceful «normality» are much sharper. Restrictions on academic freedom, as in Russia, are embedded within a broader spectrum of limitations on rights and liberties. Some of them, however, are specific to Ukraine, such as: restrictions on movement within and beyond the country for male citizens; general mobilization without the possibility of refusal on the grounds of personal convictions; significant limitations on the use of the Russian language and culture; restrictions on freedom of religion; suppression of media diversity through a single nationwide telemarathon; legislative regulation of permissible interpretations of the past; narrowing of acceptable political positions through the banning of the Communist Party and the criminalization of communist symbols and ideas. In order to legitimize these limitations, corresponding decision-makers often refer to these spheres as the sources of threat to the Ukrainian state or nation. For instance, members of the Ukrainian Parliament referred to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as “a Kremlin agent network” and “the last claws of the FSB” (Ржеутская 2024), while the former language ombudsman declared that “Ukrainian [language] is a factor of security” and “a factor in determining where someone belongs, ‘friend or foe’” (Львова 2023). Thus, the imperative of protection is presented as a legitimate justification for the curtailment of constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Undoubtedly, war poses a profound challenge to Ukrainian academia, too. According to data from the Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science (Save Schools Ukraine 2024), by July 2024, at least 270 of Ukraine’s nearly 800 higher education institutions, including both colleges and universities, had been damaged, with 9 completely destroyed, as a result of Russia’s shelling of civilian infrastructure. The most severe destruction occurred in the eastern regions of Ukraine, where Russia continued to bombard and occupy civilian facilities, which created significant disparities in academic activity and output across regions. In addition, 34 universities were forced to relocate to safer areas (Klein 2025). Staff and students faced significant difficulties during this process: financial problems (40%), lack of housing (34.5%), and challenges related to relocating families (24%) (Iashchenko, Mierau 2025). Approximately 25% of academic staff became internally displaced or moved abroad (Iashchenko, Mierau 2025). These conditions pose serious challenges to the conduct of research and education as everyday social activities, while also making their implementation potentially risky. For example, Kharkiv University—one of the country’s largest and oldest institutions, providing a broad spectrum of programs—has remained almost entirely online for the fourth year in a row.
Beyond the hardships caused directly by hostilities, there are also restrictions and consequences emerging from within the Ukrainian state, which come together with increased militarization of all spheres of social life and their subordination to the military (often framed as existential) interests of the state. In academia, this manifests, on the one hand, in the entanglement of military practices with scientific and educational ones: mandatory military training in schools and universities (Волошин 2025; Савин 2025), workshops on weaving camouflage nets or assembling drones (Масенко 2022; Пшемиська 2025), and student meetings with combatants and veterans. Centralization and the growing influence of executive power have limited internal university governance (Rabinovych, Iashchenko 2024). In addition, military personnel increasingly occupy leadership positions within academic and para-academic institutions, illustrating the broader trend of militarization within Ukrainian scholarship. For instance, Oleksandr Alferov, an officer of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, was appointed head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. Concurrently, a reform implemented by the Office of the President (Єрмак 2025) has led to a rise in the number of veterans employed across various departments, including those responsible for history, culture, and religion.
On the other hand, militarization of academia is witnessed in the ideological regulation of scholarship and teaching, including censorship of permissible research topics, methodologies, and approaches, as well as restrictions on formats of instruction. The language law has eliminated Russian from teaching and research, as well as from academic publishing (Волошин 2023). Attempts have been made to prohibit communication in Russian during the breaks in school (Волошин 2024). The new law on national memory regulates the thematic repertoire and normative evaluations of research on Ukraine’s past (Верховна Рада України 2025). The Science at Risk Monitoring Report states that control over the expression of opinions in academic and cultural spheres has tightened, with growing censorship and self-censorship (Iashchenko, Mierau, 2025). There have even been several cases of dismissals and threats of dismissal of scholars for expressing their views on recent developments within Ukrainian society. For example, at Cherkasy University announced the dismissal of a history lecturer due to the actions of her daughter, who publicly supported the Ukrainian Orthodox Church[2] (Заява пресслужби 2024).
The «Free to Think» (SAR 2024) report includes Ukraine (along with 17 other countries, including Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Germany, Russia, Sudan, Turkey, the United States) among states showing particularly concerning developments and trends. The Academic Freedom Index shows a dramatic decline from 0.62 in 2021 (the last pre-war year) to 0.28 by the third year of the war in 2024 (AFI 2024). This decline concerns all components of the index: freedom to research and teach, institutional autonomy, academic exchange and dissemination, campus integrity and and academic and cultural expression.
Although there are some studies and debates (Iashchenko 2025; Lutsenko, Lyman, Nikolaiev, Riy 2025) addressing the issue of academic freedom in Ukraine, most focus on the immediate effects of warfare, rarely considering constraints imposed by the state’s political and ideological imperatives during wartime. Moreover, while these studies often approach Western and Russian academia with critical scrutiny (VoxUkraine 2022; Plastun, Makarenko, Hryn’ova 2024), they are far less willing to apply the same analytical lens to developments within Ukrainian academia. An open and safe discussion of academic (un)freedoms within Ukrainian studies remains difficult to achieve.
Thus, on the one hand, the trend of declining academic freedom in Ukraine fits logically within a broader global dynamic. On the other, the war, however, acts as a powerful amplifier of this negative trend, observable both in Russia and Ukraine. Since the war is primarily taking place on Ukrainian territory, the destruction of academic infrastructure and the outflow of scholars and educators in Ukraine is far more significant, although similar developments are also present in Russia. At the same time, the ideological control and the subordination of science and education to wartime interests unite both Ukrainian and Russian academia. What remains largely undocumented in research on Ukraine is the equivalent of «hidden transcripts». In Russian Studies abroad, these educational and research initiatives often position themselves as strongholds of opposition to the Putin regime. While the effectiveness and alignment of these initiatives with their stated goals may be debated, their very emergence as a response to Russia’s war against Ukraine is obvious. In contrast, Ukrainian Studies abroad generally do not position themselves as political opposition and often see themselves as one of the pillars supporting the state’s agenda.
Ukrainian Studies between Ukraine and Western Academia
What, then, is the current state of research on Ukraine outside the country? Most of the research develops within so-called «Ukrainian Studies», a peculiar discipline, the very existence of which I discovered only after moving from Ukrainian academia into the Western one. This field brings together all possible research on Ukraine—its culture, history, politics, and society—under a single umbrella, consisting mostly of Ukrainian scholars located abroad alongside some Ukrainian scholars temporary affiliated with foreign institutions, as well as some other non-Ukrainian researchers interested in the region. Collectively, they are referred to as «experts on Ukraine», as if it was possible to specialize simultaneously in a country of some 40 million people, with a centuries-long history, a complex social fabric marked by contradictions and conflicts, and a diverse mix of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious groups. In Ukraine itself, each of these spheres belongs to a distinct discipline with its own subfields. In the West, however, there exists only the single category of Ukrainian Studies, tasked with explaining to outsiders what is happening in this «mysterious» and «exceptional» country, which is allegedly impossible to study within mainstream sociology or history.
Since the first days of the Russian invasion, we have seen a rapid growth of interest in Ukrainian Studies. First, Europe exploded with a previously unseen number of scholarships and fellowships for Ukrainian academics. Former experts in Russian language, literature, politics, and culture suddenly began to talk about the «decolonization» of their research objects or even about the need to re-qualify as «experts in Ukraine». The number of conferences discussing the war, Ukrainian culture, history and society skyrocketed. As it became clear the war would persist, we saw a more consolidated institutionalization of Ukrainian studies. In Germany alone, new interdisciplinary centers for Ukrainian studies were launched, while older centers received additional funding for Ukraine-focused research. Despite the increased interest, the thematic, epistemological, and normative space for exploration in Ukrainian studies narrowed considerably after the war outbreak, and the ability of social sciences to perform their critical functions has diminished. To elaborate on these constraints, I need to outline how I see the basic premises, tasks, goals, and functions of social research as it is directly connected to my vision of academic (un)freedom.
As a political sociologist working within a critical paradigm, I believe that knowledge production is never objective and always includes a certain degree of normativity. In this fashion, Norman Fairclough suggested, critical research should depart from defining «social wrongs» (Fairclough 2013: 7, 38). Then, through critique, one needs to denaturalize what is naturalized and make visible interconnections that we usually take for granted. In the wake of Euromaidan, Artem Litovchenko, explained the condition in which our discipline finds itself in times of crisis. He stated:
«During politically difficult periods of state existence, political sociology finds itself in an unenviable position. Its direct task — the prompt study of the most urgent and acute problems — runs the risk of coming into conflict with the ideological and propaganda objectives of an insecurely balancing state... Political sociology faces explicit or implicit prohibitions on certain research questions» (Litovchenko 2014: 150).
He continued by emphasizing that any research question should be evaluated on scientific grounds — its validity, competence, and methodological soundness:
«...The most acute and problematic topic for political sociology is the one that has been most diligently pushed out of the academic discourse, trying either to marginalize or eliminate it. …All political phenomena and processes must be subjected to critical sociological examination, and those that are subject to state propaganda or special regulation — in the first place. If the state, civic or collegiate institutions label the questioning of any thesis as (ideologically) unacceptable, the task of the political sociologist working within the critical paradigm is to immediately question it» (Litovchenko 2014: 151).
As the war started, the range of topics that can be considered «social wrongs» and, correspondingly, questioned has narrowed significantly and is now determined by factors that have little to do with social relevance, intellectual honesty, and analytical rigor. Rather, their selection is shaped by legislation, unspoken rules, the current political agenda, and the balance of power in Ukraine’s relations with its Western partners. For example, until recently, a number of Ukrainian scholars who had long publicly insisted that criticizing the government during wartime was impermissible abandoned this stance after the Ukrainian parliament voted to dismantle the country’s anti-corruption bodies (e.g., Kulyk 2025). Implicit taboos have been imposed on research topics, questions, approaches, and theoretical traditions that examine Ukraine’s Soviet past or Ukrainian-Russian relations in a positive or even neutral light. By contrast, in neighboring Poland, despite the growing influence of right-wing political forces, entire monographs are published on social advancement in the Polish People's Republic (Szcześniak 2023) and on reassessment of state socialism, highlighting its achievements (Chmielewska, Mrozik, Wolowiec 2021). Producing anything comparable in Ukraine, however, is nearly unthinkable.
Similarly, it is difficult to imagine studies that critically engage with anti-social neoliberal reforms, the rise of far-right groups, and political imprisonment. Although such developments raise concerns among international organizations and are documented in their reports (UN 2025; U.S. Department of State 2024), within both academic and public debates such topics, if not silenced altogether, tend to be significantly marginalized. Open and critical analysis of issues such as forced mobilization, closed borders for male citizens, the situation of ethnic minorities such as Russians and Belarusians, or the status of the Russian language and culture in Ukraine, is fraught with difficulty. The law on decolonization prescribes criticism of Ukrainian-Russian relations only, while leaving unexamined other empires that have historically shaped Ukraine, as well as current forms of dependency (Верховна Рада України 2023). Reactions to such research can range from marginalization, condemnation, and exclusion to dismissal, and in extreme cases—administrative sanctions or even criminal prosecution. The latter is applied monthly to individuals for actions as liking posts containing communist symbols on the social media platform Odnoklassniki (Латыш 2024: 348). Thus, the question of whether complementary references to communist or simply left-wing thinkers may be dismissed as ‘propaganda of a communist regime’ (Верховна Рада України 2015) remains yet unclear.
A telling example of the condemnation of scholars for raising certain issues in the context of Ukrainian studies is the recent case of Gayatri Spivak, who was invited to speak at the Lviv Media Forum. In her lecture, «Imagining Ukraine Post-Colonially», Spivak (2024) raised critical issues regarding the Roma and LGBTQ+ communities, emphasized the benefits of linguistic diversity, and called for decolonization beyond voting rights. While acknowledging Ukraine's victimhood, she also discussed the revolutionary and progressive role of Soviet Ukraine. The backlash was immediate, with Ukrainian academics questioning how she could dare to say «that». Meanwhile, the organizers first cut her speech off from the recording on YouTube and eventually deleted the whole video from the platform[3].
Accordingly, when faced with the choice of what to study and what to avoid, a researcher of Ukraine must not only possess professional knowledge and skills but also navigate a shifting environment, balancing what is academically significant, socially acceptable within the scholarly community, and legally permissible under Ukrainian law. In such a context, an atmosphere of fear of exclusion, dismissal, or criminal prosecution emerges alongside self-censorship and a decline in the quality of research. For example, I hesitated to publish this text for years, carefully weighing my choice of words and reflecting on the potential consequences it might provoke. A colleague of mine keeps a list of topics he wants but cannot write about because he knows they will trigger backlash. An older colleague once advised me, «Decide if you want an academic career or to study ‘hot’ topics,»—implying that these are mutually exclusive pursuits. Moreover, in public debates on Ukraine, one frequently encounters remarks like, ‘This is not the right time to raise such questions while Russian aggression persists,’ or ‘We will address this after the victory.’
An extreme example is a Ukrainian Holocaust historian, Marta Havryshko, who publicly writes about anti-Semitism in Ukraine and criticizes neo-Nazi formations. She has reported ostracism, gaslighting, and even threats to her life and family (Havryshko 2024). As her visibility increased, Havryshko has been included in the list of «traitors to the Motherland, militants, mercenaries and terrorists, Russian military personnel – war criminals» (Myrotvorets.center) by the Ukrainian non-governmental organization «Myrotvorets», self-described as created by a group of scientists and journalists. That is why I am afraid this brings me back to my reading of Adorno’s question: are we sure that we are pursuing scholarship more than serving some other goals?
What contributes to this ‘chilly’ atmosphere is that this hostility doesn’t just come from right-wing radicals or politically active individuals; it often originates from fellow academics and students. The discourse on Ukraine is dominated by a specific set of «Ukrainian voices» (Ishchenko 2022). As Volodymyr Ishchenko notes, «English-speaking, West-connected intellectuals, typically working in Kiev or Lviv, and who often even personally know each other» (Ishchenko 2022: 7) claim to represent the heterogeneous and polarized Ukrainian population, referring to mutual interest stemming from a unique national identity. They typically promote a «decolonization» agenda that rightfully emphasizes Ukraine’s victimhood in the war. At the same time, by framing the war as a struggle for «freedom, democracy, and European values», these scholars rarely acknowledge the contradictions and shortcomings of these very principles in the Ukrainian context. Moreover, they are even less willing to recognize the legitimacy, acceptability, or validity of divergent approaches to studying Ukrainian society. As a result, both domestic academia and Ukrainian Studies abroad has seen denunciations, cyberbullying, and the marginalization of colleagues over their status as ‘true’ scholars.
After World War II, Georg Luсkács, speaking about the responsibility of intellectuals in the development of socio-political processes, noted that they tend to fetishize social phenomena — democracy, pacifism, nation, culture — that is, to detach them «from its real social and historical basis» (Luсkács 1969: 128), turning very specific processes into abstract categories, empty signifiers. The same dominates today's academic and political discourse about Ukraine and concerns not only «European values» and «democracy», but also such categories as «Ukrainian voices», «solidarity with Ukraine», «victory», «defeat», «peace» and «war». Approaching them as self-evident categories leaves no space for concrete reflection, clarification, or criticism about what these actually mean.
To illustrate how the academic community in Ukrainian Studies, as well as Ukrainian academics with ties to Western universities, reproduce an atmosphere of opinion orthodoxy, I want to briefly consider the case of «An Open Letter in Defense of Academic Freedom and the Ukrainian Historian Marta Havryshko» (An Open Letter 2025). The letter was published on July 22, 2025, and quickly gathered more than 400 signatures from renowned scholars, activists, public figures, as well as ordinary individuals. It pointed to the deteriorating state of Ukrainian academia, condemned (far-right) attacks on Havryshko, and insisted that «scholarly integrity must not be subordinated to political or geopolitical loyalties» (An Open Letter 2025). Yet alongside expressions of solidarity, the letter triggered outrage on social media, where Ukrainian scholars, journalists, activists, and politicians condemned not only its content but also the very fact of its existence. Criticism came from multiple directions: Havryshko was accused of lying; critics pointed to personal experiences that contradicted hers; some argued that such criticism of the Ukrainian state was ill-timed; others denied her status as a scholar, claiming that threats she received were the result of social media posts rather than academic publications; still others accused her of self-interest, of using the letter as a tool to gain asylum in the United States, or even of collaborating with the Kremlin—some went as far as to join in the threats against her. Despite their diversity, these positions collectively amounted to attempts to legitimize Havryshko’s exclusion from the community of Ukrainian scholars and, more broadly, from Ukrainian society itself. According to the Ukrainian historian Georgiy Kasianov, the response to the letter turned not into a meaningful debate about academic freedom, but into a campaign of bullying directed at Havryshko. Initially reluctant to sign the letter due to partial disagreements with both Havryshko and its wording, Kasianov ultimately added his signature after observing the ensuing debates, stating: «I express solidarity with the protest against public savagery, blind hatred and malice, and the impunity of those who are trying to turn Ukraine into a caricature of Putin’s Russia” (Историческая экспертиза 2025).
The reaction to the letter—which called for broadening the space of free discussion on Ukraine—thus became a vivid illustration of what its authors described: the dominance of a single mode of judgment about Ukraine and the growing marginalization and insecurity of scholars who deviate from it. Such an atmosphere generates a «spiral of silence» (Ноэль-Нойман 1989), a dynamic that describes the reluctance of individuals to voice their opinions on socially significant issues when their position appears (or is perceived) to be in the minority. This spiral effect intensifies when opponents speak with confidence and without compromise, which in turn leaves no space for doubts and discussion, deepens the minority’s fear of isolation and reinforces their sense of the necessity of remaining silent. The louder the «majority» speaks—in the media, on social media, in academic publications and events—the more the minority retreats, while the others grow more assured of their own correctness. Moreover, in times of crisis it is not only freedom of speech, including academic freedom, that comes under threat, but also the public commitment to its very value: the dedication of institutions, faculty, and society at large to uphold it significantly diminishes. Consequently, the spiral of silence extends beyond the academic community and permeates society as a whole. In the Ukrainian case, this fear is amplified by the context of war, in which almost all freedoms, including academic freedom, are curtailed. It is no coincidence that the letter in support of Havryshko attracted a significant number of anonymous signatures, including from individuals with the status of Full Professor or Professor Emeritus, the most protected positions within Western academia.
Placing Ukraine in a Global Context
Critical thinkers of the 20th-century (Luckacs 1969; Gramsci 1971; Foucault, Deleuze 1977; Chomsky 2017), as well as today's scholars (Allott, Knight, Smith 2019), have pointed to the responsibility of intellectuals in shaping and developing social processes. On the one hand, academics have the skills and knowledge to analyze society. On the other hand, their position provides them with the opportunity to produce and disseminate certain knowledge and legitimize it as reliable, absolute, normal or objective. This gives them power and, thus, responsibility. However, beyond the contributions of individual scholars, academia is a social structure with its own formal and informal rules, internal developmental logic, and processes that are not reducible to individual actions (Bourdie 1988). Moreover, it is a product of a given society, absorbing all tendencies and characteristics common to a specific historical moment. In this sense, academia, as a structure in which an individual scientist is embedded, acts coercively towards her — that is, it imposes certain requirements, constraints and expectations. So, these are not only intellectuals who have the power to act. At the same time, they are inevitably influenced by social and academic structures, which define the specificity of their actions.
In its current form, Ukrainian-centered academia under the conditions of the ongoing war makes it virtually impossible for scholars to fulfill their professional duties as critical social scientists. Anyone attempting to engage with a variety of internal problems and contradictions in Ukraine is left with an absurd choice: either abandon critical inquiry and produce detached, superficial knowledge (and, in the worst case — add fuel to the fire of war) or continue with their work and face ostracism, threats, and limited career prospects. Obviously, today’s censorship and pressure on academics are not unique to Ukraine or Ukrainian Studies—they occur against the backdrop of the polycrisis in the neoliberal world order. The manifestations of this phenomenon within academia are highlighted by prominent figures in contemporary sociology. For instance, Donatella Della Porta (2024) has recently published her analysis of German academia, pointing at how moral panic and soft repressions guide decision-making processes in light of the Israeli-Palestinian war. During last year’s European Sociological Association (ESA) conference, Geoffry Pleyers (2024), president of the International Sociological Association, highlighted the increasing global restrictions on academic freedom. He shared accounts of sociologists facing threats to their careers and lives for simply doing their job. Pleyers described academic freedom in Western democracies as being in a catastrophic state, pointing at the global neoliberalization of academia and commodification of knowledge, transformation of the public sphere, digitalization, and the rise of right-wing influence. Why, then, should we expect better conditions in a region ravaged by a brutal war?
The invasion that Russia has unleashed in Ukraine cannot be justified by any scientific, moral, or sacred reasoning. It takes the lives of thousands of Ukrainians and destroys the lives of those who survive. Beyond its most horrific consequences, it also affects the condition of society, its democracy, and freedoms in all states that are explicitly or implicitly involved. Nevertheless, there is an objective ground for the increased scientific and political interest in Ukraine. It is pretty obvious that the ongoing war challenges and affects regions beyond Ukraine and Europe. Moreover, these processes are embedded in the general logic of global development. Undoubtedly, there is a need to study what is happening in Ukraine, develop solutions that will bring peace, and reorganize global security in ways that prevent such aggression from recurring, whether in Ukraine or elsewhere. What is, however, doubtful is that current academic endeavors pursue this goal.
The dominance of «Ukrainian voices» in academic discourse, voices that lean on their national identity to offer non-contestable, convenient, homogeneous narratives, is no accident. This condition is not evidence of a broad consensus of Ukrainian and Ukraine-focused academics but rather a symptom of power dynamics within academia. By (self-)orientalizing Ukrainian society and romanticizing its struggle in the war, refusing to treat Ukraine seriously, — that is, as a society that, like any other, contains conflicts and contradictions — and reducing its diverse and multifaceted interests to an artificially imposed homogeneity, this approach stifles meaningful inquiry and marginalizes nuanced research on Ukraine. Moreover, scholars and public intellectuals who advance the idea that peace is an exception, while «poverty and war are the norm» (Федорин, Шевчук, Сировой 2024) shape the public agenda not by emphasizing the inadmissibility of war, but by normalizing it.
As Agamben (2005) notes, the state of exception, once declared, tends to entrench itself permanently, even after the triggering event has ended. In such circumstances, the boundaries between norm and exception blur, and the «exception» becomes the new norm. To prevent this, we need scholarship as a critical instrument—capable of uncovering social dispositions and exposing the power interests embedded within them. Moreover, scholarship must be able to turn a critical gaze upon itself: to reflect on its own practices, to ask uncomfortable questions, and to recognize the relations of power in which it is entangled. Restrictions on academic freedom do not merely harm their immediate victims. Their consequences extend far beyond the university, affecting society as a whole and weakening democracy by stifling intellectual inquiry and chilling the free exchange of ideas. As Scholars at Risk claim (SAR 2024), efforts to undermine academic freedom, whether in liberal or authoritarian contexts, must be taken seriously. To neglect this task is to contribute to the erosion of democracy worldwide.
As it happens, I was born in Ukraine and I am researching Ukrainian society because I think it deserves better social, economic, cultural and political conditions. However, the last thing I want is to build my academic career on the back of my passport or the pity of those who have only recently become aware of their «Western privilege». Every time I apply for funding or try to participate in an event, I ask myself: Am I being accepted because my research is relevant and valuable, or because I’m seen as a representative of a «vulnerable minority»?
In 2022, Ishchenko wrote, «Being recognized just for our ‘Ukrainianness’ means we are going to be marginalized again with the next geopolitical realignment» (Ishchenko 2022: 8). From the perspective of 2025, we can already see this happening. Obviously, the Israeli-Palestinian military conflict occupies much more space in the European agenda, including in academia. For instance, at the 2024 European Sociological Association conference, dozens of panels were dedicated to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, while only one focused on Ukraine. This demonstrates the dangers of relying on media agendas. That is why I join Ishchenko's call, «we should aim to be included on the basis of the contributions we can make to the universal problems facing humanity, in escalating political, economic and environmental crises» (Ishchenko 2022: 8). This means we should be able to speak freely and seriously about Ukraine, just as we would about other parts of the world.
Speaking of placing Ukraine in a more global context, I want to highlight that from the perspective of freedom and unfreedom, this war is not a unique one. Sadly, it is just one of many military conflicts that have occurred and will continue to occur. I wouldn’t be writing this piece if the war hadn’t directly impacted me, but I’m not the first and won’t be the last person to face such circumstances. Countless scholars and ordinary people around the world face the need to do their jobs and live their lives with the war going on in their countries.
German academia, at least among early-career researchers, includes many scholars from outside the European Union. When I joined this community, I was struck by dozens of stories from colleagues and friends who were born and spent their childhood years in the midst of the Balkan wars or from Middle Eastern academics going through the war multiple times during their lifetime. Not to mention the military actions in those distant regions of Asia and Africa, which have long ceased being discussed at academic conferences and in the mainstream media. Therefore, to treat the war in Ukraine as a unique or singular experience that demands our sole attention is not only morally hypocritical but also a profound failure of scholarly rigor. Thus, any conversation about the Russian invasion of Ukraine must be framed within a broader discourse about the unacceptability of war in general. This requires an understanding that science and academia should not serve the interests of ideology, ruling elites, or any conflicting parties. We need to remember the explanatory, critical and emancipatory potential of academic knowledge. Given the profound responsibility and influence of academia as a social institution, and acknowledging the impossibility of full value neutrality, what is needed is an academia committed to fostering peace and reconciliation. These pursuits should not contribute to the deepening of societal divisions, the production of social tensions, or the marginalization, and certainly not to the escalation of warfare. With this in mind, it is crucial to create spaces for dialogue—not only across national borders and academic disciplines but also across ideological divides, political stances, and value systems. This kind of open dialogue can only thrive in an environment free from ideological and political regulation of knowledge production, conditions under which academia would finally be able to speak about Ukraine.
[1] «to stand alongside the best soldier in the world as the best scientist in the world».
[2] Despite the publication of the official press release on dismissal of the lecturer, the person is still listed among the employees on the official website: https://histfilos.cdu.edu.ua/instytut/kafedry/kafedra-khimii-ta-nanomaterialoznavstva.html.
[3] The recording of the keynote lecture was livestreamed on the Facebook page of Lviv Media Forum (URL: https://www.facebook.com/LvivMediaforum/videos/1503560900504148) but is also currently inaccessible.
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